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GarethMauhewsteaches
philosopl,yal the Unioersityof
MassachustUs,
Amkerst.

Morris the Moose

B. Wiseman
ScholasticBook Services,1973.
orris meets a cow. "You're a
M
funny-looking moose,'' he says.
"I'm a cow," the cow protests; "I'm no
moose."
Morris persists. ''You have four legs
and a tail and things on your head,'' he
points out. "You're a moose," he concludes.
"But I say MOO," the cow objects.
Morris is unimpressed. "I can say
MOO, too," he boasts.
Still the cow is not stumped. "I give
milk to people," she says; "moose don't
do that."
Morris remains unimpressed. "So,"
he says, ''you're a moose who gives milk
to people."
The cow makes one last point. "My
mother is a cow," she says.
Morris is unfazed. "She must be a
moose,'' he rejoins coolly, ''because
you 're a moose."
Next Morris and the cow meet a deer,
who thinks they are all deer. You can
predict the dialogue that results. Finally
Morris, the cow and the deer walk over
to a horse, who greets them with
"Hello, you horses."
The plot of this little story could hardly be simpler; yet the questions it raises
are very profound. Suppose someone
called a moose a cow? or a horse a
moose? What would be wrong with
that? Would anything be wrong with
that?
Conceived in one way the problem
raised is the problem of the distinction

between essential and accidental properties. An essential property of Morris is a
property Morris can't lose without ceasing to exist, and also, perhaps, one that
Morris couldn't fail to have had. By
contrast, an accidental property is one
he can lose without ceasing to exist and
one he might never have had.
Is "having things on your head"
essential to being a moose and so, for
Morris, essential to existing? If so, then
certainly the horse is not a moose. Is
lacking antlers only accidental to being a
horse? If so, then perhaps Morris is an
antlered horse.
The problem of essential and accidental properties is a problem of metaphysics. Some of the issues it raises can
also be conceived as problems in taxonomy - how to classify things.
To discuss biological taxonomy one
needs to know something about evolution and something about variety in the
biological world, including, among
other things, what will mate with what!
One can, however, discuss principles of
taxonomy and many of the associated
philosophical issues with nonbiological
examples, too.
Over dinner one evening I put this
question to my family:
Whatquestionscanyou think of thatarelike
these,two:

Is a bicycle a tricycle without one
of the wheels?
Is a snake a lizard without legs?
Here are someof ti,, responses
I got:
Is a bicycle a motorbike without a
motor?
Is a mouse a bat without wings?
Is a chair a rocker without runners?
Is a skirt a dress without a top?

Whimsical questions of this sort can
serve to introduce a thoughtful discussion of the practical and philosophical
problems of taxonomy. So can a delightful thought experiment like Morris ti,,
Moose.•

ohn Perry begins a recent article with
this story:

J

I once followed a trail of sugar on a
supermarket floor, pushing my cart
down the aisle on one side of a tall
counter and back the aisle on the
other, seeking the shopper with the
torn sack to tell him he was making
a mess. With each trip around the
counter, the trail became thicker.
But I seemed unable to catch up.
Finally It dawned on me. I was the
shopper I was trying to catch. 1

Perry uses this story to raise interesting questions about the logic of
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belief. What exactly is the belief I come
to have when (supposing the story above
is about me) I come to believe that I am
the one who is making the mess? It is not
the belief that the only philosopher in
the supermarket that day is the one who
is making a mess, since I could have the
first belief and not realize that I am the
only philosopher in the supermarket.
Nor is it the belief that Gary Matthews
is the one who's making the mess, for I
might realize that I am the one who is
making the mess and not know (perhaps
because I am suffering from amnesia)
that I am Gary Matthews.
Perry could also have used this story
to introduce another philosophical puzzle. How can it be that, as in the story, I
am "seeking the shopper with the torn
sack to tell him he was making a mess"?
If that were right, I would be seeking
myself to tell myself that I am making a
mess, since I am the shopper with the
torn sack. But I am not seeking myself
and I have no wish to tell myself that I
am making a mess.

Perry's story may remind us of
Winnie-the-Pooh and his attempt to
catch a Woozle. In that story Piglet
comes upon Pooh, who is walking
around in a circle. There ensues this exchange:
"Hallo!" said Piglet, "what are you
doing?
"Hunting," said Pooh.
"Hunting what?"
"Tracking something,,, said Winniethe-Pooh very mysteriously.
"Tracking what?" said Piglet, coming closer.
"That's just what I ask myself. I ask
myself, What?''
"What do you think you '11answer?"
"I shall have to wait until I catch up
with it," said Winnie-the-Pooh ... " 2

Pooh's idea that he will have to wait to
see what he finds before he will know
what he is tracking is attractively plausible. Suppose he discovers that it is a new
and unheard-of creature called a "Woozle" that is making those tracks. Then it
is a Woozle he is tracking. Of course, as
things actually turn out, it is Pooh
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himself who is making those tracks (at
least the first ones; when Piglet joins him
Piglet naturally adds tracks of his own).
But how can it be that Pooh has to wait
until he "catches up with it" to say what
it is he is tracking? He never catchesup
with himself.
Is Pooh, in fact, tracking himself?
Surely even Pooh realizes that it is
stupidly futile to track oneself. Is he then
tracking the creature that made those
tracks? But he is the creature that made
those tracks.
"I have been Foolish and Deluded,"
says Pooh at the moment of enlighten' "and I am a Bear of No Brain at
ment;
All.'' Maybe so. But understanding
Pooh's foolishness, and being clear
about what enlightenment in this case
could consist in, taxes the wisdom of
even the wisest philosopher.
Footnotes
1. "The Problem ot'the Essential lndexical,"
Nous 13 (1979). p.3
2. A.A. Milne, Winnie-the-Pooh, London:
Methuen, 1926, p. 34.
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The selections that follow were taken from

a book by Floyd Dell, an American
novelist, playwright, and writer on a wide
variety of subjects. Starting out as a
reporter early In this century, he became
editor of the Literary Review about the
time of World War I. At the time these
selections were written, Dell was on the
staff of the Llbertltor. His first novel was
the autobiographical Moon-Calf. His later
works Include a number of articles on
child-training.

The Child

Floyd Dell
ducation, as popularly conceived,
a
Child, a Building, Text-Books, and a
Teacher. Obviously, one of them must
be to blame for its going wrong. Let us
see if it is the Child. We will put him on
the witness stand:
Q. Who are you?
A. I am a foreigner in a strange land.
Q. What!
A. Please, sir, that's what everybody
says. Sometimes they call me a little
angel; the poet Wordsworth says that I
come trailing clouds of glory from
Heaven which is my home. On the other
hand, I am often called a little devil; and
when you see the sort of things I do in
the comic supplements, you will perhaps
be inclined to accept that description. I
really don't know which is right, but
both opinions seem to agree that I am an
immigrant.
Q. Speak up so that the jury can hear.
Have you any friends in this country?

E includes as its chief ingredients

-Floyd Dell, Were You Ever a Child (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1919). pp. 13-21,
137-156.

A. No, sir - not exactly. But there
are two people, a woman and a man,
natives of this land, who for some reason
take an interest in me. It was they who
taught me to speak the language. They
also taught me many of the customs of
the country, which at first I could not
understand. For instance, my preoccupation with certain natural - (the
rest of the sentence stricken from the
record).
Q. You need not go into such matters. I fear you still have many things to
learn about the customs of the country.
One of them is not to allude to that side
of life in public.
A. Yes, sir; so those two people tell
me. I'm sure I don't see why. It seems
to me a very interesting and importantQ. That will do. Now as to those people who are looking after you: Are your
relations with them agreeabl~?
A. Nominally, yes. But II must say
that they have treated me in a very
peculiar way, which has aroused in me a
deep resentment. You see, at first they

treated me like a king - in fact, like a
Kaiser. I had only to wave my hand and
they came running to know what it was I
wanted. I uttered certain magic syllables
in my own language, and they prostrated themselves before me, offering
me gifts. When they brought the wrong
gifts, I doubled up my fists and twisted
my face, and gave vent to loud cries and they became still more abject, until
at last I was placated.
Q. That is what is called paternal
love. What then?
A. I naturally regarded them as my
slaves. But presently they rebelled. One
of them, of whom I had been particularly fond, commenced to make me drink
milk from a bottle instead of from Q. Yes, yes, we understand. And you
resented that?
A. I withdrew the light of my favour
from her for a long time. I expressed my
disappointment in her. I offered freely
to pardon her delinquincy if she would
acknowledge her fault and resume her
familiar duties. But perhaps I did not
succeed in conveying my meaning clear-
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ly, for at this time I had no command of
her language. At any rate, my efforts
were useless. And her reprehensible
conduct was only the first of a series of
what seemed to me indignities and insuits. I was no longer a king. I was compelled to obey my own slaves. In vain I
made the old magic gestures, uttered the
old talismanic commands - in vain
even my doubling up of fists and
twisting of face and loud outcries; the
power was gone from these things. Yet
not quite all the power - for my crying
was at least a sort of punishment for
them, and such I often inflicted upon
them.
Q. You were a naughty child.
A. So they told me. But I only felt aggrieved at my new helplessness, and
wished to recover somewhat of my old
sense of power over them. But as I
gradually acquired new powers I lost in
part my feeling of helplessness. I also
found that there were other beings like
myself, and we conducted magic ceremonies together in which we transformed ourselves and our surroundings
at will. These delightful enterprises were
continually being interrupted by those
other people, our parents, who insisted
on our learning ever more and more of
their own customs. They wished us to be
interested in their activities, and they
were pleased when we asked questions
about things we did not understand. Yet
there were some questions which they
would not answer, or which they rebuked us for asking, or to which they
returned replies that, after consultation
among ourselves, we decided were
fabulous. So we were compelled to form
our own theories about these things. We
asked, for instance Q..Please confine your answers to the
questions. That is another matter not
spoken of in public; though to be quite
frank with you, public taste seems to be
changing somewhat in this respect.
A. I am very glad to hear it. I would
like to know Q. Not now, not now. - You say you
have learned by this time many of the
customs of the country?
A. Oh, yes, sir! I can dress myself,
and wash my face (though perhaps not
in a manner quite above criticism),
count the change which the grocer gives
me, tell the time by a clock, and say

"Yes, ma'am," and "Thank you" and I am beginning to be adept in the
great national game of baseball.
Q. Have you decided what you would
do if you were permitted to take part in
our adult activities?
A. I would like to be a truck-driver.
Q. Why?
A. Because he can whip the big
horses.
Q. Do you know anything about
machinery?
A. No, sir; I knew a boy who had a
steam-engine, but he moved away before I got a chance to see how it worked.
Q. You spoke of truck-driving just
now. Do you know where the truckdriver is going with his load?
A. No, sir.
Q. Do you know where he came
from?
A. No, sir.
Q. Do you know what a factory is?
A. Yes, sir; Jim's father got three
fingers cut off in a factory.
Q. Do you know where the sun rises
and sets?
A. It rises in the East and sets in the
West.
Q. How does it get from the West
back to the East during the night?
A. It goes under the earth.
Q.. How?
A. It digs a tunnel!
Q. What does it dig the tunnel with?
A. With its claws.
Q. Who was George Washington?
A. He was the Father of his country,
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and he never told a lie.
Q. Would you like to be a soldier?
A. Yes.
Q. If we let you take part in the
government of our country, what ticket
would you vote?
A. The Republican ticket. My father
is a Republican.
Q. What would you do if you had ten
cents?
A. I'd go to see Charley Chaplin in
the moving-picture show.
Q. Thank you. You can step down.
A. Yes, sir. Where is my ten cents?
And now, gentlemen, you have heard
the witness. He has told the truth - and
nothing but the truth - and he would
have told the whole truth if I had not
been vigilant in defence of your modesty. He is, as he says, a foreigner, incompletely naturalized. In certain directions his development has proceeded
rapidly. He shows a patriotism and a
sense of political principles which are
quite as mature as most of ours. But in
other directions there is much to be
desired. He does not know what kind of
world it is he lives in, nor has he any
knowledge of how he could best take his
place, with the most satisfaction to himself and his fellow-men, in that world whether as farmer or engineer, poet or
policeman, or in the humbler but none
the less necessary capacities of dustman
or dramatic critic.
It would be idle for us to pretend that
we think it will be easy for him to learn
all this. But without this knowledge he is
going to be a nuisance - not without a
certain charm (indeed, I know several
individuals who have remained children
all their lives, and they are the most
delightful of companions for an idle
hour), but still, by reason of incapacity
and irresponsibility, an undesirable
burden upon the community: unable to
support himself, and simply not to be
trusted in the responsible relations of
marriage and parenthood. We simply
can't let him remain in his present state
of ignorance.
And yet, how is he ever going to be
taught? You have seen just about how
far private enterprise is likely to help
him. That man and woman of whom he
told us have other things to do besides
teach him. And if he is turned over to
special private institutions, we have no
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guarantee that they will not take advantage of his helplessness, keep him under
their control and rob him of freedom of
movement for a long term of years, set
him to learning a mass of fabulous or irrelevant information, instil in him a fictitious sense of its value by a system of
prizes and punishments, and fmally tum
him out into our world no better
prepared to take his proper part in it
than he was before; and thus, having
wasted his own time, he would have to
waste ours by compelling us to teach
him all over again.
In fact, the difficulty of dealing with
him appears so great that I am moved to
make the statesmanlike proposal never before, I believe, presented to the
public - of passing a law which will prevent this kind of undesirable immigration altogether.
Shall we abolish the Child?
The only other reasonable alternative
is for us to undertake this difficult and
delicate business of education ourselves
- assume as a public responsibility the
provision of a full opportunity for this
helpless, wistful, stubborn little barbarian to find out about the world and
about himself. Well, shall we do that?
Let us not allow any false sentimentality to affect our decision ....
The vote seems to be in favor of giving him his chance. Very well!

Curiosity
us, my friends, pass over this unLetfortunate
incident, and get on to the
next thing as quickly as possible. the
next thing on our program is Truth.
The one who best understands Truth is
undoubtedly the Philosopher. - Here
he is, and we shall commence without
delay. Will some one volunteer to conduct the examination? Thank you,
madam. Go right ahead.
The Lady: We wish to ask you a few
questions.
The Philosopher: Certainly, madam.
What about?
The Lady: About Truth.
The Philosopher: Dear, dear!
The Lady: Whom are you addressing?
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The Philosopher: I beg your pardon!
- It was only an exclamation of surprise. It has been so long since anybody
has talked to me about Truth. How
quaint and refreshing!
The Lady: Please do not be frivolous.
The Philosopher: I am sorry - but
really, it is amusing. Tell me, to which
school do you belong?
The Lady: To the Julia Richmond
High School, if you must know though I don't see what that has to do
with Truth.
The Philosopher: Oh! You mean you
are a school-teacher!
The Lady: Certainly. Doesn't that
suit you?
The Philosopher: It delights me. I
feared at first you might be a Hegelian,
or even a Platonist. Now that I find you
are a Pragmatist like myself The Lady: Pragmatist? Yes, I have
heard of Pragmatism. William James summer course in Philosophy. But why
do you think I am a Pragmatist?
The Philosopher: A school-teacher
must be a pragmatist, madam, or go
mad. If you really believed the human
brain to be an instrument capable of accurate thinking, your experiences with
your pupils and your principal, not to
speak of your boards of education,
would furnish you a spectacle of human
wickedness and folly too horrible to be
endured. But you realize that the poor
things were never intended to think.
The Lady: That's true; they're doing
the best they can, aren't they? They just
can't believe anything they don't want to
believe!
The Philosopher: That is to say, man
is not primarily a thinking animal - he
is a creature of emotion and action.
The Lady: Especially action. They
are always in such a hurry to get
something done that they really can't
stop to think about it! But I'm afraid all
this is really beside the point. What we
want to know is why the school fails so
miserably in its attempt to teach
children to think?
The Philosopher: Perhaps it is in too
much of a hurry. But you are sure you
really want children to learn to think?
The Lady: Of course we do!
The Philosopher: The greatest part of
life, you know, can be lived without
thought. We do not think about where
we put our feet as we walk along an ac-

customed road. We leave that to habit.
We do not think about how to eat, once
we have learned to do it in a mannerly
way. The accountant does not think
about how to add a column of figures he has his mind trained to the task. And
there is little that cannot be done by the
formation of proper habits, to the complete elimination of thought. The habits
will even take care of the regulation of
the emotions. For all practical purposes,
don't you agree with me that thinking
might be dispensed with?
The Lady: I hardly know whether to
take you seriously or not The Philosopher: Can you deny what
I say?
The Lady: But - but life isn't all
habit. We must think - in order to
make - decisions.
The Philosopher: It is not customary.
We let our wishes fight it out, and the
strongest has its way. But I once knew a
man who did think in orcler to make his
decisions. The result was that he always
made them too late. And what was
worse, the habit grew upon him. He got
to thinking about everything he wanted
to do, with the result that he couldn't do
anything. I told him that he'd have to
stop thinking - that it wasn't healthy.
Finally he went to a doctor, and sure
enough the doctor told him that it was a
well known disease - a neurosis. Its
distinguishing mark was that the patient
always saw two courses open to him
everywhere he turned - two alternatives, two different ways of doing
something, two women between whom
he must choose, two different theories of
life, and so on to distraction. The reason
for it, the doctor said, was that the patient's will, that is to say the functioning
of his emotional wish-apparatus, had
become deranged, and the burden of
decision was being put upon a part of
the mind incapable of bearing it - the
logical faculty. He cured my friend's
neurosis, and now he thinks no more
about the practical affairs of life than
you or I or anybody else. So you see
thinking
is abnormal
even
dangerous. Why do you want to teach
children to think?
The Lady: Well - it is rather taken
for granted that the object of education
is learning to think.
The Philosopher: But is that true? If it
is, why do you teach your children the
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multiplication table, or the rule that the
square of the hypotenuse of a right
triangle is equal to the sum of the
squares of the other two sides - unless
in order to save them the trouble of
thinking? By the way, what is the capital
of Tennessee, and when did Columbus
discover America?
The Lady: Nashville, 1492. Why?
The Philosopher: You didn't have to
stop to think, did you? Your memory
has been well trained. But if you will
forgive the comparison, so has my dog's
been well trained; when I say, 'Towser,
show the lady your tricks,' he goes
through an elaborate performance that
would gladden your heart, for he is an
apt pupil; but I don't for a moment imagine that I have taught him to think.
The Lady: Then you don't want
children taught the multiplication table?
The Philosopher: I? Most certainly I
do. And so far as I am concerned, I
would gladly see a great many other
short cuts in mathematics taught, so as
to save our weary human brains the
trouble of thinking about such things. I
am in fact one of the Honorary VicePresidents of the Society for the
Elimination of Useless Thinking.
The Lady: I am afraid you are indulging in a jest.
The Philosopher: I am afraid I am.
But if you knew Philosophers better you
would realize that it is a habit of ours to
jest about serious matters. It is one of
our short-cuts to wisdom. Read your
Plato and William James again. Delightful humorists, both of them, I
assure you. I fear you went to them too
soberly, and in too much of a hurry.
The Lady: Doubtless your jokes have
a historic sanctity, since you say so, but
I do not feel that they have advanced our
inquiry very much.
The Philosopher: I abhor myself and
repent in dust and ashes. What do you
want to know?
The Lady: I want to know what is the
use of thinking?
The Philosopher: Ah, my jest was not
in vain, if it provoked you to that. I
should call that question the evidence of
a real thought.
The Lady: Well, what is the answer?
The Philosopher: Oh, please don't
stop, now that you have made such a
good start! Think again, and answer
.your own question.

..._.,....
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The Lady: That they are impractical.
But inventors The Philosopher: Did you ever know
·'1lsian inventor?
The Lady: Yes ....
The Philosopher: Was he rich?
The Lady: He starved to death.
The Philosopher: Why?
The Lady: Because every one said
that his invention was very wonderful,
but not of the slightest use to anybody ...
Yes, it's true.
The Philosopher: That the results of
thinking do not provide the motive for
thinking?
The Lady: Yes.
The Philosopher: Then what is the
The Lady: Hm... .
motive
for thinking?
The Philosopher: Yes?
The
Lady:
Just - curiosity, I supThe Lady: I was thinking of Newton
pose!
and the apple. If it hadn't been for
The Philosopher:
Disinterested
Newton's ability to think, he would
curiosity?
never have formulated the law of
The Lady: Yes.
gravitation.
The Philosopher: Then in the inThe Philosopher: And what a pity
terests of scientific truth we should
that would have been - wouldn't it?
cultivate disinterested curiosity?
The Lady: You mean that it makes
The Lady: Doubtless.
very little practical difference to us?
The Philosopher: How would you go
The Philosopher: It would if the town
about doing so?
were being bombarded. The Newtonian
The Lady: I don't know.
calculations are considered useful by the
The Philosopher:
By hurriedly
artillery schools. But it is true that it was
thrusting upon the minds of the children
Newton and not an artillery officer who
in your charge so great a multitude of
made them.
interests as to leave them no time to
The Lady: You mean that the arwonder about anything?
tillery captain would have been too inThe Lady: That would hardly seem to
tent on practical matters?
be the way to do it. But The Philosopher: And in too much of
The Phil~sopher: When Newton looka hurry. Then there's the steam-engine.
ed at his famous apple, was there
Useful invention - the very soul of
anyone there who said, "Now, Newton,
hurry. Who invented it - some anxious
look at this apple. Look at this apple, I
postilion who thought horses were too
say! Consider the apple. First, it is
slow? Or somebody whose mind was so
round.
Second, it is red. Third, it is
empty of practical concerns that it could
sweet.
This
is the Truth about apples.
be intrigued by a tea-kettle? And by the
Now
let
me
see
if you have grasped what
way, it was Stephenson, wasn't it, who
I
have
told
you.
What are the three
applied the steam-principle to locomoleading
facts
about
apples? What! Don't
tion? I've a very poor memory, but I
you
remember?
Shame
on you! I fear I
think Watt's engine was just a toy. No
will
have
to
report
you
to the mayor!''
practical use whatever. Other people
did
anything
like
that
happen?
found out the practical uses for it.
The
Lady:
Newton
was
not a child.
Arkwright. Fulton, Hoe, et cetera.
The
Philosopher:
You
should have
The Lady: I see. The results of thinktalked
to
Newton's
family
about him.
ing may be put to use afterward, but the
That
is
just
what
they
said
he
was! I will
motive for thinking is not the desire to
admit that if you left children free to
produce such results. I wonder if that is
wonder about things instead of forcing
true?
the traditional aspects of those things
The Philosopher: What is the comupon their attention, they might not all
mon reproach against philosophers and
become great scientists. But are you a
scientists?
f·
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great archaeologist?
The Lady: No!
The Philosopher: Did you ever go on
a personally conducted tour of the ruins
of Rome, and have the things you were
to see and think pointed to you by a
guide?
The Lady: Yes, and I hated it!
The Philosopher: You are not a great
archaeologist and you never expect to be
one, and yet you thought you could get
more out of those ruins yourself than
with the assistance of that pesky guide.
You preferred to be free - to see or not
to see, to wonder and ponder and look
again or pass by. And don't you think
the children in your charge might enjoy
their trip a little more if they didn't have
to listen to the mechanically unctuous
clatter of a guide?
The Lady: If one could only be sure
they wouldn't just waste their time!
The Philosopher: Madam, are you
quite sure that you, as a teacher, are not
wasting your time?
The Lady: You make me wonder
whether that may not be possible. But
sheer idleness The Philosopher: Was Newton busy
when he lay down under that tree? Did
he have an appointment with the apple?
Did he say he would give it ten minutes,
and come again next day if it seemed
worth while? What is disinterested
curiosity, in plain English?
The Lady: Idle curiosity - I fear.
The Philosopher: I fear you are right.
Then you would say that the way to approach Truth, in school and out, is to
cultivate idle curiosity?
The Lady: I did not intend to say anything of the kind. But you compel me to
say it.
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The Philosopher: I compel you? Deny
it if you wish!
The Lady: I thought you were going
to answer my questions, and you have
been making me answer yours!
The Philosopher: That is also an ancient habit of our profession. But since
you have now arrived, of your own free
will, at an inescapable if uncomfortable
conclusion, you can now have no further
need for my services, and I bid you all
good day!

The Right
to be
Wrong
ne moment!

-

I take it, my

O friends, we are agreed in demand-

ing of the Philosopher that he condescend to some concrete and practical suggestions in regard to education. Briefly, please!
The Philosopher: ''You must draw
your own conclusions. Traditional
education is based on the assumption
that knowledge is a mass of information
which can be given to the child in little
dabs at regular intervals. We know,
however, that the education based on
this assumption is a failure. It kills
rather than stimulates curiosity; and
without curiosity, information is useless.
We are thus forced to realize that
knowledge does not reside outside the
child, but in the contact of the child with
the world through the medium of
curiosity. And thus the whole emphasis
of education is changed. We no longer
seek to educate the child - we only attempt to give him the opportunity to
educate himself. He alone has the formula of his own specific needs; none of
us are ~ise enough to arrange for him
the mysterious series of beautiful and
poignant contacts with reality by which
alone he can 'learn.' This means that he
must choose his own lessons. And if you
think that, left to choose, he will prefer no lessons at all, you are quite
mistaken. Let me remind you that
children are notoriously curious about
everything- everything except, as you
will very justly point out, the things peo-

pie want them to know. It then remains
for us to refrain from forcing any kind of
knowledge upon them,,and they will be
curious about everything. You may imagine that they will prefer only the less
complex kinds of knowledge; but do you
regard children's games as simple? They
are in fact exceedingly complex. And
they are all the more interesting because
they are complex. We ourselves with our
adult minds, penetrate cheerfully into
the complexities of baseball, or embroidery, or the stock-market, following
the lead of some natural curiosity; and if
our minds less often penetrate into the
complexities of music, or science, it is
because these things have associations
which bring them within the realm of
the dutiful. Evolutionary biology is far
more interesting than stamp-collecting;
but it is, unfortunately, made to seem
not so delightfully useless, and hence it
is shunned by adolescent boys and girls.
But postage;stamp collecting can be
made as much a bore as biology; it needs
only to be put into the schools as a formal course.
"Consider for a moment the boy
stamp-collector. His interest in his collection is in the nature of a passion.
Does it astonish you that passionateness
should be the fruit of idle curiosity?
Then you need to face the facts of human psychology. The boy's passion for
his collection of stamps is akin to the
passion of the scientist and the poet. Do
you desire of children that they should
have a similar passion for arithmetic, for
geography, for history? Then you must
leave them free to find out the interestingness of these things. There is no way
to passionate interest save through the
gate of curiosity; and curiosity is born of
idleness. But doubtless you have a quite
wrong notion of what idleness means.
Idleness is not doing nothing. Idleness is
beingfreeto do anything. To be forced to do
11othing is not idleness, it is the worst
cind of imprisonment. Being made to
stand in the comer with one's face to the
wall is not idleness - it is punishment.
But getting up on Saturday morning
with a wonderful day ahead in which
one may do what one likes - that is
idleness. And it leads straight into tremendous expenditures of energy. There
is a saying, 'The devil finds some mischief still for idle hands to do.' Yes, but
why should the devil have no competi-
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tion? And that, as I understand it, is the
function of education - to provide for
idle and happy children fascinating contacts with reality - through games,
tools, books, scientific instruments,
gardens, and older persons with passionate interests in science and art and handicraft.
"Such a place would in a few respects
resemble the schools we know; but the
spirit would be utterly different from the
spirit of traditional education. The apparatus for arousing the child's curiosity
would be infinitely greater than the
meagre appliances of our public schools;
but however great, the child would be the
centre of it all - not as the object of a
process, but as the possessor of the emotions by force of which all these outward
things become Education.
"But, you may ask, what has all this
to do with truth? Simply this. We have
been forcing children to memorize alleged facts. A fact so memorized cannot be
distinguished from a falsehood similarly
memorized. And so we may very well
say that we have failed to bring truth into education. For truth is reality brought
into vital contact with the mind. It
makes no difference whether we teach
children that the earth is round or flat, if
it means nothing to them either way.
For truth does not reside in something
outside the child's mind; reality
becomes truth only when it is made a
part of his living.
''But, you will protest - and you will
protest the more loudly the more you
know of children - that their processes
of thought are illogical, fantastic and
wayward. And you will ask, Do I mean
that we must respect the child's error in
order to cultivate in him a love of truth?
Yes, I do meanjust that! Do I mean that
we must respect the child's belief that
the earth is flat, you ask? More than
that, we must respect a thousand
obscure and pervasive childish notions,
such as the notion that a hair from a
horse's tail will tum into a pollywog if
left in the rainbarrel, or the notion that
the way to find a lost ball is to spit on the
back of the hand, repeat an incantation
couched in such words as 'Spit, Spit, tell
me where the ball is!' and then strike it
with the palm of the other hand. You
can doubtless supply a thousand instances of the kind of childhood thinking
to which I refer. But for simplicity's

sake, let us use the childish notion that
the earth is flat as a convenient symbol
for them all. and I say that if we do not
respect the error, we shall not have any
real success in convincing the child of
the truth. We shall easily persuade him
that the globe in the schoolroom is
round - that the picture of the earth in
the geography-book is round - but not
that the familiar earth upon which he
walks is anything but flat! At best, we
shall teach him a secondary, literary,
schoolroom conception to put beside his
workaday one. And, in the long run, we
shall place a scientific conception of
things in general beside his primitive
childish superstitions - but we shall
scarcely displace them; and when it
comes to a show-down in his adult life,
we shall find him acting in accordance
with childish superstitions rather than
with scientific knowledge. Most of us, as
adults, are full of such superstitions, and
we act accordingly, and live feebly and
fearfully; for we have never yielded to
the childish magical conception of the
world the respect that is due to it as a
worthy opponent of scientific truth we have assumed that we were persuaded of truth, while in reality truth has
never yet met error in fair fight in our
minds.
''If you wish to convince a friend of
something, do you not first seek to find
out what he really thinks about it, and
make him weigh your truth and his error in the same balance? But in dealing
with children, we fail to take account of
their opinions at all. We say, 'You must
believe this because it is so. ' If they do
believe it, they have only added one
more superstition to their collection.
Truths are not true because somebody
says so; nor even because everybody
says so; they are true only because they
fit in better with all the rest of life than
what we call errors - because they bear
the test of living - because they work
out. And this way of discovering truth is
within the capacity of the youngest
school-child. If you can get him to state
candidly and without shame his
doubtless erroneous ideas about the
world, and give him leave to prove their
correctness to you, you will have set in
motion a process which is worthy to be
called education; for it will constitute a
genuine matching of theory with theory
in his mind, a real training in inductive
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logic, and what conclusions he reaches
will be truly his. When he sees in a
familiar sunset, as he will see with a
newly fascinated eye, the edge of the
earth swinging up past the sun - then
astronomy will be real to him, and full of
meaning - and not a collection of dull
facts that must be remembered against
examination-day.
''This means that we must treat
children as our equals. Education must
embody a democratic relationship between adults and children. Children
must be granted freedom of opinion and freedom of opinion means nothing
except the freedom to believe a wrong
opinion until you are persuaded of a
right one. They, moreover, must be the
judges of what constitutes persuasion.
You have asked me for practical and
concrete suggestions in regard to education. I will make this one before I go:
when I find an astronomy class in the
first grade engaged in earnest debate as
to whether the earth is round or flat, I
will know that our school system has
begun to be concerned for the first time
with the inculcation of a love of truth.
For, like Milton, I can not praise a
fugitive and cloistered virtue, unexercised and unbreathed, that never sallies out
and sees her adversary, but slinks out of
the race, where that immortal garland is
to be run for, not without dust and
heat.- I thank you for your attention!"
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t ten-thirty in the morning of the
first Tuesday in March of this year,
1979, Ms. Huang Hui-ya, Mr. Su Shihhsiung and I walked into the fifth grade
classroom of Hua-hsing Elementary
School, a private school in Taipei, carrying several dozen copies of the
Chinese translation of Harry Stottlemeier's
Discovery.Thus began our ten-week experiment in teaching philosophy to elementary school children. That philosophy could enter an elementary school
classroom in this manner, or should I
say, that philosophy could enter an
elementary school classroom at all, was
a first for Taiwan and, I believe, for all
of Asia. The three of us were nervous
and excited.
In terms of student and teacher
response, the results of our experiment
so far available have encouraged us
very much. But the responses of the
society, the philosophical community
and the government have been more
mixed. Our pilot project was organized
in September, 1978 without financial or
administrative support. Ms. Huang,
Mr. Su and I met once a week for four
hours to study Harry Stottlemeier's
Discovery,the Chinese translation, the
teacher's manual and the rationale and
practical application of the project. We
also persuaded Fu Jen University and
Hua-hsing Elementary and Middle
Schools to support our experiment. By
the beginning of 1979, we finally obtained the support of Professor Lo Kuang,
President of Fu Jen University, in addition to that of the authorities of Huahsing Elementary and Middle Schools.
A young entrepreneur, Mr. Lin Huangnan, and a pre-school educator, Diana
Wang, gave us financial support. Our
experiment therefore was able to commence with the opening of school in the
second semester.
The text for the experiment was the
Chinese translation of Harry Stottlemeier's
Discovery,which I had completed in the
spring of 1976. Lin Hai-yin, a wellknown woman author, was the first to
look over the translation. After advising
me on the language of the translation,
she still expressed doubts that the book
could be read and understood by
elementary school children in Taiwan,
not to mention their liking it or not.
Therefore the translation was delayed
somewhat in publication. By early 1977,

A

one of the two philosophical journals in
Taiwan, E-hu yueh-k 'an (Goose Lake
Monthly) began serialization of the
translation which was completed in
September of that year. The response of
the philosophical community in Taiwan
was very cool and dubious while it was
being published. This was, of course, a
natural response, because the majority
of professional philosophers in Taiwan
continue to believe in the traditional
Chinese definition of philosophy: "a
means of understanding the great
changes of ancient and modern times
and of investigating the relationship of
man to his universe.'' They see it as a
discipline of the highest wisdom. Not
only would children be unable to
understand it, but even intelligent adults
would have difficulty grasping it. Most
educators and people concerned about
education - for example, school administrators and parents of students are devotees of science. They believe as
a matter of principle that philosophy is
out of date. On the other hand, the readership of E-hu consisted of many
students in teacher-education colleges
and universities, and teachers in elementary and middle schools. They were
very interested in this "story" for and
about children. This novel's goal was to
develop the child's ability to think.
Many readers wrote to the journal requesting help in using the story as a
classroom text. For example, two
teachers in Tai-tung Teacher Training
College asked permission to use the
story as experimental material in language teaching, although we have yet to
receive the results of their experiment.
Educational thinking in Taiwan has
been greatly influenced by John Dewey,
but the whole educational system, administrative structure and course design
and content are a part of the state corporatistic system. Under this kind of
socio-political system, the individual is
not viewed as the basic unit. Traditionally, in other words, the position of
the individual is always preceded by the
family and profit-making organizations.
Therefore, putting into practice an
educational approach which aims at
developing the individual's potential has
been very limited in Taiwan. However
in recent years, because of rapid changes
in the economic, cultural and social
structure, the position of the individual
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has been reconsidered. Traditional
teaching materials, methods and educational ideas are already inadequate.
Education in Taiwan requires reform in
every facet. This fact is recognized by
the society in general, as well as by people directly involved in education. The
government continues to acknowledge
this fact and is working hard to implement reform. For example, guidance
classes have recently been added to the
curriculum in elementary and middle
schools. However, taken as a whole, this
action has been rather slow. Most importantly, there has been a failure to
recognize the basic problem, namely
that education in Taiwan lacks a
philosophical dimension. It is true that
many teachers have noted this problem,
and have carried out extensive study
and practical reform. For example, Professor Chia Fu-ming of National
Taiwan University has worked on.
creativity research, Professor Huang
Wu-hsing of the Academica Sinica has
developed a program of reform and experiment in math education, and Professor Arnold Sprenger of Fu Jen
University has been at work on foreign
language teaching. Professor Sprenger's
reform and research has been the most
extensive. His critique of Taiwan education is similar to Matthew Lipman's
critique of American education: the
education
lacks a dimension
of
philosophical thinking. At present, Professor Sprenger and Professor Albert
Chao of Cheng-chih University are both
interested in philosophy for children.
We hope that with their cooperation and
support the "Center for Development of
Philosophy for Children in Taiwan''
can be established in the fall of 1979.
Our experiment is divided into three
phases. The first phase was completed in
May of 1979. The aim of the first phase
was to test the response of students, the
society, teachers and · educational administrators to Harry Stottlemeier'sDiscovery.Therefore, in addition to the experiment at Hua-hsing Elementary
School (25 students, average age 11
years, in the fifth grade) and Hua-hsing
Middle School (40 students, average age
13 ½, in the seventh grade), I also used
the text in my philosophy of education
course (4-5 students, average age 21, in
their junior year of college). In that
course I used my Chinese translation of
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the text as case material. I also welcomed my students to attend my experimental class and discussion after that class.
The administrations
of Fu Jen
·University, Hua-hsing Elementary and
Middle Schools supported our experiment from beginning to end, but the
Ministry of Education interfered with
our experiment, causing us to halt the
experiment after only four weeks in the
middle school and ten weeks in the
elementary school. Their interference
was not due to the text or teaching
method, but to a bureaucratic procedural error. As a matter of fact, after
much discussion with the persons who
were in charge, they became very interested in our experiment, and they
allowed us to proceed in the fall.
Because the experiment ended early,
we were unable to get statistical results.
But from observation of the class we
know that the student response was very
encouraging. In general, the students in
the fifth grade, seventh grade and the
university all enjoyed the material and
teaching method. Of course in the
beginning, most of the students weren't
used to them, but they quickly adapted
- the lower the grade, the quicker. But
their liking the material and method was
not enough: we also saw them growing,
a growth which was rare with traditional
methods and materials. The following
examples show how the classes grew:
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called Li Lan-chih murmur, "That's silly.'' I asked everyone to be quiet and
asked J-.im to explain his comment. He
was shy, so I asked him to close his eyes
and l~sten to me read the poem again
and imagine it. He closed his eyes and
listened to me read the poem again and
imngine it. He closed his eyes for a while
and said, "It's all pitch-black." I asked
him to do it again. The answer was still
"pitch-black," but this time he added,
"You know why I said it was silly?
Because you have to use your eyes to
see. How can you see anything with
your eyes closed?" I said, "Do you
believe that all the descriptions your
friends gave were true?" He replied, "I
think they're playing a dumb game. It's
silly.'' Another student said, ''You
mean we're lying?" Li said, "Yes, if
you really want to know.'' The other
answered back, "I don't know about the
others, but I did see what I just said.
How do you know I was lying anyway?"
Li said, "Because I know you have to
use your eyes to see. Also, when I closed
my eyes, I didn't see anything. So I
know you' re not telling the truth.'' A
third student broke in, "But you're not
us. How do you know we're lying? All
you're talking about is yourself."
(2) In the seventh grade class, after
doing the experiment for two weeks, we
had a chance to discuss the mind-body
problem. Some students said we use the

'' ... their liking the material and method
was not enough: we also saw them
growing, a growth which was rare with
traditional methods and materials.''
( 1) In the fifth grade classroom, after
three weeks experience with this course,
we were doing exercises ahout imagination. I wrote a short children's poem on
the blackboard about umbrellas in the
rain. I asked the students to read it out
loud along with me and then asked them
to close their eyes and just listen to me
and imagine it. Then I asked them what
they saw. Many students had some interesting descriptions of the scenes they
saw. They kept coming up with their
own descripitions. The classroom was
very lively. Suddenly I heard .a student

mind to think. Others said we use the
head to think. Because 'mind' and
'heart'
in Chinese are the same
chatracter, we had a lively debate about
that for a while and decided it had to do
with the mind, not the heart. One little
girl said, "I think we ought to give
reasons instead of just yelling at each
other.'' I asked the class to be quiet so
she could repeat what she just said. The
discussion went as follows:
StudentA-1

think we use the head to
think; I mean, we use the brain
to think. Because, for example,

during an exam I work very
hard and I often get a head•
ache. So I think we use the
head to think.
Student B-You mean the brain.
Student C-1 think we use the mind to think
because when I can't decide
something, I say 'I can't make
up my mind.' And when I can't
think of something, I say, 'I feel
bad In my mind.' I don't say 'I
feel bad In my brain.'
Student D-We are talking about thinking,
not feeling.

We then proceeded to discuss feeling
and thinking. After that, one student
said, ''Anyway, I think we use our brain
to think. Because if a bullet hit my head
and went into my brain, I could never
think again." One little girl said, "That
doesn't prove anything. If a bullet hit
my heart, I couldn't think anymore,
either. That doesn't prove I use my
heart to think. That only proves when
you're dying, you can't think any
more."
(3) The problem about rules came up
early in every class. The first day in the
fifth grade class we did the exercise
about turning "all" sentences around.
The rule of this is that if ''all'' sentences
are true and then turned around, they
become false. One student came up with
'' All chicken eggs are things laid by a
hen." He added, "That's true, isn't it?
So tum it around: All the things laid by
hens are chicken eggs. That's true too,
so the rule doesn't work." My assistant
said, "That's an exception." A couple
of weeks later, we had another chance to
discuss rules. One student said, "Rules
should not have exceptions.'' Another
said, "Rules always have exceptions.
For example, two weeks ago when we
did the exercise on ''all'' sentences, we
had a rule and we had an exception."
But the student who claimed that rules
shouldn't have exceptions said, "We
had another rule for that kind of
sentence. (I had corrected my assistant
after she said that, and had given
another rule for that kind of sentence.)
For example, traffic rules say you have
to stop for a red light. Nobody can run a
red light." A girl said, "How about a
firetruck and an ambulance? They don't
have to stop for a red light. They're the
exception." The student replied, ~'Ha,
Ha! I just talked to my father last night.
He's a traffic cop. He said that's part of
the rule. It's not an exception."
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(4) (After Class). In the fifth grade
one day during a break period, one student said to another, ''The Chinese
Communists aren't rational." The
other said, "You're crazy. They're also
people. And we know people are rational animals, so they are, too. They're
rational, too." The first student said,
'' But the newspapers say that all the
time!' Another student who was listening to them said, ''But you know what
newspapers say is often wrong. Just look
at the ads." The first replied, "But you
say oftm,not always.''

•••

The second phase of the experiment
will begin this fall. The aim of this is to
try the material and method in a normal
class of 45-50 or more students in
elementary schools, with elementary
school teachers who lack training in
philosophy. Their only training will be
that received from us. We want to know
if"it is possible to use the philosophy for
children method in a bigger classroom,
how much philosophical training the
teachers need, and how we are going to
meet this need. We know that Professor
Lipman's experi~ents in the States
were successful. ·But most of those
classes had approximately 25 students.
Would it be possible to have children
master the dialogical and thinking.skills
involved in the philosophy for children
program in a class of 50? Wouldn't the
teacher face many discipline problems?
This summer at the Poconos training ~
camp, I brought up this problem with
Professor Ann Margaret Sharp. She
shook her head and smiled. ''I don't
know. Maybe there is a solution."
The Center for the Development of
Philosophy for Children in Taiwan is
also going to serialize the translation of
Lisa in E-hu Monthlyfor subsequent use
in the classroom. If this second phase
can show that philosophy for children
can work in larger classrooms, we will
move to phase three, which is a teachertraining program. We will ask the
government for assistance to expand the
training program and try to make
philosophy a regular part of the curriculum. We are not going to use
''philosophy'' as the name of the experimental course. We will use "thinking and value."
I

I

v
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Gregory Bateson, well-known In anthropology, and associated In recent years
with the Culture Learning Institute of the
East-West Center In the University of
Hawaii, has had a long time Interest In
problems of linguistics and communication. This brief "Metalogue" as he called
It, was written In 1948. The book from
which It was taken contains a number of
other, similarly delightful dialogues.
Readers with small children may discover,
through this dialogue, how enjoyable It
can be to script-read together. ~ch roleplaying provides, at the same time, a fine
model for Joint parent-ch/Id reasonings.

Why Do Things
Get in a Muddle?

Gregory Bateson

Daughter:

Daddy, why do things
get in a muddle?
Father:
What do you mean?
Things? Muddle?
D: Well, people spend a lot of time tidying things, but they never seem to
spend time muddling them. Things
just seem to get in a muddle by
themselves. And then people have to
tidy them up again.
F: But do your things get in a muddle if
you don't touch them?
D: No - not if nobody touches them.
But if you touch them - or if anybody touches them - they get in a
muddle and it's a worse muddle if it
isn't me.
From Steps to an Ecology of Mind by
Gregory Bateson. Copyrlgllt © 1972 by
Harper and Row Publishers, Inc. Reprinted
by permission of T.V. Crowell, Publishers.

F: Yes - that's why I try to keep you
from touching the things on my
desk. Because my things get in a
worse muddle if they are touched by
somebody who isn't me.
D: But do people always muddle other
people's things? Why do they, Daddy?
F: Now, wait a minute. It's not so simple. First of all, what do you mean
by a muddle?
D: I mean - so I can't find things, and
so it looksall muddled up. The way it
is when nothing is straight F: Well, but are you sure you mean the
same thing by muddle that anybody
else would mean?
D: But, Daddy, I'm sure I do because I'm not a very tidy person
and if I say things are in a muddle,

F:

D:

F:

D:
F:
D:

then I'm sure everybody else would
agree with me.
All right - but do you think you
mean the same thing by ''tidy'' that
other people would? If your mummy
makes your things tidy, do you know
where to find them?
Hmmm ... sometimes- because, you
see, I know where she puts things
when she tidies up Yes, I try to keep her away from
tidying my desk, too. I'm sure that
she and I don't mean the same thing
by "tidy. "
Daddy, do you and I mean the same
thing by "tidy"?
I doubt it, my dear - I doubt it.
But, Daddy, isn't that a funny thing
- that everybody means the same
when they say "muddled" but
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F:

D:

F:

D:
F:
D:
F:
D:

F:
D:
F:

D:
F:

D:
F:

D:

F:
D:

everybody means something different by "tidy." But "tidy" is the
opposite of "muddled," isn't it?
Now we begin to get into more difficult questions. Let's start again
from the beginning. You said "Why
do thingsalwaysget in a muddle?''Now
we have made a step or two - and
let's change the question to "Why
do things get in a state which Cathy
calls 'not tidy'?" Do you see why I
want to make that change?
... Yes, I think so - because ifl have
a special meaning for "tidy" then
some of other people's "tidies" will
look like muddles to me - even if we
do agree about most of what we call
muddles That's right. Now - let's look at
what you call tidy. When your paint
box is put in a tidy place, where is it?
Here on the end of this shelf.
Okay - now if it were anywhere
else?
No, that would not be tidy.
What about the other end of the
shelf, here? Like this?
No, that's not where it belongs, and
anyhow it would have to be straight,
not all crooked the way you put it.
Oh - in the right place and straight.
Yes.
Well, that means that there are only
very few places which are "tidy" for
your paint box Only oneplace No - very few places, because if I
move it a little bit, like this, it is still
tidy.
All right - but very, very few
places.
All right, very, very few places. Now
what about the teddy bear and your
doll, and the Wizard of Oz and your
sweater, and your shoes? It's the
same for all the things, isn't it, that
each thing has only a very, very few
places which are "tidy" for that
thing?
Yes, Daddy - but the Wizard of Oz
could be anywhere on that shelf.
And Daddy - do you know what? I
hate, hate it when my books get all
mixed up with your books and
Mummy's books.
Yes, I know. (Pause).
Daddy, you didn't finish. Why do
my things get the way I say isn't
tidy?

F: But I ha"Jefinished - it's just
because there are more ways which
you call "untidy" than there are
ways which you call ''tidy.''
D: But that isn't a reason why F: But, yes, it is. And it is the real and
only and very important reason.
D: Oh, Daddy! Stop it.
F: No, I'm not fooling. That is the
reason, and all of scienceis hookedup
with thatreason.Let's take another example. If I put some sand in the bottom of this cup and put some sugar
on the top of it, and now stir it with a
teaspoon, the sand and the sugar will
get mixed up, won't they?
D: Yes, but, Daddy, is it fair to shift
over to talking about "mixed up"
when we started with "muddled
up"?
F: Hmmm ... I wonder ... but I think so
- Yes - because let's say we can
find somebody who thinks it is more
tidy to have all the sand underneath
all the sugar. And if you like 1 'll say I
want it that way D: Hmmm ....
F: All right - take another example.
Sometimes in the movies you will see
a lot of letters of the alphabet all scattered over the screen, all higgledy~
piggledy and some even upside
down. And then something shakes
the table so that the letters start to
move, and then as the shaking goes
on, the letters all come together to
spell the title of the film.
D: Yes, I've seen that - they spelled
DONALD.
F: It doesn't matter what they spelled.
The point is that you saw something
being shaken and stirred up and instead of getting more mixed up than
before, the letters came together into
an order, all right way Up, and spelled a word they made up
something which a lot of people
would agree is sense.
D: Yes, Daddy, but you know ...
F: No, I don't know; what I am trying
to say is that in the real world things
never happen that way. It's only in
the movies.
D: But, Daddy ...
F: I tell you it's only in the movies that
you can shake things and they seem
to take on more order and sense than
they had before ...
D: But, Daddy ...
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F: Wait till I've finished this time ...
And they make it look like that in the
movies by doi,ng the whole thing
backwards. They put the letters all in
order to spell DONALD and then
they start the camera and then they
start shaking the table.
D: Oh, Daddy - I knew that and I did
so want to tell you that - and then
when they run the film, they run it
backwards so that it looks as though
things had happened forwards. But
really the shaking happened backwards. And they have to photograph
it upside down... Why do they, Daddy?
F: Oh God.
D: Why do they have to fix the camera
upside down, Daddy?
F: No, I won't answer that question
now because we're in the middle of
the question about muddles.
D: Oh - all right, but don't forget,
Daddy, you've got to answer that
question about the camera another
day. Don't forget! You won't forget,
will you, Daddy? Because I may not
remember. Please, Daddy.
F: Okay - but another day. Now,
where were we? Yes, about things
never happening backwards. And I
was trying to tell you why it is a
reason for things to happen in a certain way if we can show that that way
has more ways of happening than
some other way.
D: Daddy don't begin talking
nonsense.
F: I'm not talking nonsense. Let's start
again. There's only one way of spelling DONALD - agreed?
D: Yes.
F: All right. And there are millions and
millions and millions of ways of scattering six letters on the table.
Agreed?
D: Yes. I suppose so. Can some of these
be upside down?
F: Yes - just in the sort of higgledypiggledy muddle they were in in the
film. But there could be millions and
millions and millions of muddles like
that, couldn't there? And only one
DONALD?
D: All right - yes. But, Daddy, the
same letters might spell OLD DAN.
F: Never mind. The movie people
don't want them to spell OLD DAN.
They only want DONALD.
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Why do they?
Damn the movie people.
But you mentioned them first.
Yes- but that was to try to tell
you why things happen that way
in which there are most ways of
their happening. And now it's
your bedtime.
D: But Daddy, you never did finish
telling me why things happen
that way - the way that has
most ways.
F: All right. But don't start any more
hares running one is quite
enough. Anyhow, I am tired of
DONALD, let's take another example. Let's take tossing pennies.
D: Daddy? Are you still talking about
the same question we started with?
"Why do things get in a muddle"?
F: Yes.
D: Then, Daddy, is what you are trying
to say true about pennies, and about
DONALD, and about sugar and
sand, and about my paint box, and
about pennies?
F: Yes - that's right.
D: Oh - I was just wondering, that's
all.
F: Now, let's see ifl can get it said this
time. Let's go back to the sand and
the sugar, and let's suppose that
somebody says that having the sand
at the bottom is "tidy"
or
"orderly."
D: Daddy, does somebody have to say
something like that before you can
go on to talk about how things are
mixed up when you stir them?
F: Yes - that'sjust the point. They say
what they hope will happen and then
I tell them it won't happen because
there are so many other things that
might happen. And I know that it is
more likely that one of the many
things will happen and not one of the
few.
D: Daddy,
you're
just
an old
bookmaker, backing all the other
horses against the one horse that I
want to bet on.
F: That's right, my dear. I get them to
bet on what they call the "tidy" way
- I know that there are infinitely
many muddled ways - so things
will always go toward muddle and
mixedness.

D: But why didn't you say that at the
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beginning, Daddy? I could have
understood that all right.
F: Yes, I suppose so. Anyhow, it's now
bedtime.
D: Daddy, why do grownups have
wars, instead of just fighting the way
children do?
F: No - bedtime. Be off with you.
We'll talk about wars another time.
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Thinking and Self-Teaching
GilbertRyle
The theme of thinking was one to which
Ryle returned frequently In his later years,
but his concern with the relationship between thinking and education Is nowhere
better shown than In the present essay.
Ryle had demonstrated that Interest In
education In a number of previous articles, as well as In A Concept of Mind.
But here he goes decisively beyond his
earlier approaches to the problem.
"Thinking and Self-Teaching" contains
a number of tantallzlng and provocative
theses, some of which are as challengable
as they are challenging. Of the latter, the
following may be cited as particularly
deserving of further consideration:
Ryle argues that courses of Instruction
In thinking cannot be given, because all
Instruction must be Instruction In some
specific subject. "There are no residua/
problems of purely generic sorts." What Is
curious here Is why Ryle, a phllosopher so
profoundly Interested In the activity of
philosophizing, should fall at this point to
consider the posslb/1/ty that philosophy
might be a specific dlsclpllne which deals
with "problems of purely generic sorts."
While practice In doing philosophy may
not Involve certain specific thinking ski/ls
required for "arithmetic, French grammar,
Hittite archaeology, verse, composition,
etc.," yet does It not sharpen certain
general reasoning capacities which those

studies do require? And If this Is so, then
what reason would there be for not offerIng philosophy In the schools as a
separatecourse of Instruction?
"The notion of thinking Is the notion of
thinking for oneself," Ryle contends. This
Is Indeed a drastic step. But It was
foreshadowed by Ry/e's having suggested
a little earlier that "the natural processes
of digesting and perspiring" are not
taught In the schools for quite different
reasons than those which have caused us
to exclude phllosophy. For, once again,
could It not be contended that thinking Is
as natural a process as perspiring or
digesting? ("How would we go about stopping a child from thinking?" one of our
colleagues recently Inquired. "Well, 11 he
suggested after some reflection, "we
could kl/I him ...'? And If thinking Is a
natural process, then surely not all thinkIng Is of that estimable variety which we
call "thinking for oneself."
Quibbles such as these aside, the Ryle
essay exhibits Impressively the Intellectual search techniques which, with equal
Impressiveness, It analyses. No doubt
Ryle would be the first to assert that his
whole approach Is "on appro 11 (on approval - tentat/'18, conditional, experimental, subject to revision.) But then,
so Is thinking.

e are not often enough or deeply
W enough
puzzled by the notions of

thinking,pondering,reflecting,etc.; namely
of what Rodin's Le Pmseurlooks as if he
is absorbed in. I am not concerned with
the dreary notion of thinking= believing,
which anyhow has been sadly overworked, usually in the wrong harness.
What is Le Pmseurdoing, seemingly in
his Cartesian insides? Or, to sound
scientific, what are the mental processes
like, which are going on in that Cartesian camera ohscura? We are, since we
have to be, absolutely familiar with the
thing, that is, with the cogitative doing or
the process of pondering itself, for it has
been, at least off and on, since our infancy part of the pulse of our own existence.
CogitamusergoSumus. Yet we cannot, apparently, answer the simplest concrete
questions about it. Why can't we? How
could it, of all things, be hidden from
us?
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Notoriously some of our ponderings,
but not all, terminate in the solutions of
our problems; we had been fogged, but
at last we came out into the clear. But if
sometimes successful, why not always?
If belatedly, why not promptly? If with
difficulty, why not easily? Why indeed
does it ever work? How possibly can it
work? Notoriously, too, some people are
better thinkers than others; and we
ourselves may be better at thinking out
the solutions of anagrams than at thinking out the solutions of chess-problems.
Whence these disparities? What sort of
an unevenly distributed craft or skill is
this? Why did I acquire my own personal ration of it, and not yours instead?
Why does not Mozart, indeed why cannot he, suddenly start thinking Immanuel Kant's thoughts, and vice versa? Why do not schools provide classes
in thinking, as they do in mundane
crafts like drawing, Latin, carpentry,
and rifle-shooting? Ridiculous suggestion? Certainly, but then what makes it
ridiculous to suggest that thinking is one
teachable skill among others? Surely not
anything like what would make it
ridiculous to suggest that the natural
processes of digesting and perspiring are
extra skills that could and should be
taught in schools or universities.
Let us pause a bit with this little riddle. Why would it be absurd for a school
or university to offer a separate course of
instruction in thinking? There are two
reasons, one important but dull; the
other important and interesting.
1) The housewife who has separate
shelves, hooks, containers, and bags
marked for flour, sugar, onions,
mustard, et~., does not also have
separate receptacles marked 'food,'
'edibles,' 'comestibles,' or 'victuals,' for
the simple reason that she has already
provided receptacles for all the species of
these genera. Well, similarly, the school
or college curriculum which promises
courses in arithmetic, French grammar,
Hittite archeology, verse composition,
etc., is already promising instruction in
speciesof thinking. A student who has
been taught some arithmetic or some
French grammar has already learned in
some measure to think out arithmetical
problems or problems in composing or
construing French prose. All learning is
learning to tackle problems of this, that,
or the other specific varieties. There are

no residual problems of purely generic
sorts.
2) If the sch~ol or college promised to
teach Originality, Invention, Wit, Pertinence, Initiative, Enterprise, Spontaneity, Talent, and Genius, we should
feel sceptical. The lessons, exercises,
tests, competitions, etc., might indeed
and should equip and encourage the
students to attempt moves of their own,
to compose sonnets or plays of their
own~ to design experiments of their
own, and so on. But these adventures,
diminutive, modest, or striking, must be
spontaneous, else they will not be
essays, inventions or compositions of the
student's own. For it to be his failure or
his success, his good shot or his poor
shot, it has not to be something contributed by the teacher. If it is the student's own sonnet, then it is not the
teacher's sonnet, for all that the student
would never have composed it without
the teacher's suggestions, criticisms,
drills, etc. Now the notion of thinking is
the notion of thinking for oneself, of
making one's own try, however perfunctory and diffident, at some problem,
task, or difficulty. His instructors will
have equipped and perhaps encouraged
him to make his shot; but the shot is his
and not his instructors'. My initiatives,
small or great, unsuccessful or successful, cannot, in logic bewhat my teachers
or my textbook did for me.
To keep our restricted deck-space
fairly clear for the present I am going to
leave on one side such off-center things
as the thinking of the man who is glumly
brooding over an insult; the thinking of
a man who is, for pleasure, running
over in his head a tune or a poem that he
has long since got by heart; and the
thinking of the man who is just
daydreaming. We shall be concentrating
on the man who is trying to think
something out, whose thinking, unlike
that of those others, can be successful or
unsuccessful, bright or dull, industrious
or idle, expert or amateurish, laborious
or easy.
I am going to approach my objective
by a knight's move, one which I think
may surprise you a bit. For I am going
to begin by reminding you of some
truisms about teaching and therefore,
necessarily, also about learning. Why?
Because, to put it infantilely, my hope is
to defme thinking indirectly in terms of
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teaching. I am going to argue that Le
Pmseur is not, of course, engaged in
privily teaching himself whatever it is
that he wants to know - he cannot
teach it because he does not know it but that he is experimentally plying
himself with might-be cues, clues,
reminders, snubs, exercises, spurs, etc.,
of types that are sometimes or often
employed unexperimentally by teachers
who are teaching what they do know.
But we have some ground to cover at
first. Anyhow from the outset it seems
plausible to say that Le Pmseur could
always have been saved from his present
labours of pondering by getting someone else - the Angel Gabriel, say - to
teach him the answer. So there is this
connection between thinking and teaching. Thinking is trying to make up for a
gap in one's education.
I am going to assume, what has been
argued elsewhere, that, with a reservation or two, all teaching is teaching-to
and all learning is learning-to. Even the
memorizing of rhymes, dates, tunes,
etc., qualifies as learning just in so far as
it leads to more than mechanical echoing. The child has not begun to learn to
spell who can only recite, parrot-like,
the dictated spellings 'C-A-T' CAT,
'B-O-B' BOB. Only when he has begun
to try to think up the right spellings or at
least possible spellings for words to
which he has not been alphabetically introduced, has he begun to learn to spell.
To have learned to solve anagrams is to
have learned to solve new anagrams, not
to play back the solutions of anagrams
already solved by the instructor. I am
going to lean heavily later on these notions of teaching-to and being taught-to.
But I warn you that here I am flying in
the faces of most N. C. 0 .' s and of too
many educationalists, who never doubt
that teaching consists in dictating things
for subsequent verbatim regurgitation.
Naturally, though horrifyingly, some of
them think well of the potential
teaching-utility of subliminal gramophones. Tape recorders play back, but
they do not learn. People who do learn
do not.just play back. Even to have
learned something by heart is to have
become able to do more than to parrot
the piece. It is to be able to detect and
correct erroneous recitations, to recite
the piece and not some other piece when
required to do so; to be able to deliver it
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fast or slowly, or start it or stop it at required places and so on.
Partly for ulterior reasons, but partly
to dispel your attachment, if it exists, to
this superstition that learners are mere
players-back, I now remind you of a few
of the teaching-methods, devices, and
dodges by which ordinarily good or very
good teachers do actually teach things to
us.
1. They tell us lots of things, of
course,
but with variations
in
vocabulary, context, emphasis, etc.,
sometimes viva voct and sometimes in
writing; with or without new illustrations, expansions, elucidations, corollaries, etc. They do not repeat
themselves like cuckoo-docks, or not
much and for obviously good
pedagogic reasons.
2. They test us, hardly at all for our
ability to parrot their actual words or to
ape their actual movements, but for our
ability and readiness to exploit the lesson
itself by applying it, re-phrasing it, accelerating it, drawing conclusions from
it, marrying it with earlier lessons, etc.,
etc.,; in short, by doing things on our
own with it.
3. They teach us cricket-strokes,
perspective-drawing and French pronunciation, not much by describing
anythi,ng, but by showing us how the
thing should and also how it should not
be done, and then getting us to move or
utter, and not to move or utter in similar
ways.
4. They tease us, like Socrates, with
questions, and then with further questions about our answers, and it is we
who do the answering.
5. They make us practice and repractice our five-fmger exercises and
our conversions of syllogisms, with
variations in tempo, syllogism-topic,
etc.
6. They lead us by the hand along a
half-familiar track and leave us in the
lurch to get ourselves over its final
stretch.
7. They cite or exhibit blatantly erroneous or inadequate solutions, for us,
in recoil, to improve on them and/or to
pinpoint what was wrong in them; and
they caricature our own sillier attempts
in order to get us to ridicule them for
ourselves.
8. They draw our attention to partly
analogous, but easier problems, and
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leave us to use these analogies as
banisters.
9. They break up complex problems
into simpler ingredients and leave us to
solve these unalarming ingredient problems, and then to reunite their solutions.
10. When we have hit on the (or a)
solution, they set us subsidiary or
parallel problems in order to get us to
consolidate and limber up our mastery
of the original solution.
All of these and scores or hundreds of
similar didactic moves, expedients, tactics, and dodges are intended by our
teachers to get ourselves to do and to say
things of our own (as well as very often
to undo and unsay things); for example,
not just to parrot the recited spellings of
a few given words but to attempt the
spellings of hitherto unattem pted words
on the lines of those dictated specimens,
and to withdraw or improve our first attempts.

sometimes, though not always, for him
too things will have sorted themselves
out rather well after the weekend.
Dividends often do arrive rather a long
time after the investments are made.
Thus the progress made or not made or
not visibly made by Lt Pensturresembles
in several ways the progress made or not
made or not visibly made by the teacherpupil pair. Our question, "Why does
thinking not always work, or not always
quickly?" is in parallel with the same
less puzzling questions about teaching.
None the less, whatever their other
similarities, Lt Penseuris not himself, so
to speak, a Siamese teacher-pupil pair.
For the teacher knows the things that he
tries to teach to his pupil; Lt Penseuris
pondering just because he does not
know what he wants to know. My thinking is not the instruction of pupil Gilbert
by teacher Ryle. Gilbert Ryle, in his
thinking, is trying to find out what no
one, e~emal or internal, is there to

'' ... the fact that a pupil has shown no sign of
progress yesterday or today
is quite compatible
with his coming on fast next week or next
term. Seeds often do germinate slowly.''
Naturally and notoriously the pupil
often fails to respond, or to respond
well. He is, perhaps, scared, bored,
sulky, stupid, restless, unambitious, or
hostile, and the teacher is, perhaps,
tired, shy, in a hurry, cross, pessimistic,
and off his preferred subject. Conversely, the fact that the pupil has shown no
sign of progress yesterday or today is
quite compatible with his coming on fast
next week or next term. Seeds often do
germinate slowly. Muscles always arcr
slow to harden up. Did you succeed in
swimming in your first lesson? If not,
had you learned nothing at all in that
first lesson? I mention these truisms
because Lt Penseur's own ponderings
(which is what we are all along concerned with) can be in just the same plight.
He too flogs away and makes no headway today; tomorrow he too seems to be
in a worse muddle than ever; yet

teach him. To ponder is to try to make
up for un-instruction. What I am trying
to think about for myself is indeed
something that the Angel Gabriel conceivably might have known and taught
me instead, but it is something that no
one in fact did teach me. That is why I
have to think. I swim because I am not a
passenger on someone else's ferry-boat.
I think, as I swim, for myself. No one
else could do this for me.
Now I make a start on the second leg
of my knight's move, namely to bring
out a connection, not an identity, between being taught and thinking.
I have already declared that the pupil
does not qualify as having even begun to
learn to spell or solve anagrams so long
as all he is ready and able to do is to play
back the dictated spellings of a few
selected specimen words or the dictated
solutions of a few specimen anagrams.
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Only when he begins to suggest possible
spellings of his own for new words, or
possible solutions of his own new
anagrams and to reject some such suggestions, does he qualify. Ditto for learning rock-climbing,
chess, and
philosophy. His blank repetition of what
the teacher said or exhibited is not yet
what the teacher was trying to get him to
do. But notice now: when the pupil does
make his own applications and misapplications in new tasks of what his
teacher has told or exhibited, then he
certainly qualifies as thinking. For he is
now applying off his own bat a recently
learned operation-pattern to a new object or situation; he is today innovating
according to a formerly set precedent;
he is today chancing his arm subject to
some previously inculcated safeguards.
His frequent mistakes and failures are
now his doing; his occasional successes
are now his doing. It is he and not his
teacher who now merits praise or blame
for getting things right or wrong.
Here we are confronted by a seeming
paradox. For we seem to be saying that
in spelling or misspelling a new word, or
in solving a new anagram, or in composing his own limerick or sonnet, the pupil
is doing something on his own, which,
therefore, he had not been taught. If it is
his own sonnet or limerick, or his own
anagram-solution, or his own spelling or
misspelling of the word "rabbit," then
that could not have been something that
his teacher had taught him. Conversely,
if that sonnet, that anagram-solution, or
that spelling of "rabbit" had been
taught by the teacher, then it was not the
pupil who thought it up, but the teacher
- or his teacher. However, the appearance of a paradox vanishes when we
remember that having learned, say, to
spell does not reduce to having become
the passive recipient and subsequent
automatic regurgitator of some dictated
letter-sequences. It is to have become
able and ready to attempt new applications of acquired patterns, methods,
precedents, examples, etc. The young
rock-climber is first learning to climb
when he ceases to tread wherehis teacher
trod and begins to try to tread over new
slopes in the ways in which his teacher
treads.

• • •

I am not changing the subject when I
now invite you to consider (A) what

Socrates and the slave boy do in Plato's
dialogue, the Meno; and (B) what they
do in my sequel to that dialogue.
(A) Socrates asks the geometrically innocent slave boy how he would construct
a square precisely double the area of a
given square. In the end the boy comes
out with the right answer, namely that
the square on the diagonal of the
original square is of twice the area of
that square itself. But Socrates elicits
this correct Pythagorean answer without
telling the boy any geometrical truths,
however simple. He merely asks him
questions, and then by further questions
gets him to abandon his first tern pting
answers. We need, for our purpose, to
note a few points about this piece of interrogative pedagogics or tutorial crossquestioning.
( 1) Though this point is not emphasized, the boy is already equipped with a
modicum of elementary arithmetic and,
of course, with colloquial Attic Greek.
(2) Unaided
Socratic
crossquestioning could not possibly have
made similar progress or any progress at
all towards the solution of factual questions about, say, the casualties at
Marathon or the date of the next eclipse
of the sun. Nor could Le Penseur'sunaided ponderings.
(3) Though Socrates draws his famous
moral that the boy must in a previous
existence have got to know that
Pythagorean theorem for it to be able to
be elicited from him now by mere questioning, we, surely like all the
disputatious young men in the Academy
who were any good, flatly reject this
moral on the obvious ground that if,
without still ulterior memory-flogging,
the boy had been able in that supposed
previous existence to discover the
Pythagorean theorem by thinking, then
there is nothing to prevent the boy from
discovering it by thinking today. How
was it originally discovered? Some solutions to some problems are attainable by
pondering, all the more so when the
ponderer is cunningly and persistently
barked at by a Socratic sheepdog who
already knows the way.
(4) Although the boy has given to each
question, one by one, first his illthought-out answers and finally the
wanted well-thought-out answer, still he
does not claim to have thought out the
whole proof for himself. After a fumble
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or two he had picked up each of the
several links one by one, but it was
Socrates who had controlled the chain.
Already
knowing
the proof of
Pythagoras' Theorem, Socrates, unlike
the boy and also unlike Le Penseur,knew
all along what questions were the right
questions to ask and what was the right,
or at least a suitable, sequence in which
to ask them.
(B) Now listen to my own fabrication,
namely the story of Socrates' secondinterview with the boy. Socrates begins
again by putting a theorem-sized question to the boy; and he starts off as
before by posing appropriate questions
and demolishing the boy's initial
ans}Versto them. But now - oh horror!
- Socrates realizes that he himself has
either quite forgotten or, even worse,
never had mastered the second half of
this second theorem's proof. He has no
idea how to go on; and, as Euclid's
Elementshas not been published yet, he
cannot even surreptitiously consult that
will-be standard work. What is to be
done? He frankly confesses the crisis to
the boy, who, to start with, sees no difficulty. He says, "But yesterday,
Socrates, you did not tell me any of the
answers; you only asked me questions,
to which I myself after some false starts
gave you the right answers. Why can't
we do that again? You don't need to
know their answers in order to ask questions.''
Socrates explains that randomly
thrown out questions cannot be expected to assemble themselves into a
proof-generating sequence, but he concedes that with huge luck they might do
so; and he concedes that he, Socrates,
has had enough teaching experience in
general, anal has enough geometrical
knowledge in particular to avoid asking
lunatic, irrelevant, or infantile questions
and to see through grossly silly answers.
He cannot, as yesterday, pilot the slave
boy, since today he does not know the
channels. But he can make and coordinate some conjectural pilot-like suggestions and experiments, and he can
now and then spot where rocks and
shoals might be before getting to them.
He is at home on salt water in general,
though not on this particular stretch of it.
So Socrates starts off, pessimistically
enough, trying out a question that occurs to him and then another and
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another; and by lunchtime all the progress they have made is the negative
discovery that most of these particular
questions had better not be asked again;
though one or two short questionsequences had felt a bit promising. And
that, very likely, is all the progress that
they do make. But it could be that on the
next day Socrates and the boy are getting an idea of some of the deeps and
shallows, some of the headlands and
islands. Even if steering directly towards
their unseen goal is still impossible,
steering away from some specific
troubles is becoming fairly easy.
Perhaps eventually Socrates' initially
chartless quasi-piloting fetches them
nearly or even exactly where they want
to be. Explorers always do have to start
off chartless; yet, as we know, some of
them sometimes with luck, flair, patience, and an already trained eye for
country, end up with a bit of what had
been no-man's-land
now properly
charted.
Now for my moral. This joint plight
of the slave boy and my Socrates who on
this occasion had not done his
geometrical homework is precisely the
plight that Pythagoras himself had been
in during the hours or weeks when he
was still trying to discover a proof of his
own dear Pythagoras' Theorem. For
hours or weeks Pythagoras had been his
own slave boy being plied by his own
unprepared Socratic self with hesitantly
mooted candidate-questions
nearly,
though not quite, randomly hit on, and
tentatively posed in nearly, but not
quite, random sequences. By thinking
he eventually solved his problem
without once during the entire course of
his ponderings being yet equipped to
teach himself or anyone else its solution.
He had not, and no one had, done his
homework. It was not yet there to do, as
it has been there ever since.
Unlike the guide who leads his docile
companions along paths that already exist and are already familiar to him,
though not to them, the pioneering
pathfinder, Pythagoras say, has no
tracks to follow; and any particular sequence of paces that he tentatively takes
through the jungle may soon have to be
marked by him as leading only into
swamps or thickets. All the same, it may
be, though it need not be, that in a day's
time or a year's time he will have made a
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former geometry tutor. The expert
track along which he can now guide
moves that you make in climbing the
docile companions safely and easily
cliff-face may be imitated by a mere
right through the jungle. How does he
mimic; but the patterns of them may
achieve this? Not by following tracks,
also be applied experimentally by the
since there are none to follow. Not by
young climber who is trying out ways of
sitting down and wringing his hands.
scrambling upwards on such cliff-faces.
But by walking over ground where
He is deliberately trying to climb cliffs
tracks certainly do not exist, but where,
after the ways in which you climb them.
with luck, assiduity, and judgment,
He is not aping you but learning to do
tracks might and so perhaps will exist.
things of sorts that you have long since
All his walkings are experimental walklearned to do. He is following your exings on hypothetical tracks or candidateamples, not trying to simulate your motracks or could-be tracks, or tracks on
tions. His success, if he does succeed, is
appro; and it is by so walking that, in
a bit of scaling, not a bit of representing.
the end, while of course he fmds lots and
Naturally my Penseurknows what it is
lots of impasses, he also finds (if he does
like to be taught things that he does not
find) a viable track.
Pythagoras or, in general, Le Penseur know by teachers who do; and he knows
what it is or would be like himself to be
is also in just this same unencouraging
the teacher of some things that he knows
position. Tracks are found by the
to others who do not. So now he experipioneer (if they are found), only by
mentally applies to himself, just in case
quasi-following could-be tracks, that is,
they may tum out to be effective, operaby his experimentally trying out on aptions of types that are often or somepro one bit of ground after another to
times employed effectively by live
see if they could henceforth be unanxteachers upon live pupils. He chalks
iously trodden by docile travelers who
upon the back of an envelope a diagram,
are not exploring.
which he does not know to be even an
There is my moral. Let me stiffen it
approximation to the right one, in the
with two cautionary remarks:
rather faint hope that it may get him to
(1) To repeat: Pythagoras in trying to
see something that he needs to see, in
think out the proof of his theorem is not
the
way in which the right diagram on
teaching himself this proof, since he has
the
classroom
blackboard often but not
not yet found it. Nor is my Socrates
always does get the students to see what
teaching the boy the thing that he has
they need to see. Or he suspiciously conomitted to prepare himself with.
cocts for his still unfledged argument a
(2) Pythagoras, my Socrates or, to
candidate-premise just to see whether it
generalize, Le Penseur,is tentatively, exwill work, or can be modified into workperimentally, suspiciously, and quite
ing, and a premise in his argument. It is
likely despondently trying out on himnot yet a premise. It is a premise on apself expedients, routines, procedures,
pro. He is not basing anything on it; he
exercises, curbs, and dodges of types
is only As-If basing something on it. He
which teachers do employ, not always
is not just theatrically staging the moves
successfully, when they want to teach
of an arguer; and he is not just playing
things that they know to pupils who do
at arguing; he is working, working exnot. He is trying them out on himself to
perimentally with a merely could-be arsee if they will be effective, which very
gument-step. This is what an hypothesis
often they will not be. They are not
is, a could-be premise on appro.
already established leads to his goal, but
We began with some vexatious teasers
only could-be leads or candidate-clues or
about thinking, like "if it is an art, craft,
potential cues, as the As-If tutorial quesor skill, how do we acquire it, and why
tions unconfidently put to the slave boy
do schools not give special instruction in
by my geometrically
unprepared
it? Why does it not always work? How
Socrates.
does it ever work?" Now we can see,
To say that Le Penseuris experimentaljust one rung lower down on the
ly subjecting himself to on appro tutorial
sophistication-ladder, that the same
questions, clues, deterrents, exercises,
questions, though still vexatious, are not
etc., is not to say merely that he is being
quite as vexatious when asked about
histrionic. He need not be, though he
teaching. Is teaching one art, craft, or
may be, aping his old headmaster or his
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skill among others? Could universities
teach it? What would they be teaching
you in just teaching you to teach
(period)?
No, teaching, like thinking, is after all
not just· one art or skill among others,
any more than cooking is one souffie
among others. Yet it remains true,
though I think unimportantly true, that
there do exist instructional dodges, expedients, etc., varying with different
pupils and with different kinds of
lessons, without which a good golfer
may be a poor golf coach; or without
which a new Comprehensive School
teacher of French may cope less effectively with her unruly charges than does
her colleague whose French is much
weaker. I suppose it is such crafts that
Colleges of Education do teach. For
"education" is not itself the name of
one teachable craft among others.
'' Learning to teach ... •' is an unfinished
phrase, because "teaching ... " is unfinished.
My concluding point is this. Plato
said that in thinking the soul is conversing with herself; or maybe "debating"
would be nearer the Greek.J .B. Watson
said that thinking is sub-saying;plenty of
philosophers' and psychologists declare
that all thinking is conducted in symbols, or in words and sentences, or in
pictures or in diagrams or in formulae,
etc. The metaphor of words or sentences
being the vehicles of thought has still a
vogue, and the idea that thought, like
American golfers, is in need of vehicles
seems to be quite generally swallowed.
But what sorts of generalizations about
thinking are these? Have amateur or
professional introspections revealed this
general dependence of thinking upon
wording? But if that is all, might not
Trobrianders think well enough without
such vehicles? After all, we Europeans
do eat with knives, forks, and spoons.
Yet Trobrianders, maybe, eat without
gastronomic vehicles. Or are these
generalizations about thinking supposed
to be conceptual necessities? Yet if so,
just how does the description of someone
as, after breakfast, pensant,carry with it
the information that during that time he
was saying things to himself in his head
or picturing things to himself in his
mind's eye, etc.?
We can now cope with this bother in
two moves:

( 1) For person A to teach person B
something, A must either say things to
B, which B hears, takes in, etc.' or A
writes things or draws things, which B
reads, copies, takes in, etc.' or A
demonstrates or shows things to B,
which B sees or hears or tastes or smells,
etc.' or A audibly jeers at B or visibly
beckons or frowns to him, or noticeably
pauses meaningfully; and so on and so
on. A cannot teach B without communicating with him. Lessons have to
be got across, often across a classroom.
Lessons are a very special sub-species of
interpersonal communications, namely
of educatively intended communications. Of course,the tuition of B by A requires vehicles.
(2) So, in so far as Le Penseuris occupied in experimentally or on appro
trying out on himself, as on his inner
slave boy, things of the sorts that constitute the vehicles by which live teacher
A conveys his lessons to live pupil B, he
is necessarily operating, overtly or just
in imagination, with and on such things
as words, sentences, diagrams, signals,
gestures, etc. He is not, as we have seen,
just mimicking real teachers; but he,
just as much as the actor who is mimicking Socrates or Mr. Chips, has in logic
to do the sorts of things that are done by
Socrates or Mr. Chips in teaching their
pupils. We might parody Plato and say
that in thinking the soul is not just conversing or debating with herself; she is
experimentally
conveying could-be
lessons to herself. Sometimes she is
quasi-lecturing to herself; old-style German thinkers seemed to be doing this all
the time.
Cartesians love to depict the activity
of the thinker as consisting of supremely
immaterial ingredients, such impalpable
ingredients as ideas, intuitions, insights,
etc. In fact, the crude stuff of thinking
has to consist of the perfectly ordinary
vehicles of everyday interpersonal
lesson-communication,
though here
employed not in its normal didactic task,
but in the parasitic or higher-order task
of query-tuition. It does not matter
whether Le Penseuractually draws his
diagrams on paper, or visualizes them as
so drawn; and it does not matter
whether in his quasi-posing his on appro
Socratic questions to himself he speaks
these aloud, mutters them under his
breath, or only As-If mutters them on
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his mind's tongu_e.What matters is what
he is trying to do, and is sometimes succeeding in doing, by thus overtly or
covertly plying himself with these
candidate-lesson-vehicles, for example,
that he is trying to find, and is
sometimes finding, the proofs of
theorems. As A's well-charted teaching
can occasionally dispel B's ignorance, so
my uncharted thinking can occasionally
dispel my own ignorance. Thinking is
trying to better one's instructions; it is
trying out promissory tracks which will
exist, if they ever do exist, only after one
has stumbled exploringly over ground
where they are not.

''Thinking is
trying to better
one's instructions;
it is trying out
promissory
tracks which
will exist,
if they everdo
exist, only after
one has
stumbled
exploringly
overground
where they
are not. ''
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A Ganie of Catch
Richard Wilbur

onk and Glennie were playing
catch on the side lawn of the
M
firehouse when Sebo caught sight of
them. They were good at it, for seventhgraders, as anyone could see right away.
Monk, wearing a catcher's mitt, would
lean easily sidewise and back, with one
leg lifted and his throwing hand almost
down to the grass, and then lob the
white ball straight up into the sunlight.
Glennie would shield his eyes with his
left hand and, just as the ball fell past
him, snag it with a little dart of his
glove. Then he would bum the ball
straight toward Monie, and it would
Reprinted by permission;
© 1953 The New Yorker Magazine,Inc.

spank into the round mitt and sit, like a
still-life apple on a plate, until Monie
flipped it over into his right hand and,
with a negligent flick of his hanging
arm, gave Glennie a fast grounder.
They were going on and on like that,
in a kind of slow, mannered, luxurious
dance in the sun, their faces perfectly
blanlt and entranced, when Glennie
noticed Sebo dawdling along the other
side of the street and called hello to him.
Sebo crossed over and stood at the front
edge of the lawn, near an apple tree,
watching.

"Got your glove?" asked Glennie
after a time. Sebo obviously hadn't.
"You could give me some easy

grounders," said Sebo. "But don't bum
'em."
"All right," Glennie said. He moved
off a little, so the three of them formed a
triangle, and they passed the ball around
for about five minutes, Monie tossing
easy grounders to Sebo, Sebo throwing
to Glennie, and Glennie burning them
in to Monk. After a while, Monk began
to throw them back to Glennie once or
twice before he let Sebo have his
grounder, and finally Monk gave Sebo a
fast, bumpy grounder that hopped over
his shoulder and went into the brake on
the other side of the street.
"Not so hard," called Sebo as he ran
across to get it.

Thinking, The Journal of Philosophy for Children, Volume 1, Number 3 & 4 Combined

"You should've had it," Monk
shouted.
It took Sebo a little while to find the
ball among the ferns and dead leaves,
and when he saw it, he grabbed it up
and threw it toward Glennie. It struck
the trunk of the apple tree, bounced
back at an angle, and rolled steadily and
stupidly onto the cement apron in front
of the firehouse, where one of the trucks
was parked. Scho ran hard and stopped
it just before it rolled under the truck,
and this time he carried it back to his
former position on the lawn and threw it
carefully to Glennie.
"I got an idea," said Glennie. "Why
don't Monk and I catch for five minutes
more, and then you can borrow one of
our gloves?"
"That's all right with me," said
Monk. He socked his fist into his mitt,
and Glennie burned one in.
''All right,'' Sebo said, and went over
and sat under the tree. There in the
shade he watched them resume their
skillful play. They threw lazily fast or
lazily slow - high, low, or wide - and
always handsomely, their expressions
serene, changeless, and forgetful. When
Monk missed a low backhand catch, he
walked indolently after the ball and,
hardly even looking, flung it sidearm for
an imaginary put-out. After a good
while of this, Sebo said, "Isn't it five
minutes yet?''
''One minute to go,'' said Monk with
a fraction of a grin.
Scho stood up and watched the ball
slap back and forth for several minutes
more, and then he turned and pulled
himself up into the crotch of the tree.
"Where are you going?" Monk asked.
"Just up the tree," Sebo said.
"I guess he doesn't want to catch, "
said Monk.
Scho went up and up through the fat
light-gray branches until they grew
slender and bright and gave under him.
He found a place where several supple
branches were knit to make a dangerous
chair, and sat there with his head coming out of the leaves into the sunlight.
He could see the two other boys down
below, the ball going back and forth between them as if they were bowling on
the grass, and Glennie's crew-cut head
looking like a sea urchin.
"I found a wonderful seat up here,"

Scho said loudly. "If I don't fall out."
Monk and Glennie didn't look up or
comment, and so he began jouncing
gently in his chair of branches and singing, "Yo-ho, heave ho" in an exaggerated way.
'' Do you know what, Monk?'' he announced in a few moments. "I can
make you two guys do anything I want.
Catch the ball, Monk! Now you catch it,
Glennie.''
''I was going to catch it anyway,''
Monk suddenly said. "You're not making anybody do anything when they're
already going to do it anyway.''
"I make you say what you just said,"
Sebo replied joyfully.
"No, you didn't," said Monk, still
throwing and catching but now less
serenely absorbed in the game.
''That's what I wanted you to say,''
Scho said.
The ball bounded off the rim of
Monk's mitt and plowed into a gladiolus
bed beside the firehouse, and Monk ran
to get it while Sebo jounced in his
treetop and sang, "I wanted you to miss
that. Anything you do is what I wanted
you to do."
"Let's quit for a minute," Glennie
suggested.
"We might as well, until the peanut
gallery shuts up," Monk said.
They went over and sat cross-legged
in the shade of the tree. Scho looked
down between his legs and saw them on
the dim, spotty ground, saying nothing
to one another. Glennie soon began
abstractedly spinning his glove between
his palms; Monk pulled his nose and
stared out across the lawn.
"I want you to mess around with
your nose, Monk," said Scho, giggling.
Monk withdrew his hand from his face.
"Do that with your glove, Glennie,"
Scho persisted. "Monk, I want you to
pull up hunks of grass and chew on it."
Glennie looked up and saw a selfdelighted, intense face staring down at
him through the leaves. '' Stop being a
dope and come down and we '11catch for
a few minutes,'' he said.
Scho hesitated, and then said, in a
tentatively mocking voice, ''That's what
I wanted you to say.''
"All right, then, nuts to you," said
Glennie.
"Why don't you keep quiet and stop
bothering people?" Monk asked.
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"I made you say that," Sebo replied,
softly.
"Shut up," Monk said.
"I made you say that, and I want you
to be standing there looking sore. And I
want you to climb up the tree. I'm making you do it!"
Monk was scrambling up through the
branches, awkward in his haste, and getting snagged on twigs. His face was
furious and foolish, and he kept telling
Scho to shut up, shut up, shut up, while
the other's exuberant and panicky voice
poured down upon his head.
"Now you shut up or you'll be
sorry,'' Monk said, breathing hard as he
reached up and threatened to shake the
cradle of slight branches in which Scho
was sitting.
'' I want-'' Sebo screamed as he fell.
Two lower branches broke his rustling,
crackling fall, but he landed on his back
with a deep thud, and lay still, with a
strangled look on his face and his eyes
clenched. Glennie knelt down and asked
breathlessly, "Are you O.K., Sebo? Are
you O.K.?," while Monk swung down
through the leaves crying that honestly
he hadn't even touched him, the crazy
guy just let go. Scho doubled up and
turned over on his right side, and now
both the other boys knelt beside him,
pawing at his shoulder and begging to
know how he was.
Then Sebo rolled away from them
and sat partly up, still struggling to get
his wind but forcing a species of smile
onto his face.
"I'm sorry, Sebo," Monk said. "I
didn't mean to make you fall."
Sebo' s voice came out weak and
gravelly, in gasps. ''I meant - you to
do it. You - had to. You can't do anything - unless I want - you to."
Glennie and Monk looked helplessly
at him as he sat there, breathing a bit
more easily and smiling fixedly, with
tears in his eyes. Then they picked up
their gloves and the ball, walked over to
the street, and went slowly away down
the sidewalk, Monk punching his fist into the mitt, Glennie juggling the ball
between glove and hand.
From under the apple tree, Sebo, still
bent over a little for lack of breath,
croaked after them in triumph and
misery, '' I want you to do whatever
you 're going to do for the whole rest of
your life! ' '
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By Ray W. Karras
Lexington Public Schools
Lexington, Mass.

Final Evaluation of the Pilot Prograni
in Philosophical Reasoning
in Lexington Elementary Schools
1978-79

In the spring of 1978 Lexington elementary

was successful in helping elementary

schools completed a one-half year pilot

school children learn how to think better.

program In philosophlcal reasoning
among fifth and sixth grade students. The

Yet we must admit that this is an informed estimate, not a hard conclusion.

evaluation of that program recommended

Differences between good and poor think-

that a full-year pilot program be con-

ing may be too delicate to be absolutely

ducted and evaluated in 1978-1979.This

measured in filled-in blanks and rendered

Fina/ Evaluation follows through on that

in statistical significances. Learning how

recommendation.
The findings are encouraging. They

to discuss effectively, to respect others'
opinions and to modify one's own opin-

seem to bear out the promise of the

ions through argumentation and evidence

Pre/Im/nary Evaluation and to give force to

- all these were central features of PRP

the recommendation in that Evaluation

classes. Many tests used in this Final

"that a specific place for philosophical

Evaluation are necessarily attempts to

reasoning eventually be provided in the

quantify what is essentially unquantifi-

curriculum for all elementary students."

able; we want to know the quality of the

The Philosophical Reasoning Program
(PRP)seems to have sign/I lcantly improv-

kids' thinking, and we want to know how
well we have been able to help them think

ed students' abilities In the use of formal

better. Even as we evaluate through

and Informal logic, and It has been

numbers, we hope that our students will

favorably received by most students

one day find more sensitive ways than we

tested. While our results show the need

have yet devised to tell us what Is on their

for Improvement In certain areas, we

minds. Perhaps that Is what philosophical

hypothesize that the final pilot program

reasoning Is all about.
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''Our finding
is that
PRP worked.''

I. Conditions of the Program
and its Testing
This evaluation draws on several
sources. We pre- and post-tested approximately 150 students in six fifth and
sixth grade classes in three elementary
schools using materials of the Institute
for the Advancement of Philosophy for
Children. Each class spent about two
hours per week in language arts and/or
social studies throughout the year on the
program centered around the children's
novel, Harry Stottlemeier'sDiscoveryby
Matthew Lipman. We compared these
students with pre- and post-tests with
approximately 150 "control group"
students in classrooms where philosophical reasoning was not offered.
At the beginning of the fmal pilot year
(Fall, 1978), eight classrooms were involved in the program. One of these
classes dropped out of the program in
mid-year when its· teacher decided that
the thing just wasn't working. Another
class discontinued the program due to
the conflicting sabbatical leave requirements of its teacher. The work of
neither of these classes is reflected in this
Final Evaluation.
Our study is also informed and supported by parallel studies. Renee Sack, a
PRP teacher in the preliminary pilot,
devoted a good deal of her sabbatical
leave time at Harvardduring 1978-79 to
furtherstudy and evaluationof the program. The conclusion of her Harvard
paper,An Analysisof tJuHany Stottlemeier
PhilosophicalReasoningProgram- as lmpkmented in tJu Lexington Elementary
&hoou,is available from the IAPC. Ms.
Sack'sgeneral view is that "the course
in philosophicalreasoning for children
has as its basis a worthygoal and has the
potential to help childrenbecome more
critical and creative thinkers.'' Also,

during the past year, the Institute for the
Advancement
of Philosophy
for
Children released the results of its
1976-78 experimental research in
philosophy for children. Basing its
research on public school children in
Newark and Pompton Lakes, New
Jersey, the Institute found highly significant improvement in reading, mathematics, reasoning and academic readiness
among experimental group students.
These Resultsare also available from the
IAPC. While the Lexington PRP program was under way, a similar experiment was conducted in six elementary
schools in the Hilo, Hawaii, area of the
Big Island. The Evaluationof the Hawaii
Philosophy
for ChildrenProjectis reproduced elsewhere in this J oumal; its fmdings
generally conform with Lexington's.
Throughout the pilot year in Lexington, PRP teachers received extensive
concurrent instruction in seventeen 1 ½
hour seminars conducted by professional philosophers. In these seminars both
the content and methods of teaching
reasoning skills in formal and informal
logic, epistemology,
ethics and
aesthetics were examined. Conducting
formal philosophical discussions with
students and providing written and
other classroom activities were stressed.
In all of this, teachers were assisted by
the extensive instructional materials
provided by the Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children.
The wholehearted cooperation and effort of its teachers made the course and
its Evaluation possible. Teachers Renee
Sack, Mary O'Connell, Phyllis Gruber,
Alvin Knowlton, Kelly Ford, Edith
Sparre and Helena Seyferth are, more
than anyone else, responsible for this

promising intervention in Lexington's
curriculum. They were aided in
seminars by instructors especially trained in philosophical education - Dr.
Phillip Guin of the Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children,
Mr. David Ackerman of Newton Public
Schools, and Dr. Clyde Evans of the
University of Massachusetts (Boston).
Dr. Henny Wenkart of Harvard used
her professional knowledge as a
philosopher to evaluate one of the tests.
Mr. Richard A. Buck and Mr. Saleh
Rahman of Lexington High School provided statistical expertise in the quantitative sections of the Evaluation.
This evaluation presents two main
areas of findings: Changes in Students'
Thinking Skills, and Student Acceptance of the Program. Teacher evaluations of this work are presented· concurrently.
II. Changes in Thinking Skills

Did PRP students achieve significant
improvement in thinking skills? To answer this question we administered four
different tests. Each test pitted experimental students in the PRP against
control group students of equal ability
who were not in the program. Our finding is that PRP worke~.
Our criterion of "equal ability"
derives from national stanine scores in
the Comprehensive Test of Basic Skills
given to most Lexington fourth and
sixth grade students. From the CTBS
we chose as most appropriate to PRP the
national stanine scores on Reading
~otal, Reading Comprehension and
Language Total as they appeared in
students' 4th grade testing. We then
matched these three scores, insofar as
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possible, for each experimental student
with the same scores for each control
group student. Ideally, an experimental
group student with a Reading Total
stanine score of 5, a Reading Comprehension stanine score of 4, and a
Language Total stanine score of 5 in
his/her CTBS was matched with a control group student with the same 5-4-5
pattern. National stanine scores in control and experimental groups ranged
from a low of 4-4-4 to a high of 9-9-9.
On a scale of 1 to 9, a score of 5 indicates
that the student is just about at grade
level.
Controlling our experiments for
"equal ability" poses a special problem
for these Lexington students. We are
"short" in lower stanine ability level
students as measured by the CTBS. In
other words, we do not have in Lexington a typical national distribution of
ability levels, and this makes difficulties
for stastical evaluations of our program.
All students in these tests attended
Lexington Public Schools, though control and experimental groups attended,
in most cases, separate elementary
schools within the system. In all
statistical evaluations we sought a
statistical significance level of .05, the
standard level for most statistical work.

Tests of Thinking Skills
Test I. Was there significant improvement in formal and informal logic skills
among PRP students? To help answer
this question we administered a 44-item
multiple-choice test developed by
Educational Testing Service (available
through courtesy of the Pompton Lakes,
N .J. Bd. of Education) as a pre-test in
the fall of 1978 and as a post-test in the
spring of 1979 to a total of nearly 300
Lexington students. Tl,, ruuhs of tkis test
show a significantimp,ovemmtby the experimentalPRP groupover~ controlgroup.
After eliminating unacceptable samples,
we found from a sample size of 64 control and 64 experimental students (i.e.,
64 pain) that t = -3.05132 where the
critical region at .05 significance began
at t = -1.671. This very strong showing in favor of the experimental group
essentially agrees with the fmdings of the
1978 Preliminary Evaluation when the
same test was given.

Upon closer examination, this test
suggested an interesting hypothesis. It
suggested that, in Lexington, the greatest
improvement
in philosophicalreasoningoccurNationalatanlnegrouprange

n::::i

Lexington "low": 4-4-4to 5--6-8
Lexington "middle": 6-6-5to 7-8-8
Lexington "high": 8-7-6to 9-9-9

19
29
16

PRP students at stanines 4-4-4
through 7-8-8 significantly improved
between pre- and post-tests more than
control students in the same period.
PRP students·.in stanines 8-7-6 to 9-9-9
did not significantly improye more than
control group students. I do not defmitely "know" why we get this disparate
situation. But it can be noted that, in
this test, the Lexington ''high'' stanines
comprised a smaller sample than either
of the other two stanine groups. Possibly
our fmdings in Test 2, below, will help
explain. Furthermore, the ceiling of improvement pressed down upon many
students in the top stanines. In the pretests, they were racking up scores in the
upper thirties against the perfect score of
forty-four. How much room for improvement is left at that point? Even a
point improvement of one or two in the
post-test will not mean too much for
either side when n = 16 pairs.
Test 2. Is there a significant correlation
between the philosophi::al reasoning,
pro'gram and the ability of students to
express reasoning through writing? This
was the question PRP teacher Renee
Sack asked in a test she devised and administered during her 1978-79 sabbatical leave. The test results indicate
that there is a significant correlation.
Ms. Sack administered her test to five
fifth- and sixth-grade classes at the
Franklin School at the end of the school

red among Lexington's ''average'' and
''belowaverage''students.We broke down
the results into three stanine groups and
found the followini:
tat.OS
-1.734
-1.701
-1.753

Lexingtont
-2.002
-1.830
-1.356

Sig.
yes
yes
no

year. Three classes had completed a
year or PRP; two control classes had
completed the regular curriculum. Here
is the Sack Test:

Here are some samples of
reasoning. Would you classify
them as: a) good reasoning; b) not
so good but possibly okay; c)
seems good but possibly unsound;
d) poor reasoning.
Explain your choice for each
situation.
1.l'm staying away from canned
foods ever since I read about
that man who died from eating
canned soup that wasn't good.
I'm sure the next can I open will
be poisoned.
2. My friend says Watershlp Down
Is a very good movie, and I'm
sure he's right because he
always gives the correct answer
In school.
3. That new girl In school ls always
causing trouble. Yesterday, the
moment after she walked In the
front door of the building, there
was an explosion
In the
chemistry laboratory on the top
floor. I'll bet she caused that explosion.
4. The factories In this town have
shut down and everyone's out of
work. The unemployment
checks have about run out. Pret-
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ty soon people will be homeless
and starving. I think lots of new
jobs need to be created so people can have work and earn a living.
Students were asked to classify the
quality of the reasoning by choosing a,
b, c, or d, and to write two or three
sentences explaining their answers. For
each of the four questions, one point was
given for classifying the reasoning quality consistent with the explanations, and
0 to 3 points were given for the quality of
the explanation itself. The highest possible score for each question was therefore
4, and the highest possible total score for
each test was 16. Using formal and informal logic was necessary in answering
these questions. Students' answers were
scored by an outside authority, Dr.
Henny Wenkart, a Ph.D. in philosophy
at Harvard. Dr. Wenkart did not participate in constructing the test, nor did
she know any of the students tested or
teachers involved.
For statistical analysis we compared
the control group of two classes with the
experimental group of three classes, a
total of 83 students.
The average and below average group
in stanines 3, 4 and 5 showed that the
experimental PRP group achieved an
average score of 9. 25 out of a possible
16, while the control group achieved the
lower average score of 8.36 out of 16. As
encouraging as this difference appears,
it is not statistically significant at the .05
level. Two factors should be remarked
here. First, the sample size in these
lower stanines was small - only 11 in
the control group. It is likely, as in the
high stanine scores in Test 1, that the
sample size here was too sm·all to produce significant results. Secondly, as in
the high stanine scores in Test 1, the
size-of-sample problem was compounded by the limited range of possible
scores. This is the second instance where
we failed to achieve
statistical
significance with small samples and
limited test ranges, so that it may be fair
to infer that these factors, more than the
PRP input, were responsible for lack of
statistical significance. This conjecture
is strengthened when we look at the
results of the Sack Test among the rest
of the sttidents at Franklin School.
The above-average students in the
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test - those in national stanines 6, 7, 8
and 9 - showed that the experimental
groupof PRP studentsscoredsignificantlybetter than theircounterparts
in the samestanines
amongthe controlgroupofnon-PRPstudents.
In the experimental group, t cz 2.66, well
inside the critical region at .05 level of
significance at t cz 2.011. The sample
sizes were much greater in these high
stanines: 22 in the control group and 29
in the experimental
group. The
statistical conclusion is clear: among
students of above average ability there
was a significant advantage in favor of
the experimental group which had completed
a year of philosophical
reasoning. 2 As a matter of additional interest, the average absolute scores out of
16 were: for the control group, 8.96,
and for the experimental group, 10.9 nearly two scoring points higher for the
PRP students.
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Test 3. How well have PRP students in
the 1978 pilot program done since then?
Evidence suggests PRP students have
moved ahead of their control group
counterparts in the year since they took
Harry. We compared the sixth grade
stanine scores of the experimental and
control groups in the Preliminary
Evaluation with the fourth grade
stanines of both groups. Findings:
Reading Totals averaged .2 stanine
gains in favor of PRP students;
Language Totals averaged .3 stanine
gains in favor of PRP students; Reading
Comprehension stanines averaged a .1
gain in favor of the control group. The
net gain for PRP students was .4
stanines. This evidence succests that the
Harry program's intervention between
4th and 6th grade CTBS testing may
have helped PRP students improve their
scores more than the standard curriculum. Again, the sample size (only 11
pairs) was probably too small and the
scoring range (only 1-9) may have been
too narrow for statistical significance.
Test 4. Was there a significant increase in "imaginative speculation,,
among PRP students? To find out we

administered in pre- and post-testing an
instrument called "What Could It Be?"
to 38 control and 38 experimental
students, again matched by stanine
scores. This was the single unfavorable
test of all we administered. We found no
significant improvement in the experimental group; in fact, the control
group showed greater improvement.'
"What Could It Be?", like "Experimental Version III'', was developed
by Educational Testing Service for the
Harry program. It was given in the 1978
Lexington pilot program, where it showed significant improvement for the PRP
group over the control group. To explain the different result in the Final
Pilot Program, it is worth noting that we
had strong reservations about the value
of this test when we gave it the first time.
As we said in the Preliminary Evaluation:
"The secondtest, called "What CouldIt
Be?" yieldedpromisingbut muchlessfirm
statistics. "What CouldIt Be?" intendsto
test the imaginativeabilitiesofstudents.It
presentsa seriesoffour designsand askstest
takersto list all the thingstheycouldbe. In
scoring this test we simply counted the
numberof answersstudentsgave, takingno
accountofthe quality of answers. We did
not countthenumberof uniqueanswers,for
instance.But not evenan analysisof uniquenesscould expressthe quality of these
answers; when·I scannedanswersto this
test, /found answersthat wereto mestunningly interesting,but which I had no way
to quantify. Yet this test doeshaveinterest
in this evaluationin that it may serveas a
very rough illustrationof our aim to improve speculative thinking among Lexingtonstudents."
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How, by all that is statistically holy,
does one quantify the wit in such
answers as the following from both control and experimental groups?
What do you think this drawing could be?

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

two smiles landing on the moon
two Jump ropes doing pushups
looking down a lady's dress
a French person with too big a hat on
two people kissing In a pool
beginning of a heart
worm that swallowed a camel
snobby mother and snobby child
Nessie
bottom view of a male or female going to
the toilet

What do you think this drawing could be?

t
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Oriental anesthesia
a spider getting a suntan
electrified lollipop
a scared moon
a bun with too many hot dogs
a house of pencils
girls on the Legs commercial
One student listed 33 different Items,
each with six legs. The Items ranged from
a cow, a house, a lady, a word, through
a liver and a notebook.
a ball wearing a wig
a person In an electric storm
square dancing
fireman tells people to jump
symbol of might
clock without hours
hole In a person's pants.

What do you think this drawing could be?

l
patrol of ants
tin can alley
Bralle letter
soccer position
skinned knee
bandald
crewcut just growing back
TV tennis
5 ants playing Jump rope

•
•
•
•
•
•

a broken world
the moon playing the accordion
a house for triangular-shaped ants
a pretended smile
a toad's hand
Einstein's mustache.

... and there were many more to delight
and confound the evaluator. One student found 67 different things in the
four drawings.
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Student Acceptance of the Program

As a group, our fifth and sixth graders
responded favorably to their year of instruction in philosophical reasoning.
Our main source of information on this
point was a Student Evaluation questionnaire, devised by PRP teachers and
given to all PRP students in one class
period at the end of the school year.
While the results of this study were
favorable to the Harry program, the
reliability of such qualitative evaluations
by students must always be regarded circumspectly. A great deal depends on the
conditions under which such questionnaires are administered, the time of the
year, and the surrounding events.
We asked students if they thought
learning philosophical reasoning was an
important purpose to them: 71 % of those
answering said yes; 29% said no (Question 1b). 46 % of those answering thought
adding HarryStott/emeier
to school courses
would be of "great value"; 34% thought_
it would be "partially valuable"; only
20% thought it would be of "no value".
(Question 2). We also asked if students
found anything "confusing" in the
course: 27% said they did, and when
asked to explain, typically spoke of
understanding the "mind", or of problems in formal logic like ''all''
sentences. (These may be valuable kinds
of things to fmd "confusing.")
Inherent in this type of questionnaire
is the difficulty of portraying the attitudes of a group, which necessarily
submerges those of any given individual. The QJ.iestionnaire summary
does not take account of several students
who embodied contradictions within
their questionnaire answers. Throughout most of the questionnaire one student praises the value of learning logic
and then - illogically! - says (in question 15) that he would change Harry by
getting "most of the logic out of the
book", and winds up in question 16
complaining that there is ''too much
logic'' in the course. Another student
disliked the course ("it's useless"), but
when asked if the book Harry was helpful, agreed that it was ''because it helped
me understand better" (question 3).
Fortunately, such contradictions were
rare.
Student Evaluations indicate two
areas that need improvement. Over half

the students disliked the book HarryStottlemeitr's Discovery(Q. 4), though a majority •found it helpful (Q. 3). Typical
complaints were that this children's
novel is "unrealistic", does not have
enough ''action'',
and is often
"boring". Teachers of the course report
that they are still working with ways to
pace the book with the other learning activities. In its seventeen short chapters,
Harryseems no sooner to get students into the ''story'' than they are taken aside
to analyze what they have read. Yet,
most teachers feel that Harryis necessary
to "set up" the philosophical problems
dealt with in the course.
Another area of concern appears in
question 14. A minority (35 %) of the
students found that they used outside of
the course what they learned inside it.
Here, of course, is the problem of learning transfer common to most academic
courses. However, it is clear that transfer of learning from Harry did occur
when students spoke, as they often did,
of "arguments" with their siblings at
home or with other students at school.
And the episode in the novel with Dale,
who is asked to salute the flag, though
doing so opposes his religion, made a
strong impression on many students
who felt this was very applicable to their
own lives today.

Students were invited to comment in
several parts of the Student Evaluation
questionnaire. Here are examples:

• ... Because normally there Is only one
answer and you ask the teacher a
question but now we were answering
with our own opinions.
• ... Because we usually don't talk
about thinking.
• ... Well, because what we say can
start a new discussion.
• ... Yes, because there wasn't any
right or wrong and everybody stated
their opinions and they were very In·
terestlng.
• ... In other discussions we didn't go
Into so much depth and detail about
the subject.
• ... We usually talk about parts of
speech or commas or something ....
• ... They had something more than just
discussions of school work, they had
something more to do with llfe.
• ... Well, everyone had something to
say for a change and It was arguing.
• ... 1. The discussion about reasoning
and types of sentences, because It was
fun to decide If It was faulty or not and
what type of sentence It was.
• ... 2. The discussions about dlf·
ference of degreeand· difference of
kind, and the one about apes and men
stood out because of all the different
opinions and reasons.

Q.9. Pleasedescribeany of tht wn'ttm activitiesthat standout'inyour mind. This quesion produced whal we regardedas 62
''positive" commentsand 3 "negative"comments. Examples:
• ... Standardizing sentences, literal
and figurative, syllogisms, brains,
perfect school.
• ... Seeing films.
• ... I don't know anything.

(2: 6. Wtre thesediscussionsdijftrentfrom
discussions
you havebeenwed to in school?If
yes, how?(57%)answered"yes'?,
• ... I never was taught to use
phllosophlcal reasoning before so I
could never really talk the way I do In
Harry.
• ... In a regular discussion If you say
what you want to, you'll get sent to the
prlnclple (sic).
• ... They are more BORING.
• •••because you would have to think
much harder than you usually do.
• ... Because they weren't stupldl
• ... I haven't had anything llke this
ever. I wish I have though.

• ... BecauseI never really talked to a
teacher before.

• ... The thing about your mind.
• ... The paper with the carry-over relations stands out very vividly.
• ... None, but the turning around
sentences was something new to me.
• ... The mind benders, those were fun
because you really had to think them
through.
• ... I llked drawing the brain.
• ... The papers that were on "all"

sentences.
• ... We had to write If we thought we
were asleep or awake and had to give a
reasonwhy.
• ... The one I took before this one.
• ... When the boy In the classroom's
parents didn't want him to salute the
flag.
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• ... One where they gave you a few
sentences and you were supposed to
decide whether It was poor reasoning
or good reasoning.
• ..• I have no written activities that
stand out in my mind that have to do
with Harry Stottlemeler.
• ... Syllogisms test, drawing our
minds, Ideal school.
• ... Four posslbllltles, standardization,
stereotypes, building on our thoughts,
Jumping to conclusions.
• ... Perceptions. I llked It because you
couldn't be wrong.

Q 10. Have you thought of any ideas or
thingsthatyou had neverthoughtof before,due
to this course?Pleaseexplain. The questionnaireproduced41 ''positive11 commentsand
11 "negative" comments.Examples:
• ... Yes, llke If someone asks you If a
thought can hurt and stuff llke that.
• ... Yes, how to prove someone wrong
by loglc thinking, Jumping to concluslons.
• ... No, because I never think anything
about Harry except the non-explanation
things.
• ... Yes, I have been reasoning wrong.
• ... Yes, we don't usually talk about
your mind but I did In this course.
• ••• Not really. Most of the things I had
thought of before but never discussed.
• ... Yes, I say what I feel. I bring out
my opinion more and more ....
• ... Nol
• ... Yes, other people have experiences, like dreams, Just as you do.
• ... Most everything we talked about
was new and I got some new side to a
subject.
• ... No, because I sort of tuned out.
• ... I have. I never used to analyze a
sentence.
• ... I learned about how to use drawings to show categories.
• ... Yes, llke I never thoqght about the
brain and the mind being separateor
being together.
• ... Yes, my friends and me once had
an argument about what Is real and
what Is not.
• ... Yes, putting someone else In my
place.
• ... Kind of contradicting, because now
I know how to contradict and before I
didn't.
• ... Yes, I had never thought If there
(was) Is anything behind the universe.
• ... Yes~It's too hard to write.
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• ... Yes because everything that I
learned and I am learning makes me
use my thought differently.

Q 11. What, if anything,didyou learnabout
yourself that you didn't know before,in this
course? We found 35 ''positive11 and 13
''negative11 comments.Examples:
• ... That I should think for myself and
not copy other people.
• ... How I think.
• ... Nothing.
• ... That there was really a Harry
course.
• .•• I don't think I learned anything
about myself.
• ..• I'm not sure.
• ... Nothing about myself but about
other people.
• ..• That I can trust myself.
• ... When I work hard I get the hang of
It.
• ... That doctors haven't found a mind,
and to use more logic.
• ... I thought only some grownups did
this blah thing.
• ... I have a part of me I still don't
know about myself and ·no one else
knows It either.
• ... I don't think I learned anything I
didn't know before about myself.
• •.. If I put my mind to something, I
can figure It out.

• ... I didn't know I could concentrate
on one thing and have a strong opinion
on It.
• ... I could be smarter and more
logical than I thought I could be.
• ... I learned from group discussions
you can't Just say "Oh I'll neversmoke',
that everyone does it.

The Student Evaluation Questionnaire revealed ~ear and strong values in
the philosophical reasoning program.
77 % found the class discussions
"helpful and/or educational" (q. 5.) an important finding in that participation in discussion is a central feature of
the philosophical reasoning program.
Students clearly recognized areas in
which they felt they had improved.
Question 12 asked, ''... if Harry contributed to your improving in the following areas.'' Here is how students
answered (in absolute numbers):
36 how to listen better
15 how to address others
86 how to back up your opinions
66 how to express your thoughts
more effectively
68 how to think more logically
25 how
, to write better
Perhaps the "bottom line" in the Student Evaluation is in question 16, where
students were essentially asked whether
they thought Harry Stottltmeier'sDiscovery
should be taught to future classes. 82 %
recommended teaching Harry at least
once a week; 68% thought Harry should
be taught at least three months of the
year. A complete breakdown of these
figures is given in the Summary Questionnaire.
Final Hypothesis
The Philosophical Reasoning Program appears to have significantly improved the thinking skills of students. It
appears to have won acceptance by the
students themselves as a valuable part of
the elementary school curriculum.
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In this whole matter of philosophy
and education, the great thing is that
education should go into philosophy and
not philosophy into education. Deciding
first on a philosophy and then proceeding to teach in terms of it is about
the worst thing that one can do. We
should protest against it with unflagging
energy. The reason is quite simple.
When education is founded on a philosophy and bent to serve its purposes,
education
is pretty sure to be
sectarian ... ! have no right to make my
students so hate what I disbelieve that
they will never know what it is. If I do,
then I give clear proof that I am scared.
I get no light on what I am doing. Philosophy should give light ... In education,
the springs of behavior are of minor importance while the ideals of conduct are
of major importance. Knowledge of the
former is worthwhile only as it may
serve to support the latter. By itself it
gives no guidance, for the springs of
behavior never produce anything better
than themselves. Because education
begets the kind of faith it is, the
discipline of the imagination is its
ultimate fruitage. Psychology and the
science of human nature can make
plainer to us those springs of human
behavior which have to be controlled if
that discipline is to be effective. But
they do not determine the end for which
that control is sought. For the end is
their control and not their indulgence.
The end is so to rise above them that
they can be viewed with increasing
detachment and seen in their concrete
operations in human society. It is there
we learn what they really are, how they
work, what they bring about, and what
they are worth. It is there we find out the
candles which burn babies. So far as we
have disciplined our own imaginations
and have seen what education is, we
may, if we can have any faith at all, have
the faith that we do not have to put the
candles out in order to keep the baby
from being burned. He will be burned
as sure as fate if we cultivate his egotism
instead of disciplining his imagination.

We must determine at least · two
developmental levels...
The first level can be called the actual
developmentallevel, that is, the level of
development of a child's mental functions that has been established as a result
of certain already completeddevelopmental cycles. When we determine a child's
mental age by using tests, we are almost
always dealing with the actual developmental level. In studies of children's
mental development it is generally
assumed that only those things that
children can do on their own are indicative of mental abilities. We give
children a battery of tests or a variety of
tasks of varying degrees of difficulty,
and we judge the extent of their mental
development on the basis of how they
solve them and at what level of difficulty. On the other hand, if we offer
leading questions or show how the problem is to be solved and the child then
solves it, or if the teacher initiates the
solution and the child completes it or
solves it in collaboration with other
children - in short, if the child barely
misses an independent solution of the
problem - the solution is not regarded
as indicative of his mental development.
This "truth" was familiar and reinforced by common sense. Over a decade
even the profoundest thinkers never
questioned the assumption; they never
entertained
the notion that what
children can do with the assistance of
others might be in some sense even more
indicative of their mental development
than what they can do alone ....
This difference ... is what we call the
zone of proximal development. It is the
distance between the actual developmental level as determined by independent problem solving and the level of
potential development as determined
through problem solving under adult
guidance or in collaboration with more
capable peers.

I believe we are on the verge of
developing a new kind of culture, one
that is as much a departure in style from
cofigurative cultures, as the institutionalization of cofiguration in orderly
- and disorderly - change was a
departure from the postfigurative style.
I call lhis new style prefigurative,because
in this new culture it will be the child and not the parent and grandparent that
represents what is to come ....
Today, as we are coming to understand better the circular processes
through which culture is developed and
transmitted, we recpgnize that mari's
most human characteristic is not his
ability to learn, which he shares with
many other species, but his ability to
teach and store what others have
developed and taught him. Learning,
which is based on human dependency, is
relatively simple. But human capacities
for creating elaborate teachable systems,
for understanding and utilizing the
resources of the natural worlds, and for
governing society and creating imaginary worlds, all these are very complex. In the past, men relied on the least
elaborate part of the circular system, the
dependent learning by children, for continuity of transmission and for the embodiment of the new. Now, with our
greater understa,nding of the process, we
must cultivate the most flexible and
complex part of the system - the
behavior of adults. We must, in fact,
teach ourselves how to alter adult
behavior so that we can give up postfigurative upbringing, with its tolerated
cofigurative components, and discover
prefigurative ways of teaching and learning that will keep the future open. We
must create new models for adults who
can teach their children not what to
learn, but how to learn and not what
they should be committed to, but the
value of commitment.

-from Frederick J.E. Woodbridge, Contrasts In Education, (New York: Teacher
College Press, 1929)pp. 29-32.

-LS. Vygotsky, Mind in Society, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968) pp.
85-86.

-Margaret
Mead, Culture and Commit·
ment (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1970)
pp. 88-89, 92.

Determining Children's
Potential Thinking Levels

The Child,
The Teacher,
and the Culture
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Kant on
Avoiding Errors
in Thinking
The following maxims of common
human understanding do not properly
come in here, as parts of the Critique of
Taste, but yet they may serve to
elucidate its fundamental propositions.
They are: (1) to think for oneself; (2) to
put ourselves in thought in the place of
everyone else; (3) always to think consistently. The first is the maxim of unprejudiced thought; the second of enlarged
thought; the third of consecutivethought.
The first is the maxim of a never passive
reason. The tendency to such passivity,
and therefore to heteronomy of the
reason, is called prejudice ; and the
greatest prejudice of all is to represent
nature as not subject to the rules that the
understanding places at its basis· by
means of its own essential law, i.e., is
superstition.
Deliverance from superstition is called enlightenment,because, although this
name belongs to deliverance from prejudices in general, yet superstition
specially (in smsu eminenti)deserves to be
called a prejudice. For the blindness in
which superstition places us, which it
even imposes on us as an obligation,
makes the need of being guided by
others, and the consequent passive state
of our reason, peculiarly noticeable. As
regards the second maxim of the IQind,
we are otherwise wont to call him
limited (borni, the opposite of enlarged)
whose talents attain to no great use
(especially as regards intensity). But
here we are not speaking of the faculty of
cognition, but of the mode of thought
which makes a purposive use thereof.
However small may be the area or the
degree to which a man's natural gifts
reach, yet it indicates a man of enlarged
thought if he disregards the subjective
private conditions of his own judgment,
by which so many others are confined,
and reflects upon it from a universalstandpoint (which he can only determine by
placing himself at the standpoint of
others). The third maxim, viz. that of
consecutive
thought,is the most difficult to
attain, and can only be attained by the
combination of both the former and
after the constant observance of them
has grown into a habit. We may say that
the first of these maxims is the maxim of
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understanding, the second of judgment,
and the third of reason.
-Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment,
Analytic of the Sublime, par. 40.

Are Mental Categories
Social in Nature?
The generalized way in which reality
is reflected also undergoes radical restructuring ....
It becomes possible to take assumptions as they are formulated in language
and use them to make logical inferences,
regardless of whether or not the content
of the premise forms a part of personal
experience. The relationship to logical
reasoning that goes beyond immediate
experience is radically restructured; we
see the creation of the rudiments of
discursive thinking, whose inferences
become as compelling as those from
direct, personal experience.
All the~e transformations result in
changes in the basic structure of
cognitive processes and result in an
enormous expansion of experience and
in the construction of a vastly broader
world in which human beings begin to
live. In addition to the sphere of personal experience, we see the appearance
of the sphere of abstract general human
experience as established in language
and in the operations of discursive
thinking. Human thought begins to rest
on broad logical reasoning; the sphere of
crative imagination takes shape, and
this in tum vastly expands man's subjective world.
Finally, there are changes in selfawareness of the personality, which advances to the higher level of social
awareness and assumes new capabilities
for objective, categorical analysis of
one's motivation, actions, intrinsic properties, and idiosyncracies. Thus a fact
hitherto underrated
by psychology
becomes apparent: sociohistorical shifts
not only introduce new content into the
mental world of human beings; they also
create new forms of activity and new
structures of cognitive functioning.
They advance human consciousness to
new levels.

...

We see now the inacuracy of the
centuries-old notions in accordance with
which the basic structures of perception,
representation, reasoning, deduction,
imagination, and self-awareness are fixed forms of spiritual life and remain unchanged under differing social conditions. The basic categories of human
mental life can be understood as products of social history - they are subject
to change when the basic forms of social
practice are altered and thus are social in
nature.
-A.A. Luria: Cognitive Development: Its
Cultural and Social Foundations (Cam·
bridge: Harbard University Press, 1976) pp.
162-164.

Thinking as the internalization
of dialogue
In 1934 the brilliant
Russian
psychologist Vygotsky characterized the
growth of thought processes as starting
with a dialogue of speech and gesture
between child and parent. Autonomous
thinking, he said, begins at the stage
when the child is first able to internalize
these conversations and "run them ofr'
himself. This is a typical sequence in the
development of competence. So too in
instruction. The narrative of teaching is
of the order of Bygotsky's conversation.
the next move in the development of
competence is the internalization of the
narrative and its "rules of generation"
so that the child is now capable of running off the narrative on his own. The
hypothetical mode in teaching, by encouraging the child to participate in
"speaker's decisions," speeds this process along. Once internalization has occurred, the child is in a vastly improved
position from several obvious points of
view - notably that he is able to go
beyond the information he has been
given to generate additional ideas that
either can be checked immediately from
experience or can, at least, be used as a
basis for formulating
reasonable
hypotheses.
-Jerome S. Bruner, On Knowing (C&m·
brldge: The Belknap Press, 1962), pp. 89-90.

Thinking, The Journal of Philosophy for Children, Volume 1, Number 3 & 4 Combined

Reflections
childhood

... education

... philosophy

...

On the importance of
the concept of meaning
Vigtosky was "fascinated by the problem of 'free will' or 'autonomy'. For
instance, there is a discussion in Mind in
Society(pp 100 ff.) about the manner in
which, in the course of child development, 'meaning' comes to dominate
both 'objects' and 'actions.'
"This change Vygotsky interprets as
showing how 'intentionality' takes over
from 'causality,' as the untutored infant
is transformed into the educated and
autonomous adult. This is just one of
_the ways in which Vygotsky sought to
transcend Dilthey's dichotomy between
Natur and Geist, and so between
'physicalistic'
and 'intentionalistic'
modes of explanation."
-from Stephen Toulmin, "The Mozart of
Psychology," In The New York Review,Vol.
XXV, No. 14, September 28, 1978, p. 53, n.8.

Can classroom dialogue

help children learn
to read and write?

"Luria has argued that, in people
raised within alphabetic cultures,
reading and writing skills - though
making use of the eyes are
'represented' cerebrally in the auditory
rather than in the visual region of the
cortex. He has supported this hypothesis
with evidence from both ends of life. On
the_one hand, with patients in Russian
aphasia clinics, it was brain lesions in
the auditory, not the visual cortex that
were typically found to disrupt writing
skills - though this was not true in the
case of brain-damaged
Chinese,
educated within an ideographic culture.
''On the other hand, Russian school
children learning to write from dictation

were observed to be 'talking out' the
words to themselves as they wrote,
under their breaths; and when they were
prevented from doing so - e.g., by being required to hold their tongues between their teeth as they wrote - their
number of errors at once increased sixfold. Either way (Luria has claimed) the
understanding and production of speech
appear, in alphabetic cultures at least, to
form the primary linguistic skill. When
reading or writing. are acquired, subsequently, they form secondary skills, being learned in association with subvocal
speech, committed to memory with its
help, and cerebrally represented in close
conjunction
with the pre-existing
auditory 'store' of speech.
''These ideas about children's use of
subvocal speech as a tool in the mastery
of intellectual skills pick up themes long
familiar in the W estem philosophical
tradition. (Plato took quite seriously the
suggestion that what we call 'thinking'
may simply consist in 'talking to
oneself.')"
-from Stephen Toulmin, "The Mozart of
Psychology, In The New York Review,Vol.
XXV, No. 14, September 28, 1978, p. 53.

Thinking and Experience

Every experience involves a connection of doing or trying with something
which is undergone in. consequence. A
separation of the active doing phase
from the passive undergoing phase
destroys the vital meaning of an experience. Thinking is the accurate and
deliberate instituting of connections between what is done and its consequences.
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It notes not only that they are connected, but the details of the connection.
It makes connecting links explicit in the
form of relationships. The stimulus to
thinking is found when we wish to determine the significance of some act, performed or to be performed. Then we anticipate consequences. This implies that
the situation as it stands is, either in fact
or to us, incomplete and hence indeterminate. The projection of consequences
means a proposed or tentative solution.
To perfect this hypothesis, existing conditions have to be carefully scrutinized,
and the implications of the hypothesis
developed - an operation called reasoning. Then the suggested solution - the
idea or theory - has to be tested by acting upon it. If it brings about certain
consequences,
certain determinate
changes, in the world, it is accepted as
valid. Otherwise it is modified, and
another trial made. Thinking includes
all of these steps - the sense of the problem, the observation of conditions, the
formation and rational elaboration of a
suggested conclusion, and the active experimental testing. While all thinking
results in knowledge, ultimately the
value of knowledge is subordinate to its
use in thinking. For· we live not in a settled and finished world, but in one
which is going on, and where our main
task is prospective, and where retrospect
- and all knowledge as distinct from
thought is retrospect - is of value in the
solidity, security, and fertility it affords
our dealings with the future .... To learn
from experience is to make a backward
and forward connection between what
we do to things and what we enjoy or
suffer from things in consequence.
Under such conditions, doing becomes a
trying, an experiment with the world to
find out what it is like, the undergoing
becomes instruction - discovery of the
connection of things.
Two conclusions important for education follow (1) Esperience is primarily an
active-passive affair; it is not primarily
cognitive. But (2) the measureof the value
of an experience lies in the perception of
the relationships or continuities to which
it leads.
-John Dewey,"The Theory of the Chicago
Experiment," an article written by Dewey In
1934, and appearing as Appendix II of
Katherine C. Mayhew and Anna C. Edwards,
The Dewey Sc ool (New York: 1936).
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Lawrence Metcalf Is Professor of Social
Studies Education at the University of
//1/nols, Urbana, Ill. This article Is reprinted
from Progressive Education, Nov. 1950
pp 41-45, with permission from the John
Dewey Society.

The Failure to Proniote Values
or to Promote Valuing
Lawrence Metcalf

eachers have been told by philosT
ophers of education that values are
important and that every good teacher
should build values in his students. The
philosophers have not always communicated to teachers an understanding
of what a value is, how it may be built,
or of what the valuing process consists.
Many teachers who act upon the urging
of the philosophers approach the value
problem as if the polution were a matter
of inculcating the "proper" attitudes.
The· 1ac1cof a distinction between an attitude and a value accounts in large part
for our failure to build a curriculum
oriented around values and valuing.
A common practice of those teachers
who confuse attitude with value is to list
the traits that they want to inculcate, instill, and to stamp in. One usually finds
on any such list honesty, loyalty, kind-
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ness, cooperation, independence, selfreliance, spirituality, respect, dignity,
adaptability, creativeness, and the like.
The building of a favorable attitude
toward, and it is assumed a valuing of,
honesty often takes the form of rewarding the child when he is thought to be
honest, and punishing him when he is
thought to be dishonest. This approach
sometimes includes the attempt by the
teacher to set good examples although
every adult finds it impossible always to
be completely honest in all his dealings
with children and other adults.
When we teach high school students
that they should always be honest, loyal,
kind, truthful,
polite, generous,
cooperative, self-reliant, obedient, and
thoughtful we are implying that all is
right with the world as long as people
learn to be good. At least we are implying that morality is simply a matter of
one's being good rather than bad. Such
an approach to the curriculum is likely
to leave out of moral education any conscious attempt to face students with
choices between good and good. Yet
these are the very choices which involve
morality. When a wife asks her husband
for an opinion of her new hat, should he
be truthful or kind? Sometimes we give
slighting recognition to this kind of
value problem when we say that the
choice is between the lesser of two evils.
It would be just as accurate to say that
we choose the greater of two goods. And
in every case the judgment as to what
constitutes the greater good is found in
the consequences of our choice. The
mere inculcation of proper attitudes
toward honesty and the like may make
this choice more difficult instead of
easier.
We often find that it seems moral to
be less than completely honest. This
need for occasional dishonesty helps to
explai:l why the common and traditional
approach to moral education often falls
short of its objectives. Even whe_n
teachers succeed in creating in their
students a taste or preference for honesty as opposed to dishonesty, they have
not succeeded necessarily in creating
students capable of moral responsibility.
A morally responsible agent is able to
choose reflectively among conflicting attitudes and values. It is our failure to
build the habit of the reflectively-made
choice_which largely explains the lack of

a democratic value orientation in the
high school curriculum of today.
A more adequate treatment of the
moral problem would provide students
with opportunities to choose reflectively
among the attitudes and values which
they hold. They might be faced, for example, with many situations involving
choices between honesty and kindness.
They cannot, and this we do know,
choose to be both honest and kind in all
situations. This opportunity to make
choices between good and good, and to
make them reflectively, is most likely to
be present in a curriculum that emphasizes the study of problems and
related controversial issues. This emphasis upon problems and issues need
not wait for the development of a core
curriculum. In fact, a more reflective
approach to traditional subject matter
may facilitate reorganization of the curriculum.
A common sense observation- and
we must always be cautious and careful
in our use of common sense- suggests
the futility of teaching a child that he
should always be honest and kind. Let
us suppose that Mr. & Mrs. Brown and
their small son have been asked to dinner by the Joneses. Mrs. Jones may ask
the son, Johnny, how he likes the soup.
Johnny, if he is honest in this situation,
may say that it is the worst he has ever
tasted. This is anything but a kind and
polite answer, and it is very probably the
very answer which none of the adults
want him to make. If Johnny has been
"well-taught" in his attitudes toward
honesty and kindness, and if he has
never faced a similar situation before, he
can hardly know what to say without
first reflecting upon his problem. Should
he be honest or kind, and how is he to
determine which to be?
Many adults would solve Johnny's
problem by adding sophistication to the
list of desirable and to be inculcated
traits. Johnny, in this situation, should
murmur something trite, and perhaps
unintelligible, and hope that he is not offered a second serving. The learning of
this kind of sophistication hides from
view the fact that when Johnny is commended for his courtesy he is also
rewarded for his dishonesty.
Adults experience the same difficulty
in making their moral choices. A few
years ago a secretary sought advice from
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a newspaper woman who was writing a
weekly column of counsel for her readers. The secretary wrote that she was
working for a man for whom she had
developed strong feelings of loyalty. He
had raised her salary several times, provided liberal vacations, set up good
working conditions, and had even
helped to finance the medical care of her
aged mother. The secretary, in sharing
many of his business secrets, had learned that her employer was evading a
substantial part of his income tax. She
wanted to know whether she should be
honest , and report his crime to the
government, or whether she should be
loyal and keep her mouth shut. The advice of the columnist was that a moral
person is always honest and loyal!
The usual procedure for a person in
this kind of situation is to decide in some
way what he wants to do, and then to re\·
tionalize his decision by describing it as
either honest or loyal. He will never rationalize with an appeal to dishonesty or
disloyalty. It is thus that a certain kind
of moral training tends to produce selfdeception rather than moral responsibility in the learner.
The student who cheats on an examination may say to himself that one
should open the door when opportunity
knocks and that it is foolish to pass up a
good thing. The employer who lays off
his workers may tell himself that everyone has to look after himself. He will, of
course, not hesitate to accept a loan
from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation even though he occasionally
denounces government bureaus which
perform economic functions.
This kind of self-deception and confusion will always exist in the area of
values as long as we teach that the moral
problem involves choices between good
and evil rather than between good and
good. Neither is it an adequate solution
to indoctrinate against self-deception.
Teaching people how to choose among
competing goods (values) may not
reduce self-deception but such teaching
would make self-deception
less
necessary. The Sunday School and the
public school too frequently supply no
answer to mo~ality other than the
answer of a correct motor response. People who merely learn perceptually a set
of attitudes rather than a process of valuing must always decide in some
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unreflective manner what to do when
values are in conflict.
These value conflicts (involving
choices between good and good) arise
within groups as well as within individuals. In fact, the conflicts often exist within individuals because those conflicts are resident in the group culture. A
curriculum which passed on the cultural
heritage without refinement and selection would merely present the learner
with a bundle of conflicts. A curriculum
which passed on a selected and refined
part of the cultural heritage would still
be inadequate because conflicts between
good and good would always arise
within that purified heritage. The latter
is the kind of value conflict which arises
when a man wants to be both honest and
kind in a situation that will not permit
him to be both. A more adequate approach would supplement refinement
and selection with considerable attention
to the problem of how to make choices
when decency conflicts with decency. In
terms of learning theory it is not going
too far to say that any value such as
honesty cannot acquire a clear meaning
except as it is brought into sharp conflict
with a value such as kindness.

.. . any value, such as
honesty cannot acquire
a clear meaning except
as it is brought into
sharp conflict with
a value
such as kindness.
Whether the conflict is between individuals, between groups, or within individuals, we find that goods are in controversy and conflict; that values are
competing for our acceptance; that
choices have to be made. The values in
conflict acquire more clarity of meaning
as we reflectively consider alternative
consequences. This facing of conflicting
sets of consequences is made possible by
a curriculum which gives major recognition to the solving of problems and the
understanding of controversial issues.
In these situations of value conflict
there are at least two positions as to what
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constitutes good behavior. One position
says that the good person is one who
makes the right decision, who does the
proper thing. The other position says
that the good person is one who makes
his decision reflectively. According to
this latter view, a value is good not so
much in terms of its specific forness or
againstness, but in terms of how it is acquired and held. This position
recognizes that ends and means are continuous with one another, and that a
democratic end can be achieved only
through the democratic means of reflective thought. Democratic morality rests
upon the process of reflection.

Attitudes, Beliefs, and the
Building of Values
We pick up from the culture many attitudes and beliefs. Values, however, are
not acquired in this way. Values are
built as we choose reflectively from the
attitudes we have unreflectively acquired. These attitudes are bound to
have an unreflective origin even though
the school would avoid their inculcation.
It is humanly impossible for us to reflect
in advance of all that we acquire as belief
or attitude.
Attitudes are examined reflectively
when we test beliefs involved in and
related to our attitudes.
Beliefs,
although different from, are related to
attitudes. Our attitucle toward tomato
juice, for example, rests in part upon
what we believe to be true of tomato
juice. As these beliefs are reflectively examined our attitude approaches the
character of a value.
In short, values are built as attitudes
are clarified through an examination of
beliefs. We do not build values through
precept, example, ceremony, practice,
or ritual. The process of valuing is more
reflective than the memorization of a
preamble, or the taking of an oath. The
person who pledges allegiance may be
no more loyal than the person who does
not. Neither does valuing result alone or
necessarily from attendance in church,
or from the daily reading of the Bible.
These practices fall largely in the area of
attitude inculcation.
Johnny Brown has acquired in the
usual way the usual attitudes toward
honesty and kindness. He is for
politeness and against rudeness, for
honesty and against dishonesty. His opportunity for value-building arises when

his attitude toward honesty conflicts
with his attitude toward kindness.
Whether he can or will handle this conflict reflectively depends in part upon
the nature of his previous learning. If a
substantial part of his previous learning
is conceptual, and if it includes the habit
and the valuing of reflection, then, further value-building may take place.
In facing his problem reflectively, he
will try to predict the consequences of
his behavior in advance of behaving. He
will try to figure out the consequences of
telling the truth as contrasted with the
consequences of not telling the truth.
His predictions will take the form of ifthen propositions.
The elaboration of hypotheses in the
shape of if-then propositions is made
possible for the learner whose learning
has been conceptual as well as motor
perceptual. The concepts come from
past reflection as do many of the data
used in testing the truth of the propositions. That is, the reflective approach to
value problems includes both the formulation of propositions and the use of
evidence in their testing. Is it true that
the telling of the truth will antagonize
the Joneses? What are some likely consequences of such antagonism? Perhaps
the Joneses will not be hurt or angry and
will simply dismiss the incident as childish. Some testing of alternative and projected consequences must take place if
Johnny is to know what he is doing
before he does it.
There is a difference between saying
that one should not tell the truth, and
saying that if one tells the truth then
Mrs. Jones will have her feelings hurt.
The first statement is attitudinal in its
form, and it is neither true nor false.
The second statement is propositional in
form, and it is either true or false. One
can test the second statement by
reference to publicly available data. ~he
first statement suggests that we act irrespective of consequences while the second statement suggests that we take
consequences into account.
It may be objected that the formulation and testing of if-then propositions
does not tell Johnny which· set of consequences to prefer. This objection brings
us to the question of whether we can
have a full-blown science of values. Certainly the testing of propositions can be
scientific in quality. What about the
choice that is made between two sets of
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consequences? Does the scientific
method provide an answer to this kind
of choice? One set of consequences cannot be validated over another set of consequences in any ultimate ~ense but consequences which are immediate can be
related to those which are remote. If we
get these consequences, then, what else
do we get? Any proposition which deals
with further consequences can be tested
in the same way as any other proposition. But no matter how far the consequences are projected Johnny must
decide what do, and when this decision
is made the projection of consequences
has, for the moment, come to a conclusion. The scientific method cannot be
used for determining ultimate value any
more than it can be used to determine
ultimate truth.
When Johnny decides to be kind, let
us say, rather than truthful, how is his
decision different from one made
without the prediction and verification
of consequences? The chief difference is
that he sees more clearly what he is
about. He sees more clearly what he is
likely to get. He may even see more
clearly what it is that he wants. He can
hardly know what he wants if he does
not know the consequences of wanting
to be kind instead of truthful. The projection of consequences may help us to
decide what we want. It is here that we
fmd the difference between an attitude
and a value. An attitude is an unexamined, and, perhaps, an .inculcated
preference while a value stands for an
examined and plannd for preference.

■
When we use the reflective approach
to values in our teaching, we seek to
carry on operations which are both free
and experimental. We try to fmd out
through free and permissive discussion,
and similar techniques, what our
students believe and have attitudes
toward. We try to fmd out what is on
their mind, what it is that bothers them,
and what is confusing to them. We try to
help them to see more clearly the nature
of the conflicts among and within them.
We try to help them to project or to anticipate consequences of acting upon
certain beliefs and attitudes. We try to
help them to find data which they can
use in testing the probable truth _orfalsity of what they believe to be likely conse-

quences of doing this rather than that.
The central emphasis is upon helping
them as best we can to see more clearly
what they believe, what they value, and
what they are doing as a consequence of
acting upon certain premises or assumptions. As alternatives become more
clear, they are in a position to choose
beliefs and values. In the absence of
these clearly conceived alternatives they
are stuck with the valueless content of
mixed and inconsistent attitudes acquired willy-nilly from a culture that
does not know where it is going.

Building Democratic Values
It has been said that we cannot build
democratic values in a school that fails to
practice democracy: This is true as far as
it goes and provided that practice is not
give a mechanistic meaning. The statement that we must live democratically in
order to learn the meaning of democracy
can become a cliche leading to serious
misconception. We know that people in
concentration camps sometimes learn to
value democracy. Like the person who
values fresh air when he emerges from a
dank mine many of us value freedom
only after we have had a taste of tyranny. Nevertheless, we are on sound
ground when we try to build a valuing of
freedom in the presence of freedom. In
the schools we want students to feel free
to express their attitudes for we could
hardly be successful in our attempts to
build values if we were ignorant of the
attitudes we were trying to clarify. A
permissive and reflective atmosphere is
essential to the clarification of attitudes
and the testing of beliefs. We cannot lose
sight of the fact that the democratic
school is both permissive and experimental. Democratic values by their
very nature cannot be imposed. They
must arise from the thinking of the
learner, and there is no known technique by which teachers can make
students think.
We defeat our democratic purposes
when we list certain values as
democratic and then proceed to indoctrinate them. Students may have their
attitudes determined for them, or they
may think their way toward a value
structure. As Plato once said, we are
slaves who serve the purposes of other
men. In a democracy we are free to participate in the creation of the values by
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which we intend to live. A non-participatory approach to values means that we
merely acquire attitudes each of which is
held as an absolute. When one absolute
conflicts with another we are lost for
decision. Sometimes an attitude is held
so absolutely that we oppose with witchhunting any attempt to make it an object
of intelligent criticism.
The high school curriculum can promote the learning of values and valuing
as it opens to criticism those many attitudes which are usually protected,
sacred, and unreflectively held. Our
culture is shot through with touchy spots
within which reflective thought is
regarded as subversive activity. I am
reminded of the friend who said that his
community regarded him as a socialist
because his class was studying social
problems. There is in this country a
serious opposition to the promotion of
any kind of learning which threatens to
make insecure the usual ways of doing
business. It is not without irony that
there is this opposition to reflective learning inside a culture that is considered
by many one of the last fortresses of
freedom.
These are sorry days for those who
value freedom, and the attempt to build
democratic values is risky business. We
have now carried our attitude toward
the correct motor response to the extent
of regarding a loyalty oath as some
evidence for a person's loyalty. Those
who refuse in the name of freedom to
sign such oaths on the ground that their
use represents an attempt to "scare off''
those who would deal with controversial
issues in the classroom are rashly labelled disloyal. Yet if there is anything at all
in the theory we have discussed here,
there can be no building of loyalty as a
value when teachers and students feel
inhibited and restrained whenever they
study issues that are "hot" and problems that are "current". It -well may be
that those who worry most about the
loyalty of the teacher and the maturity of
the student are those whose unexamined
policies could not stand the test and
scrutiny of rigorously reflective thought.
There is no curricular practice more
undemocratic than that of closing off
reflection in any area ofliving.
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A Philosophy for Children Workshop
for Chicago Teachers of the Gifted.
George Dalin

uring the 1978 winter quarter
at De Paul University, a ten consecutive week workshop
on the
Philosophy for Children program was
held for Chicago Public School teachers
of gifted elementary school pupils.
Twenty-nine teachers and one coordinator, selected by the director of gifted
programs, began the workshop and
twenty-five teachers successfully completed the workshop. All of the
workshop participants were certificated
elementary school teachers who, in addition to their regular classroom teaching,
taught part time gifted programs. A majority of the teachers held advanced
degrees; however, very few of them had
any university or college training in
philosophy~ A cross section of teachers
throughout the Chicago school system
was represented.

D

The workshop participants were given
various options in which to receive
credit for the after school three-hour sessions. Many of the teacher opted for advanced salary lane placement credit for
the Chicago Public Schools' curriculum
department. Some of the teachers
prefered a one hundred dollar stipend.
A few of the teachers decided to register
for graduate credit; these teachers were
also given a one hundred dollar stipend
to de/ray the cost of the graduate level
credit.
. In charting the instructional course
for the workshop, the director of gifted
programs, his staff, and I planned a
course outline, which was approved by
the deputy superintendent of curriculum, that consisted of reviewing the
Philosophy for Children materials, of
viewing the lnstitute's video tapes, and

of developing classroom instructional
strategics. Since many of the workshop
participants
had little training in
syllogistic reasoning, they were introduced to some basic logical concepts.
The teachers were assigned to read

Ha"y

Stottlemeier's Diseooery, Lisa

(Chapters 1 and 2), the instructional
in tM
manuals for both novels, Philosophy
Classroom,and Logie: The .Art of Defining
and Reasoningby John Oesterle. Written
assignments consisted of exercises from
the logic text, a lesson plan on one of the
philosophical topics from Ha,ry , and a
short paper on the nature and value of
philosophy for children.
Each workshop session was divided
into three parts. The first part focused
on the novel (Ha,ry) and the instructional manual; exercises were selected from
the manual and reviewed by the entire
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group. The second part of each session
was devoted to viewing the Institute's
video tapes. The final part was spent on
the basic concepts of logic. Eight of the
ten workshop sessions were devoted to
Harry Stottlemeier'sDiscoveryand two sessions on Lisa.
How successful the workshop was is
what I will now discuss. It should be
noted that I conducted the workshop
without an assistant, and it was my first
experience
using the Institute' s
materials with classroom teachers. My
course outline had to be· revised from
time to time. Sometimes I had success in
getting teachers to be critical in their
thinking; other times I fell flat on my
face. However, the teachers and I still
managed to accomplish some of the objectives of the workshop.
When the teachers and I discussed the
Philosophy for Children materials, we
engaged in various activities. Many of
the exercises in the Harry instructional
manual lend themselves to various instructional strategies. Many of the
teachers indicated that role-playing on
their part would help them to understand the philosophical concepts from a
child's point of view. This strategy,
when used in the workshop, seemed to
get many of the teachers involved in the
discussion. Another strategy that proved
successful was when small groups of
teachers presented a lesson to the rest of
the class. A majority of the teachers,
though, were more comfortable when I
led the discussions on logic. Some of the
teachers admitted to the rest of the workshop participants that they had a lifelong
difficulty with logical reasoning.
However, this did not prevent some of
these teachers from providing valuable
contributions on the difficulties they had
in understanding the material and then
teaching the material to their class when
the time would arrive for them to do so.
What was exciting to me was that
some of the teachers went back to their
classrooms and tried some of the Harry
material with their students. These few
teachers shared their experiences with
the rest of us during the workshop session. One teacher taped her pupils'
responses to Chapter One of Harry; she
then dittoed the responses and gave each
teacher a copy. The teachers greatly appreciated this teacher's effort. It gave
them evidence that demonstrated that

inner city pupils were certainly capable
of understanding the material. It should
be noted that the teachers were not required to begin the Philosophy for
Children program until they had completed the ten week workshop.
At first, the teachers were in doubt as
to what constituted a philosophical discussion. After they had read the chapter
on philosophical discussion from Philosophyin the Classroom,the teachers had difficulty in transferring what they read to
the workshop discussions. It seemed to
me at the beginning of the workshop
that many of the teachers wanted to find
a method that would guarantee them
that they could distinguish between nonphilosophical discussion and philosophical discussion. I used Professor Clyde
Evans' paper, ''Philosophy With Children: Some Experiences and Some Reflections' ' to explain some of the basic
skills children would need for a philosophical discussion. Professor Evans'
paper helped the teachers to understand
the basic concepts. When the teachers
re-read the chapter on philosophical
discussion in Professor Lipman's book,
they were able to grasp the basics of a
philosophical discussion.
In the early sessions of the workshop,
the pervasive attitude among the teachers was that one belief or opinion was
just as good as the next belief or opinion.
At times some teachers were claiming
that philosophers simply engaged in a
confusing game of semantics or logic
chopping. To counter this attitude, I
drew their attention to what Harry and
his friends were doing in the novel. I explained and illustrated that philosophic·
al analysis and methodology consisted of
clarity and precision and the posing of
questions that would probe the topic
at hand.
Part of each workshop concentrated
on teaching strategies. I decided to use
the Institute's videotapes on classroom
instruction of the Philosophy for Children program. These videotapes were
made in classrooms where the Philos·
ophy for Children program was imple·
mented. ·The workshop participants
used a teacher rating sheet, prepared by
the Institute, each time they viewed a
videotape. The rating sheet, however,
was used by some teachers as a means of
fmding fault with the teacher's perfor·
mance. I had to emphasize to the

teachers that the videotapes were to be
viewed and analyzed with great care.
The object of viewing, then, was not
finding fault in teaching styles but to see
how the pupils were responding to Harry
Stottlemeitr's Discoveryand the exercises
from the manual. After a few videotapes
I made the rating sheet an optional exer·
cise which was favorably received by the
teachers.
The point I want to make about the
videotapes is that they are, I believe, an
integral part of the Philosophy for
Children workshop. Some of the teach·
ers demonstrate excellent rapport with
the children. This is important for the
success of the program. Also the video·
tapes, for the most part, show that
pupils at various achievement levels
have the ability to grasp the central
issues in the Harry and Lisa novels. We
also see that many of the pupils share
their experiences and thoughts with
their peers. The important factor about
showing these videotapes, then, is to tell
the viewers to suspend their judgment
about teachers' idiosyncrasies and to
concentrate on the discussion that is taking place.
I must admit that I sometimes turned
some of the workshop sessions into tor·
ture sessions for the teachers. I believe
Charles Sanders Peirce once claimed
(perhaps with tongue in cheek), "Few
persons care to study logic, because
everybody conceives himself to be pro·
ficient enough in the art of reasoning
already.'' I should have taken this
observation by Peirce into account. The
first mistake I made was to assign an
of logic text. (Perhaps
Aristotelian
subconsciously I wanted to get back at
someone after my undergraduate experience with such a text). Many of the
teachers were in agony when they at·
tempted to grapple with the "Distinc·
tions Preliminary to the Categories"
chapter. I told the teachers that this type
of additional work in logic would aid
them; they, on the other hand, thought
this additional work was the work of an
evil genie. To put it simply, I wasted
their time.
When I received the ''Thinking
About Thinking''
filmstrip series, I
found that the logic presented on the
filmstrip was understandable for all the
teachers. All of the teachers were able to
understand the basic concepts, and the

type
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worksheets contained in the kit were intelligible to all. The filmstrip series and
the exercises in the two manuals are
more than enough to cover the logic
needed to teach the program. A college
text on logic is not necessary to cover the
basic logic in both novels.
At the last workshop session, the
teachers were given a brief questionnaire, prepared by the director of gifted
programs, on the effectiveness of the
workshop. About 70 percent of the
teachers rated the workshop sessions as
"good" or "very good". Twenty-six
percent of the respondents rated the
workshop as "fair". Four percent rated
the sessions as "excellent". When they
were asked what was the major value of
the workshop various answers were
given. Many of the teachers (90%)
thought that the Philosophy for Children materials were excellent. Some of
the respondents (40 %) believed that
their classroom teaching techniques
would change for the better. A majority
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of the respondents (90 %) felt that learning about the basic concepts of logic anci
the use of philosophical discussion would
held them to implement the program at
their home schools. One teacher wrote
that she would no longer accept '' stock
answers" from her pupils.
Various suggestions were made by the
workshop participants on how to improve the Philosophy for Children program workshop. Some of the teachers
(35%) wanted me to simplify the college
text logic. A few (20%) wanted to
discuss more of the exercises from the
two instructional manuals. Some of the
teachers (30 %) wanted more roleplaying in order to get more teachers involved in the workshop disucssions.
Another suggestion made by some
teachers (25 %) was to reduce the
amount of required reading. Finally,
twenty-five percent of the respondents
wanted to spend more time discussing
the Harry novel and Philosophyin the

Classroom.

In summary, the ten-week workshop
was, I believe, a success. This evaluation on my part is illustrated by the
teachers' willingness to participate in a
program that has much to offer gifted
children. Practically all the teachers
demonstrated a positive attitude toward
the program. This is not to say it was
always smooth sailing for me and the
teachers. We had our moments of frustration, but we also had some moments
where we were able to get to the philosophical issues in both novels. The
eagerness of some teachers to get some
of the Harry material into their regular
classroom instruction was exc1tmg.
These teachers helped to generate interest in the other teachers about the
program. How the teachers implement
the program and carry out the program
on a daily basis with pupils remains to
be seen. All indications of success seem
to me in the offing with this first group
of Chicago teachers of the gifted who
participated in the workshop.
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Philosophy in Childhood
Were it even without the comparatively frequent recurrence of exalted moments breaking our routine, we
could, all of us, be conscious of what is
going on in the thinker's mind by recalling our childhood. All children under
nine or ten years of age _are poets and
philosophers. They pretend to live with
the rest of us, and the rest of us imagine
that we influence them so that their lives
are only a reflection of our own. But, as
a matter of fact, they are as self-contained as cats and as continuously attentive
to the magical charm of what they see
inwardly. Their mental wealth is extraordinary; only the greatest artists or
poets, whose resemblance to children is
a banal certainty, can give us some idea
of it. A goiden-haired little fellow playing with his blocks in the garden may be
conscious all the time of the sunset while
pretending not to look at it. ''Come
along!" the nurse said to Felicite de la
Memmais, eight years old, "you have
looked long enough at those waves and
everybody is going away.'' The answer
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"/ls regardentce queje regarde,mais ils ne
voientpasce queje vois,'' 1 was no brag, but
merely a plea to stay on. Who can tell
what the four Bronte tots saw or did not
see in the moors through which, day
after day, they rambled holding hands?
Cannot you remember looking for long
spells at a mere patch of red on a sheet of
paper or in your little paint-box? Most
intelligent children, as was the case with
Newman, have the philosopher's doubts
about the existence of the world. You
see them looking curiously at a stone;
you think "children are so funny" and
all the time they are wondering if the
stone may not be eternal, and what it is
to be eternal. Have I not heard a little
girl of nine interrupt a conversation of
professors who were talking about
nothing to ask the astounding question:
''Father, what is beauty? What makes
it?"
This superiority of intellect persists
until the child's imitativeness begins to
work from the outside in. When Jack
begins to copy Daddy's way of shaking
his head of shrugging his shoulders, his
poor little soul also begins to be satisfied
with dismissing questions. Pretty soon
this magnificent tide of interest which
fills the child's soul will ebb away to
leave it dry and arid. There may be occasional returns of it. All school-boys,
writing an essay for their teacher, are
·visited by thoughts which they realize
would be what is called literature, but
they do not dare to write them down,
and ill-treated inspiration, in its turn,
does not dare to return.
J. ''They watch what I am watching,but t/aeydo not see
what I see."

-from Ernest Dlmnet, The Art of Thinking,
{New York: Simon and Schuster, 1929)pp.
32-33.
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Thinking and Literacy
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I cannot help feeling, Phaedrus,that
writing la unfortunately like painting; for
the creations of the painter have the attitude of life, and yet If you ask them a
question they preserve a solemn sllence.
And the same may be said of speeches.
You would Imagine that they had lntelllgence, but If you want to know
anything and put a question to one of
them, the speaker always gives one unvarying answer. And when they have been
once written down they are tumbled about
anywhere among those who may or may
not understand them, and know not to
whom they should reply, to whom not:
and, If they are maltreated or abused, they
haveno parent to protect them; and they
cannot protect or defend themselvea.

o spoke Socrates, the philosopher

Swho for centuries has served as our
model of rational thought.• Today

Socrates' position is in jeopardy. You
see, Socrates engaged in oral philosophical discussion. His dialogues with
his students come down to us in written
form thanks to Plato. The dominant
belief today, however, is that thinking
and literacy are inextricably bound
together. 2
According to the psychologists,
literacy transforms a person's cognitive
capacities; indeed, it leads to forms of
thought which, because they are
abstract, are considered to be higher.

But their view of the relationship of
thinking to literacy does not stop there.
Written language is taken to be a precondition of abstract thought as well as
its generator. Thus, the oral cast of
mind is said to constitute "the chief
obstacle to the classification of experience, to the rearrangement in sequence of cause and effect, to the use of
analysis, and to scientific rationalism."'
It seems that oral and written statements
differ radically: we deem the former to
be successful if they are undentood, for
their primary function is interpersonal;
we deem the latter to be successful if
they appeal to premises and to rules of
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logic, for their primary function is interpersonal; we deem the latter to be
successful if they appeal to premises and
to rules of logic, for their primary function is getting it right.+
The object of this essay is to challenge
the thesis - henceforth the Dependency
Thesis - that thinking is dependent on
literacy. I will explore, first, the implications for that thesis of the very existence
of Socrates and will then consider the
claim, made by many teachers of
English, that learning to write just is
learning to think. This will be followed
by an examination of the claim made by
the psychologists that it is not the act of
writing, but written language itself,
which binds thinking to literacy. My
discussion of the relationship between
written language and thinking will lead

of presuppositions and implications; if
only written statements could be used to
examine problems and produce new
knowledge; if the latter alone were
capable of being counterintuitive while
the former of necessity were congruent
with dogma - the life and death of
Socrates would be unintelligible.
Socrates was a philosopher and a gadfly
and was put to death for it. Yet his
thinking was done on his feet: it was exhibited not in the composition of essays,
but in the give and take of conversation.
Scholars have shown that the Greece
of Socrates was in the process of becoming a literate culture. 6 They know that
Socrates himself was able to read and
write. Ought we not to assume, then,
that Socrates was the thinker he was
becausehe was literate?Granted, the ex-

to a consideration of the various kinds of
thinking. Once it is recognized that the
Dependency Thesis forces a single, narrow mold on human thought, the
dangerous implications of that thesis for
education in thinking will become apparent. In the final section of this essay
these will be explored and suggestions
for a more fruitful approach to thinking
as an aim of education will be made.
1. The Case of Socrates
Unless we are to suppose that Socrates
was a closet essayist who memorized
written dialogues with his students for
presentation in the marketplace, we
must reject the invidious distinction
drawn by psychologists such as David
Olson between utterances and texts. 5 If
that distinction were valid - if oral
statements could not withstand analysis

istence of Socrates makes the distinction
between oral and written statements
untenable. Still, his existe~ce would
seem to be compatible with the thesis
that literacy and thinking are inextricably bound together.
Socrates poses no problem for the
Dependency Thesis so long as we
assume that he became literate beforehe
began his philosophizing. It is not clear
that we can legitimately assume this,
however. Scholars believe that in his day
the teaching of reading and writing
began in adolescence, but we do not
know if Socrates' own education in the
2Rs began then, let alone when his philosophizing began. We must also assume
that his literacy was roughly equivalent
to literacy as we know it today, and it is
not clear that we can legitimately do so.
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In the Greece of Socrates oral communication apparently was still dominant. There were books, and for over
three centuries an alphabet; however,
there is good reason to believe that
words were not composed for people to
read but for them to listen to. In the
dialogue from which our opening quotation was taken, Socrates does not read
for himself the speech which Phaedrus
carries on a roll hidden in his cloak, but
asks Phaedrus to read it to him.
Phaedrus, in turn, has heard it read
repeatedly. Thus, whether Socrates was
fluent in both reading and writing by
modern standards is a real question.
It is difficult for us to realize that
Socrates was steeped in a culture in
which the written word did not have the
monopoly over intellectual life it has today. But SUJ>iPOSe
for the sake of argument that Socrates was as fluent a reader
and writer as the experts today claim
children must be if they are to explore
problems,
draw out implications,
analyze, classify and in general think
along abstract lines. We must still differentiate between individuals in preliterate or oral cultures and individuals
who are non-readers and non-writers or at least unaccomplished readers and
writers - in a literate culture such as
ours. Our culture is dominated by the
written word and permeated by abstract
thought. It provides an environment,
therefore, in which the kind of thinking
associated with literacy can be acquired
whetheror not an individual is ableto reador
write.

2. Writing and Thinking
Psychologists are not the only advocates of the Dependency Thesis. Teachers of English repeatedly tell us that
writing and thinking are inseparable
and that learning to write i'slearning to
think. 7 Let us, therefore, bracket the
case of Socrates and examine that complex activity we call "writing" to see
which of its many components can
plausibly be linked to thinking.
Grand claims have been made for
handwriting. It has been said that the
ability to write italic script will give
Johnny "the identity and self-confidence he seeks so desperately to find in
an increasingly mechanistic,
computerized, automated society.' ' 8 Italic
writing has also been linked to good
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taste in prose and has been called a rational verbal skill. 9 Yet the purported effects on personality of a fine Italian hand
have not been documented, and to call
any sort of handwriting a rationalskill is
grossly misleading for handwriting is a
neutral skill which can be used in the
service of both rationality and irrationality. One method of handwriting
may be better than another for its visual
beauty, its legibility or its ease of learning, but handwriting is still handwriting: a tool to use in expressing oneself
and in communicating with others.
Many people have jumped on the
handwriting bandwagon thinking that
they were supporting education for
critical thinking, logical reasoning and
scientific method or even a new humanism. But no amount of training in handwriting will make the world a better
place or us better thinkers. Those on the
bandwagon have rightly called handwriting a trappingof literacy without
realizing that trappings are ornamental,
not essential. We have all known highly
literate people equipped with crabbed
scrawls, and a look at the manuscripts in
the British Museum is enough to convince one that logical lions can have
abominable penmanship.
Skill in handwriting is essential
neither for literacy nor for rational,
abstract thought. Nor can we count on
proficiency in handwriting to repoduce
literacy or to raise the level of our
thought processes. Consider how many
people there are with a beautiful hand
and nothing to say! Let their existence
be a warning to us all that handwriting
instruction can too easily become the
opiate of our children, occupying their
time and their minds and making both
them and us believe that they are learning much more than they really are! In
truth, this aspect of writing is separable
from literacy and can be detached from
thinking.
When we are confronted- with
children who do not handwrite fluently
and legibly we need to remember that an
education in handwriting can be bypassed without sacrificing either literacy or
rational thought. Indeed, if our interest
is in fostering good thinking, we owe it
to those children who have difficulty
learning to handwrite to explore alternative tools for recording and communicating their ideas. We owe it to
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them, for instance, to provide opportunities to learn to typewrite. We tend to
assume that handwriting is essential for
all to learn whereas typing is a frill and,
furthermore, that handwriting must be
learned first. Yet one can learn to type
before learning to handwrite and, although typing is not essential for all to
learn, it is a skill which can have quite as
much value for the possessor as handwriting can, which is not to say that
either one provides a magical access to
the world of rational, abstract thought.
It will be said that handwriting can be
bypassed in an education for thinking
because there is an alternative tool for
recording one's ideas, namely typewriting, but that both typewriting and handwriting demand that we be able to spell.
However, while the performance of
these skills requires that ::;tatements be
inscribed on physical material for others
to read, it does not require that the
author of the statements be adept at
spelling. For one thing, we can tolerate a
good many misspelled words in our
reading of texts, perhaps more than we
realize. The objections people have to
misspelled words stem less from the difficulties they pose for comprehension
than from the failure to distinguish trapping from essentials. Spelling, like
handwriting, is a trapping of literacy.
But whereas in our calmer moments we
recognize that one can be literate
without a legible hand, we do not extend
such charity to the misspeller. When
"i" and "e" are reversed, when single
"r" is doubled and double "c" is not,
we never stop to find out if an author
can read fluently and write coherently,
let alone whether ideas are being explored and implications drawn; we
simply dismiss text and author as unworthy of attention.
Misspelling is an interesting phenomenon. Years ago, as a fifth and sixth
grade teacher, I became convinced that
some children had a knack for spelling
and other,s did not, and that the ability
to spell had nothing to do with their
powers of thought. Yet to this day I feel
humiliated by my own spelling mistakes
and embarrassed by those of others.
Surely I am not the only one to cringe in
the face of a misspelled word. The
reason for this gut reaction is obvious
enough: we judge people's literacy by
their spelling - or at least their illiteracy

by the misspelling - and we judge their
intelligence and social worth by their
literacy . 10 "Is it possible that the author
of this communique is· dumb?" I ask
before recalling that spelling is neither
necessary nor sufficient for learning and
rational thought, but is simply a tool for
aiding communication.
As I have said, we can understand
misspelled texts. Moreover, if one's
spelling is so bad that communication is
hampered, it is always possible to dictate
and let someone else transcribe what one
has to say. A fifth grader whose name
really was Johnny and whose spelling
problems were legion used to insist that
he did not need to learn to spell since
when he grew up a secretary would do
his spelling for him. I argued, cajoled
and browbeat him to drill on his twenty
words a week, but of course Johnny was
right. If he does not now have a
secretary, he can turn to family or
friends or use telephones and tapes. For
him, althoughr certainly not for all my
fifth and sixth graders, learning to spell
was filled with frustration and misery:
he simply could not do it without
sacrifice on his part and that of his teachers which was out of all proportion to the
benefits which might accrue.
If we judge people by their spelling,
we judge them even more by their grammar. Yet how essential is good grammar
for rational thought? Surely a person
can reason logically while splitting in·
finitives and can tease out the presup·
positions and implications of statements
while saying, "Me and him went to the
movies." A child who does not realize
that "John hit Mary" entails "Mary
was hit by John" will have limited ability to draw logical conclusions. But this
kind of knowledge is not at issue when
people say that learning to write is learning to think. At some very deep level
grammar and thinking merge. But at
that level - inference - an education
about gerunds, subordinate clauses and
the parts of speech is irrelevant. Just as
brilliant thinkers can have an illegible
hand and a penchant for misspelled
words, so too can they dangle participles
and misuse the subjunctive.
Thinking can be detached from handwriting, spelling and grammar and it
should be lest we fill up the curriculum
of the early years with these subjects in
the belief that children are thereby
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learning to reason. Mastery of these
skills is certainly not to be scorned but it
should not be confused with literacy, let
alone with thinking itself. The danger,
you see, is that we will get so bogged
down in teaching the mechanics of
writing that we will never get beyond
them to teach the very things we appeal
to in justifying training in those
mechanics. Remember, then, that an
education in the mechanics of writing is
neither an essential ingredient nor a
guarantee of rational, abstract thinking.

3. Thinking in an Oral Medium
The aspect of writing which one must
assume is at issue when it is claimed that
learning to write is just learning to think
in composition - that is, the creation of
written works. For this an author does
not need to possess mechanical skills
such as handwriting and spelling since
the final product, and even intermediate
stages thereof, can be transcribed by
another. What is required of one who
composes written works - at least
prose, non-fiction works - is that ideas
be presented and organized, evidence
and arguments be marshalled, and implications and conclusions be drawn.
When you get right down to it, a wellexecuted prose, non-fiction work exhibits the very kind of thinking which
according to the psychologists is a consequence of literacy. It might be supposed
therefore, that in order to learn to think
a person must learn to compose such
works. Yet learning to compose written
works is simply one way to learn to think
logically and abstractly. It may be a
good way for some people, but there is
no reason to suppose it is a good way for
everyone or that it is the only way.
That so few of us seriously entertain
alternatives to the teaching of writing as
a way of teaching children to think is a
sad commentary on our society's fixation on the written word and its devaluation of oral communication. Children
couldlearn to explore ideas orally; they
could be given practice through discussion in finding implications; they could
learn by engaging in dialogue to
challenge assumptions and defend their
conclusions; they could be given experience in listening for nonsequiturs.
Gareth Matthews has documented a
number of fascinating philosophical
discussions he and other adults have had

with young children when they ask questions such as this one: 11
Jordan (five years old), going to bed at 8
P.M., asked: "If I go to bed at 8 and get
up at 7 in the morning, how do I really
know that the little hand of the clock has
gone around only once? Do I have to
stay up all night to watch It?
"If I look away even for a short time
maybe the small hand wlll go around
twice."

Many parents would regard Jordan's
question as a manoeuvre for postponing
his bedtime. Others would tell Jordan
not to worry, the clock is a new one and
does not pick up speed. However, as
Matthews points out, Jordan's question
may be a much deeper one that these
parents realize. Jordan's concern is perhaps a very general one about whether
observed states are a reliable guide to
unobserved states. Indeed, Jordan may
have put his finger on the philosophical

problem of induction or on the still more
fundamental problem of whether anything at all exists while he sleeps.
We really do not know how far oral
communication can take us in the development of thinking for we do not give it
a chance. Our prejudices against oral
communication run deep. Despite the
gross inadequacies of our Post Office,
the most literate among us bemoan the
rise of the telephone and the resultant
decline of written correspondence.
Meanwhile, college professors reward
students for well-written examinations
while giving no credit for intelligent contributions to class discussions. As a college teacher, how often have I heard it
said, and said myself, "It's funny, but I
really misjudged that student. From his
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comments in class I had gotten the impression he understood the material
almost as well as I did, but his final exam is badly written. He obviously is a
poor student! 1 '
We do not dream that thinking is
compatible with utterance, nor that
abstract thoughts and concerns may be
lurking in the minds and hearts of young
children. David Ecker has recorded an
hour-long discussion in a sixth grade
classroom of the relationship between
theories of art and contemporary paintings.12 His summary and analysis of it
make it quite clear that the children not
only understood the imitation theory of
art the fteacher had introduced to them,
but were capable of criticizing it: they
adduced counterexamples, pointed out
the undesirable positions to which one
endorsed the theory would be committed and raised questions about imitation
itself. Of course, they did all this under
the guidance of a teacher. The point is
that we were fortunate enough to have a
teacher who encouraged dialogue and
tried to further theoretical discussion.
Few adults take the theoretical questions of children seriously; 13 instead,
they brush them aside oi: transform
them into psychological or physical
questions to which they then give very
concrete answers. Were adults to treat
children's intellectual concerns with
respect and encourage discussion of
them, children might be well on their
way to becoming highly developed
thinkers long before they had mastered
the 3Rs. Indeed, the compositions they
were required to write in school might
have some meaning for them since, as
abstract thinkers, they might have some
point to make , and be armed with
arguments to support it. a
Socrates worried that reliance on the
written word would weaken memory. 15
Today most of us have no memory for
the broad outlines, not to mention the
nuances and details, of oral argument.
We doubt that children can really learn
to think if they cannot write down their
thoughts, for we do not believe that people can connect their ideas to one another if they cannot go back over their
statements. ''How can one's arguments
be coherent if the premises are not right
there to be read and reread?" we ask,
forgetting that we have been conditioned by the written word. I once wrote an
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examination in constitutional law for a
blind student at the Harvard Law
School; that is, he composed it and, as
he did, I transcribed it. The most
remarkable aspect for me of that remarkable experience was that, although
he sometimes paused between sentences
for many minutes, he never asked me to
read back to him what I had set down. I
read his exam back to myself repeatedly
to see if his train of thought was coherent, but he did not have to do this for his
memory was trained as mine was not.
In this age of technology, however,
memory is not the vital commodity it
once was. Dialogues, conversations, oral
arguments, dictated examinations and
compositions can all be taped. Just as
writers can reread their premises, speakers can rehear them. To be sure, listening takes time, but then the kind of
thinking which involves the analysis of
presuppositions and the drawing out of
implications is at best a slow process.

4. Speaking a Written Language
We have seen that thinking can be detached from writing both as mechanical
skill and as composition. The latter,
therefore, can be bypassed in an education designed to teach people to think.
However, while teachers of English tend
to stress the act or processof writing as
they endorse the Dependency Thesis,
the psychologists seem to be more concerned with the raw materialsof writing
than with its processes - that is, with
the nature of written statements themselves. Thus we must ask if literacy and
thinking are inextricably bound together
by virtue of the very form or structure of
written, as opposed to oral, language.
It is an open question if a distinction
between oral and written language can
withstand critical examination. Certainly Olson's distinction between utterance
and text is not satisfactory. He has summarized it in terms of three underlying
principles. 16 First, utterances appeal for
their meaning to shared experiences and
interpretations; because they do, the criterion for a successful utterance is understanding on the part of the listener.
Texts, on the other hand, appeal to
premises and rules of logic for deriving
implications; thus the criterion for a successful statement of text is its formal
structure. Second, utterances and texts
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appeal to different conceptions of truth.
Truth in the former has to do with
wisdom, while truth in the latter has to
do with the correspondence between
statements and observations: thus true
statements in a text may be counter to
intuition, commonsense or authority
while true statements in utterances will
be congruent with dogma or the wisdom
of elders. Third, utterances and text differ in regard to function: in oral speech
the interpersonal function is primary,
hence if a sentence is inappropriate to
the listener it is a failure; in texts,
however, the logical or ideational function is primary with communication
playing second fiddle to "getting it
right."
There can be no doubt that utterances
are contextbound. However, it does not
follow from the fact that they are intended for some audience that their only criterion of success is that the audience
understand them. If I say to you, '' An
MIT professor believes we should build
more nuclear power plants, so let's go
ahead,'' you will be right to lecture me
about non-sequiturs even as you understand my utterance. Socrates had to be
concerned about his listeners lest his
dialogues become monologues and his
reputation as gadfly be forfeited. But
concern for one's audience is scarcely
incompatible with concern for valid in•
ference and truth. As the volumes written about them testify, Socrates' utterances admit of more than one interpretation - a property which, on
Olson's view, differentiates utterances
from texts. But then Locke's essays,
which Olson takes to be model texts, admit of more than one interpretation, too.
Further investigation into oral and
written language may reveal that in a
literate culture the two are not distinct.
If they are not, it would be a truism to
say that one can speak a written language. If the two do differ in significant
ways, then Olson's statement that "formal schooling, in the process of teaching
children to deal with prose texts, fosters
the ability to 'speak a written
language'," bears repeating. 17 In either
case, the point to keep in mind is that
since written language can be spoken,
thinking can be dependent on the form
and structure of written language
without being dependent on literacy. Of
course, for there to be written language

a culture would have to be literate. But
an individual in that culture could learn
to speak a written language without being able to read or write it.
Those who support the Dependency
Thesis while acknowledging that one
can speak a written language assume
that the possession of this skill presupposes literacy. Only if one can read and
write can one speak in this way, goes the
argument. Yet once it is granted that
written language can be spoken, it is difficult to see why one who speaks it must
necessarily be able to read and write. Of
course, there must bea written language
if a wr,itten language is to be spoken.
And if there is a written language there
must bepeople who can read and write it
lest the spoken written language over
time diverge so far from the written
language simpliciter that it loses the properties of a written language. Still, the
conclusion that everyspeaker of a written
language must be literate does not follo~
from the fact that if a written language is
spoken there must be someliterate people.
Reading and writing a written language is one way to learn to speak it. But
just as spoken language in general is
learned by hearing it spoken and
through practice in speaking it, so one
can learn to speak a written language in
this way. Indeed, it is not unreasonable
to expect that given a supportive oral en·
vironment children would learn to speak
a written language relatively easily. By
"supportive" I do not merely mean one
that is warm and friendly, although a
psychologically benign environment
would no doubt be important. An oral
environment supportive of spoken written language would be one filled with
that language. It would have live speakers, although it could also make use of
tapes and films. It would also provide
ample opportunity for practice.
In their article on the cognitive consequences of literacy, Sylvia Scribner and
Michael Cole warn that confusion
results when the consequences of
literacy over the course of human
history are not distinguished from the
consequences of literacy for the individual in present day society. 18 I leave
open here the question of whether from
an historical perspective literacy and
thinkingare linked by virtue of the very
nature of written language. The point I
want to make is simply that if they are,
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for any individualin a literateS(ldtrysuch as
oursthinking can nonetheless be detached from reading and writing and, hence,
education for thinking can bypass
education ·in these 2 Rs.
Neither as mechanical skill nor as proficiency in composition is the ability to
write essential for thinking. As we have
already seen, rational abstract thinking
can take place in an oral medium and
when there is reason to inscribe what has
been said the thinker can turn to others
for help in transcription. Nor is the
ability to read and write a written
language essential for thinking: since
each language can be spoken it is quite
possible to acquire it without resorting
to book learning. To be sure, teachers of
reading, like teachers of writing, will insist that learning to read is learning to
think. But the component skills of reading are no more essential for thinking
than are those of writing. Comprehension, analysis, interpretation are central
elements of reading as they are of abstract logical thought. Yet these skills,
along with other ones which are shared
with thinking, can be learned and exercized in oral contexts. Insofar as the Dependency Thesis claims that literacy is
essential for thinking, we must reject it.
To deny that literacy is essential for
rational abstract thought is not to say
that no benefits for thinking accrue from
it. If you can read and write, you can go
back over your composition to see if
your train of thought has gotten sidetracked or if you have made serious errors. You can also proceed throughout
at your own pace and can have the advantage of being able to "see" your
thoughts on paper, so to speak. In an
oral medium that particular advantage
is lost, but with the help of a tape
recorder you can review what has been
said for purposes of editing, and a supportive oral environment will all ow you
to control pace. Because literacy is not
essential for thinking it is in the final
analysis a question of costs and to some
extent these will vary from individual to
individual. Where reading and writing
come easily, let us not forget that these
skills can be harnessed to the promotion
of rational abstract thought. Where
mastery of these 2Rs is itself problematic, let us remember that they are but
one route to such thinking. Let us
remember also that an over dependency

on the written word has a high price:
memory suffers, as do visual and oral
skills. Most important, of all, thinking
itself is diminished.
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Quite simply, there is more to think-

tional task. The inability to tell in words
one's plan no more means that no plan
has been developed, than the inability to
put in writing a plan one can describe in
words means that the plan is based on
faulty logic.
One can be in the middle of thinking
without saying or trying to say anything
to oneself or to others; one can have succeeded in thinking without being ready
or even able to tell in words what has
been thought out. Moreover, insofar as
thinking is language based, it is not confined to the straight-jacket in which advocates of the Dependency Thesis would
put it. Poetic thought, for instance, does
not analyze presuppositions and draw
out logical implications. Its object is not
to minimize ambiguity but to capitalize
on it; its concern is not to formulate new
knowledge. Nor is the concern of practical problem solving to formulate new
knowledge: its object is the determination of some course of actions, not the
discovery of theoretical truths.

ing than advocates of the Dependency
Thesis acknowledge. One danger of that
thesis is that it will cause educators to
lose sight of thought which is not language based. The kinds of thinking Ryle
mentions are not trivial, nor are they
"merely" intuitive; they do not just
emerge as we mature, nor do they spring full blown from our heads on
graduation day. They require experience and practice - in truth, education or a sort not provided by courses in
reading and writing. As Ryle says, a
guide might have to go to additional
labors to describe the route settled on
and might even be unequal to this addi-

·1'he thinking which the psychologists
claim is so intimately tied to reading and
writing is the kind done in the academy.
That they focus on the mode of thinking
which as members of the academy they
value most would be of no consequence
were their writings not used to justify
educational
programs.
Since their
claims about thinking and literacy surface in discussions of curriculum, however, it is absolutely imperative that we
understand just how narrow their conception of thinking is.
In his best-seller on the evolution of
human intelligence, the scientist, Carl
Sagan, distinguished two modes of

5. The Varieties of Thinking
Even if learning to read and write
were essential for abstract logical thinking, it would be incumbent on us to
challenge the Dependency Thesis because of the injustice it does to human
thought. In the first place, thinking outruns language. The British philosopher,
Gilbert Ryle has said it well: 19
The architect might try to think out his
design for the war-memorial by arranging and re-arranging toy bricks on the
carpet; the sculptor might plan a statue
in marble by modelling and remodelling
a piece of plasticine. The motorist might
weigh the pros and cons of dlff erent
roads In his mind's eye. The guide might
be planning tomorrow's climb, methodically scanning through a telescope the
slopes, precipices and water-courses of
the mountain from his hotel.
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knowing, one a function of the left
hemisphere of the brain and the other a
function of the right. 20 He might just as
well have called them two modes of
thinking. The "rational" mode - the
one '' so many of us regard as all of us
there is" - is the sole concern of the
Dependency Thesis. But there is also an
"intuitive" mode and educators ignore
it at their peril. Intuitive thinking is
holistic, not analytic; it involves pattern
recognition, not drawing out of logical
implications.
According to Sagan, these two modes
of thinking have complementary survival value. To convince yourself that he
is . right imagine a world in which
everyone on all occasions thought in the
manner of the academy. Practical life
would come to a halt, poetry would
perish, music and art would wither.
Even the sciences and philosophy those bastions of abstract, analytic
thought - would be impoverished, for
intuitive thinking lies at the heart of
both scientific creativity and philosophical insight. "Intuitive" does not mean
''innate'': we are not born knowing how
to think intuitively nor do we simply
develop into intuitive thinkers as we
mature. This mode of thought must be
learned, just as rational abstract thought
must be. Thus, if we value the intuitive
mode of thinking, we must find ways to
encourage and foster it even as we foster
the rational mode.
The Dependency Thesis would pour
all thinking into a single narrow mold. It
would have us lose sight of the richness
and variety of human thought by sacrificing synthesis to analysis, insight to
logic, ambiguity to explicit meaning, the
concrete to the abstract and practical intelligence to intellectual theorizing.
From the standpoint of education the
thesis is a dangerous one. Its currency
among psychologists makes it all too
likely that it will be used to justify a
single track approach to education for
thinking. That approach is readily imagined: if literacy is taken to be a precondition of thinking, then education for
thinking will have to include education
in the first two of the 3Rs; if literacy is
thought to transform a person's cognitive capacities, then the latter sort of
education will be all that is needed. In
other words, education for thinking will
consist in learning to read and write.
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~uperticially the curriculum package
delivered by the Dependency Thesis has
much to recommend it. We are committed to teaching children to read and
write. When education for thinking is
equated with education for literacy it is
not necessary to introduce something
new into the curriculum: we can embrace thinking as an aim or goal of
education without being accused of advocating ''frills. ' ' At the same time, the
desire that children learn to think provides one further bit of justification for
programs designed to teach reading and
writing. Thus education in the basics
gains support from the close connection
which the Dependency Thesis posits between thinking and literacy, even as it
constitutes a solution to the problem of
how to teach children to think. Yet can
we really depend on programs which
teach reading and writing to teach thinking too? Will not thinking be forgotten
when it becomes part and parcel of
education in these basics? Moreover,
does thinking as an educational aim
really justify programs which teach
reading and writing?
The last question is easily answered.
Since it is possible to think on one's feet
as Socrates did, indeed possible in a literate culture like ours to do so without
being able to read and write, education
for thinking is not dependent on education in reading and writing- before we
accept the Dependency Thesis' curriculum package, therefore, we must explore
alternatives and weight costs. No doubt
some learn to read and write with
so little difficulty that a route through
the 2Rs to the educational aim of think-

ing is justified. But for some this route
will be paved with anxiety, fr stration
and failure. For them a curriculum based on a supportive oral environment is
surely more appropriate than one based
on the written word. Remember that in
weighing costs one must take into account not just the money, time and
energy a program consumes, but also
the misery, the hatred of learning and
the loss of self-esteem which can result
from even the best intentioned curriculum design.
The Dependency Thesis is not just the
thesis that literacy is essential for thinking, however. It holds also that thinking
is a consequence of literacy. Thus the
route to thinking through reading and
writing would seem to find its justification in the fact that it gets results. Even
if an education in the 2Rs is paved with
sorrow for some, does it not have one
great advantage over its competitors,
namely that it guarantees success? I am
afraid this advantage is illusory.
Scribner and Cole have pointed out that
the psychological studies which purport
to link literacy and cognitive capacities
fail to distinguish between literacy and
schooling. 21 Thus the positive findings
those studies yield may reveal more
about the powers of schooling than
about the powers of literacy. Furthermore, even if those studies do connect
literacy to thinking, the data do not support the claim that the transformation of
the thinking of all those who can read
and write is guaranteed. And supposing
they did support this strong claim, the
kind of thinking which an education in
reading and writing would yield would
not be all inclusive: the thinking done by
Ryle's ·architect, sculptor, motorist and
mountain guide would be ignored, as
would the thinking Sagan calls "intuitive.''
Reading and writing education constitutes at best an education in language
based thinking. That it constitutes an
education even in this depends on the
way it is conducted. If it is an education
in reading and writing essays, it perhaps
develops the abstract, logical thought on
which the psychologists focus, but it will
fail to foster the kind of thinking done by
a poet or novelist. When one considers
how difficult it is to teach essay reading
and writing, and that abstract, logical
thought, although important, is but one
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kind of thought, the literacy route to
thinkinglooks less and less inviting. Can
one doubt that on that route many will
lose their way entirely and that others
will get so bogged down in the details
and mechanics of literacy that their
thinking processes will have scarcely
been enhanced? Is not the development
of the thinking of each person too important a goal of education to be sacrificed
unnecessarily on the altar of literacy?
One promising approach to thinking
as a goal of education has been taken by
Matthew Lipman and his associates.
Lipman has written two philosophical
novels, Harry Stoulemeier'sDiscovery,and
a sequel, Lisa.22 Harryand Lisa are about
children who discuss "heavy" issues,
among them: lying and truth-telling,
what is right, what is fair, the nature of
mind, the nature of death. These children also discover for themselves general
principles of reasoning which they then
apply in their own conversations. Lipman's novels are meant to be read by
children, rather than to be read to them
by their teachers or their parents.
Nevertheless, Harryand Lisa lend themselves well to attempts to detach education for thinking from education for
literacy.
The overall Philosophy for Children
program into which Harry and Lisa fit
emphasizes dialogue and discussion. 23
Just as the children in these novels learn
to reason and to think philosophically
through conversation with teachers,
parents and peers, so children in the
elementary and junior high classrooms
in which the novels are used are supposed to learn to think by talking things
out. Their teachers, in tum, are supposed to be gadflies. They are instructed to
encourage students to take the initiative
in formulating some position, to help
them question their underlying assumptions, to introduce alternative views and
to suggest ways of arriving at more comprehensive answers. In sum, these
novels portray, and are also intended to
serve as vehicles for establishing, a supportive oral environment for fostering
philosophical thought.
Nonetheless, were there functional illiterates in a classroom in which Harry
and Lisa were being used they would be
at a great disadvantage for they would
not be able to read them. It is important

to realize, therefore, that these novels
couldbetapedin English,as Harryhas been
in Spanish, 24 so that the functional illiterates in every classroom could profit
from the talk and interaction of the fictional children. A child who is a poor
reader may be a fme listener. Indeed, I
would hope that the vast number of
written works which lend themselves to
philosophical discussion among children
and hence to the development of
abstract, logical thinking would be put
on film or tape. 25 The kind of supportive
oral environment for thinking Lipman
has tried to create is quite exciting, but
in education for thinking, as in education in general, variety is the spice of life.
It would be z. mistake to suppose that
the way to the development of thinking
Lipman has charted is the only one
worth exploring, however. No single
educational route to something as rich
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and varied as human thought can
possibly be adequate. Give to philosophy the monopoly on education for
thinking which the psychologists and
teachers of English would give to
literacy and we will find that we have
once again set ourselves a very limited
destination. When thinking is taken
seriously as a goal of education the
sciences, the arts and practical activities
must all have access to it and routes
must be charted through the gymnasium, the studio, the laboratory, the
theater and the shop as well as through
the classroom. A single track approach
to education for thinking, whether
literacy based or not, is misguided
because the thinking which should be an
aim of education takes many forms. Just
as the different guises of thinking
permeate life itself they should permeate
the curriculum.
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Philosophy, University of Hawaii at Hilo.
He and Prof. Nobuko Fukuda conducted a
year-long experiment In philosophy for
children In HIio during the 1978-1979
academic year. A report on the findings of
that experiment, written by Dr. William
Higa at the University of Hawaii, will appear In Vol. II, No. 1 of Thinking.

vonne Nakamura and her sixth
Ygraders
were sitting on the carpet in

Philosophy
For Children
In Ha-waii
Barry Curtis

their classroom at W aiakea Elementary
School in Hilo, talking about children's
rights. Yvonne had divided the class into
small groups, and had asked each group
to come up with at least one right that
they thought children should have. This
discussion, like many others which the
children had participated in during the
school year, was part of a Title IV -C
program in philosophy for children in elementary schools on the Island of
Hawaii. The program was based on
Harry Stottlnneier'sDiscovny and the accompanying teacher's manual, a curriculum in philosophy for fifth and sixth
graders developed by Matthew Lipman
and Ann Sharp of the Institute for the
Advancement
of Philosophy
for
Children. Yvonne's sixth ·graders had
just finished reading Chapter 9 of Harry,
which deals, in part, with the issue of
children's rights.
Yvonne asked each group of children
to report on the outcome of their discussion, and as they did, she wrote it up on
the blackboard. Yvonne said she had expected the children to come up with
trivial things, like the right to watch
whatever show you want to on TV. She
was surprised at the depth and breadth
of scope contained in the children's suggestions. When they were finished, the
blackboard looked like this:

We think children have the following
rights:
1. To make decisions.
2. To defend themselves.
3. To have the same rights even If their
racial backgrounds are different.
4. To have freedom of speech.
5. To learn Independently and do
things themselves ("and not be
babied," It was explained.)
6. To think for themselves.
7. To do some of the things adults do,
(for example,voting - "Afterall,
what the president does affects us,
too," but not drinking - "You have
to be older before you can handle
It," or staying out late at night "You might get hurt".)
8. The right to have rights.
9. The right to disagree.

Of all the suggestions on the list,
perhaps the most interesting one was
number 8: ''the right to have rights.'' It
is an unusual experience for children to
be treated by adults as subjects of moral
rights, and even more unusual for
children to be consulted about what they
think their rights are. By conducting this
discussion with the children, Yvonne
had acknowledged their "right to have
rights.'' She had addressed the children
seriously as moral agents and thinking
persons, and they had responded
seriously, by dealing with a moral issue
which closely touched their lives at a
high level of generality, and in a way
that combined both insightfulness and
restraint. Like other children involved
in the Hawaii project, Yvonne's sixth

Thinking, The Journal of Philosophy for Children, Volume 1, Number 3 & 4 Combined

graders were beginning to do philosophy. In the process, they were moving
toward a more enlightened conception
of themselves and each other.
Philosophy for Children in Hawaii
achieved a number of interesting results
during its first year. Post-testing of the
children revealed significant gains in
reading comprehension, reasoning ability and ideational productivity. The improved performance of the Hawaii
children in these important areas provides suggestive evidence of the potential impact of the philosophy program
on basic educational skills. But the
Hawaii children had also gained something else - something which shows up
only indirectly on standardized tests.
They had developed an increased
awareness of themselves as thinkers thinkers who deserve to be heard and
taken seriously by adults as well as other
children. Of all the positive results of the
Hawaii project, this was perhaps the
most important one. The children had
discovered their own considerable
abilities to make intellectual discoveries
and to "think for themselves."
Philosophy for Children got started in
Hawaii in the summer of 1978, when a
philosophy professor and a professor of
education from the University of Hawaii
at Hilo began training a dozen elementary school teachers in the use of Harry
Stottlemeier'sDiscoveryin the classroom.
Teachers were selected for the program
from a group of volunteers, who were
interested in trying out Harry in their
classes during the following school year.
In preparation for teacher-training, the
two University of Hawaii professors had
attended an IAPC-sponsored seminar in
philosophy for children earlier in the
summer.
The teacher-trainers conducted a twoweek summer workshop, meeting four
hours a day to discuss the philosophical
issues raised in Harry, and to acquaint
the,teachers with the exercises, activities
and discussion plans in the accompanying teacher's manual. The overall goal
of the workshop was to help the teachers
develop a "feel" for what it is to do philosophy and how to do it with children.
In addition to the summer workshop,
participating teachers attended twohour seminars every two weeks during
the regular school year to stay in touch

with the program and share their experience in the classroom.
More than 300 children, from six
Hilo area elementary schools (one of
them private), were involved in the program. These children, like children
everywhere in Hawaii, represented a
variety of different races, ethnic groups
and nationalities: Japanese, Filipino,
Hawaiian, Portuguese, Korean, Samoan, Puerto Rican, Chinese, and
mainland Caucasian (a minority). Of the
twelve classes involved in the project,
one was in the fourth grade, two in the
fifth grade, eight in the sixth grade, and
one class included both fifth and sixth
graders. One of the fifth grade classes
consisted of ''gifted'' children, and four
of the sixth grade classes were at inner
city schools.
Early in the fall, meetings were held
with parents of participating children to
explain the nature and purposes of the
project. At some of these meetings, the
parents read and discussed a chapter
from Harry;at others, they went through
one of the exercises from the teacher's
manual. The meetings were well attended, and the response to the program was
enthusiastic. Besides informing the
parents about the curriculum, the
meetings served to create an atmosphere
of support and trust at home which undoubtedly helped to further the effectiveness of the program.
The teachers began using the curriculum in October, following pretesting of the children, and continued to
use it in the classroom on an average of
two hours a week for the rest of the
school year. Some of the teachers used
the curriculum during their social
studies period; others used it during
time set aside for reading or math. St.
Joseph's School, the only private school
involved in the project, specifically earmarked two forty-minute periods a week
just for philosophy. During these sessions, the children learned some basic
Aristotelian logic, and participated in
discussions with their teachers on the
issues
in
ethics,
aesthetics,
epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy
of science, and philosophy of psychology
arising out of Harryand the exercises in
the teacher's manual. As a catalyst for
these discussions, the fifth and sixth
graders took turns reading sections of
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each chapter of Harry aloud. The fourth
graders, for whom the reading was
somewhat difficult, followed along as
best they could, while their teacher read
aloud with them.
The children's response to Harry was
enthusiastic. Several of the teachers
reported having to collect the books at
the end of each session, because the
children wanted to read ahead. Other
teachers said they had difficulty in getting the children to stop in the middle of
a chapter to discuss the philosophical
issues, because the children were anxious to go on reading and find out
"what happens next." Once the discussions got going, however, most of the
children· became actively involved. As
the discussions progressed during the
course of the school year, the children
became more and more interested in
talking about philosophical questions,
and more and more confident of their
own abilities to ''think for themselves.''
One reason for the rising level of intellectual self-confidence on the part of
the children was the attitude taken by
their teachers in leading classroom
discussions. The teachers were generally
willing - tentatively at -first, more confidently later - to take the children
seriously as thinkers, and to talk with the
children about their ideas in a way that
granted their capacity for insightfulness
and creative thinking. Like guides in
new territory, the teachers were willing
to listen to the children's suggestions
about which way to go. Sometimes this
willingness went a little too far, with the
result that the conversation only scratched the philosophical surface, got bogged
down in sidetracks, or reduced itself to
an opinion poll. But once in a while,
when the teachers displayed a general
sense of direction, as well as a readiness
to listen, the children were able to fmd
the path to a genuine philosophical
discovery. It was this, above all, that
built up the children's confidence in
themselves, and sustained their interest
in the program. We saw one example of
this in Yvonne's class, where the
children came in touch, perhaps for the
first time, with a concept of themselves
as subjects of moral rights. Here is
another example from a class of sixth
graders who were led to a similar insight
in a radically different way.
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Mahoney
Ken
Mahoney

Nicky

Mahoney
Scott

Mahoney

'' Several teachers reported having to collect
the books at the end of each session,
because the children wanted to read ahead.
Other teachers had difficulty getting
children to stop reading to discuss
philosophical issues ... they were anxious to
find out 'what happens next'.''

Lynne
Tom

Kim
Mahoney
Kim
Mahoney
Doug

Craig
Kent
Lena

Carol

On the same day that Yvonne's class was talking
Mahoney
aboutchild,ni's nglus,Ed Manoneywas condU&ting
a discwsion with his sixth g,adns at DtSilva School
aboulobligationsbttwun childrni and partnts. Ed
askedthe childrenwhethertherewas anythingtJuyowed thn, partnts. Tiu discussionwent lik this:
Lena
-Yes, money, if you borrow it.
John
-Yes, they give you most
everything you want, so you could
at least fix their bed.
Beth
-Gratitude.
-You should help them wash dishes
Jeff
and do other things around the
house.
Jennifer -Respect.
Lena
-1 agree with Jennifer, because they
brought you into the world, so at
least you owe them respect.
Mahoney -Well, let me ask you this: do your
parents owe you anything?
-They don't owe you nothing, but
Jeff
they love you, so they give you
what you want.
-You weren't asked to be brought
Nicky
into the world, so you don't own
them anything.
back on the otAerquestion.
Now we're talking about whether
there's anything your parents owe

Mahoney -You're

Janalcc

you.
-1 agree with Nicky. Since because

Nicky
Mahoney
Child
Ken
Mahoney
Tom
Mahoney

Children
Mahoney
Other,
Mahoney
Jeff

they brought us into the world,
they ought to take care of us.
-Till when?
-Till you're 18.
-What if you want to stay on?
(Silence). You think about that,
okay? When do you change from
being a teenager into an adult?
-When you get married.
-What if you never get married?
(Children laugh).
-When you're independent.
-Thaes
interesting, Scott. I like
that word, "independent." Just
for fun, let's take a poll. How
many think your parents owe you
something? (A bare majority raise
their hands.) Let's use our imaginations for a minute. Suppose
you're 23 years old, and you're
married and have a couple of kids.
(Giggles from the class.) What do
you owe your children?
-Love and respect.
-Shelter and clothes and food.
(Mahoney starts listing the
children's suggestions on the
blackboard.)
-Love and discipline.
-What is discipline?
-Telling them what to do.
-Okay, what else would you owe
your children?
-Love and companionship.
-Protection.
-Toys.
-Everything they need to survive all of the things on the
blackboard.
-Attention.
-That's
different from protection,
isn't it? (Carol nods.)
-Education.
-How much education?
-Enough to be self-supporting.
-Teach them right from wrong.
-Anything else you owe your
children?
-Care.
-ls that the same as attention?
Love? (Class is silent.) No?
(Mahoney adds "care" to the list
on the blackboard.) Most of the
things on this list are things we
think of as "positive." Love, care,
companionship. Are any of the
things on the list negative things?

-Discipline.
-Does anyone think it's positive?
-Yes.
-Why?
-If you don't teach them, they'll
act tough and be brats.
-It teaches you manners.
Ken
Mahoney -Well, that's very interesting, class.
We've just about run out of time.
So not I want you to stand up in
your place if you've said
something today. (All but six
stand.)
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Perhaps the most interesting thing
about this conversation is the way in
which Ed Mahoney led the children to
an insight. The children were initially
very sure that there were things which
they owed their parents, and fairly clear
about what was owed. But they were not
so clear or sure about what, if anything,
their parents owed them. It was not until
Ed got the children to imagine themselves as parents that they began to see
that moral responsibility between parent
and child is a two-way street - that
there are some things that parents owe
their children, as well as things that
children owe their parents. When this
happened, the floodgates were opened to
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a variety of ideas about the responsibilities of parents toward children.
Like the children in Yvonne's class, Ed
Mahoney's sixth graders had made the
discovery that children, too, have rights.
And like Yvonne's students, they were
able to go on to give serious and
thoughtful examples of some of the
rights which they thought children were
owed.
Ed and Yvonne have very different
styles of teaching, but they share two
important qualities in common that
make for productive classroom discussions: openness to the opinions of
children, and genuine philosophical interest. Their openness makes it possible
for the children to freely express their
own ideas, without fear of saying something "childish" or wrong, and their
philosophical interest guides them in
organizing discussions and choosing
material that can lead the children
toward important intellectual insights. It
isn't easy to be open and philosophical
at the same time; the two are often at
odds with each other, especially when
you're talking with a large group of
children who have widely different
capacities and interests. A balance must
be struck between leading the children
and listening to them, and this in itself
requires fairness and careful judgment.
The central problem with Ed and
Yvonne, as with most of the other teachers, was their failure to probe more
deeply into philosophical discoveries
once they were made. While most of the
teachers were able to lead the children to
an insight, they nearly always stopped
short of exploring the insight in detail.
Ed's discussion of obligations between
parents and children is marked by a
variety of missed philosophical opportunities - the opportunity to explore
key concepts, like the concept of
discipline or the concept of independence; the opportunity to look for
hidden
assumptions
among the
children's suggestions; the opportunity
to pose counterexamples to some of the
children's ideas and thereby help to
refine their precision; the opportunity to
ask for reasons. Ed's students had a flash
of insight, but the insight was never
carefully examined. As a result, the
nature and scope of their discovery remained unclear. Yvonne's discussion on
children's rights suffered from the same

defect. The children were led to discover
new territory and, once there, left it
largely unexplored.
The odd thing is that most of the
teachers were aware of the philosophical
opportunities that passed them by. Ed,
for example, was obviously sensitive to
the philosophical significance of the concept of independence and the concept of
discipline when they arose in the course
of his discussion with the children. But
he took only a few, faltering steps
toward investigating these concepts with
the class before moving quickly on to a
new topic. In the course of the discussion on children's rights, Yvonne was
clearly aware of at least one crucial
philosophical issue why should
children's rights be more limited than
the rights of adults? She even raised this
question briefly with the children, but
gave up on it after a moment or two of
discussion.
Why were the teachers so reluctant to
probe? The answer probably has to do
with their lack of philosophical experience. None of the teachers had any
formal background in philosophy prior
to the summer workshop. While the
workshop helped to awaken their interest in philosophy, and provided them
with a few rudimentary philosophical
skills, not enough philosophy was actually done with the teachers to give
them a developed sense of how to proceed once they arrived on philosophical
ground. Too much time was spent in
discussing philosophical methodology,
and not enough time on actually doing
philosophy with the teachers. As a
result, the teachers had very little practice in using dialectical techniques.
While they were aware of the importance of such things as pointing out inconsistencies,
discussing
possible
counterexamples, and looking for hidden assumptions, they had very little experience in actually doing these things
themselves. Hence they were reluctant
to try them out at any great length in the
classroom.
Fortunately, Title IV-C funding for
Philosophy for Children in Hawaii has
been made available for a second year.
Since most of the same teachers will continue to be involved in the program, the
teacher-trainers will have the opportunity to help the teachers further develop
their dialectical skills by giving them
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more practice in doing philosophy.
Greater emphasis will be placed in the
coming year on involving the teachers in
philosophical conversations where they
can gain a greater working knowledge of
standard dialectical techniques. In this
way, perhaps, the teachers can be
motivated to probe further beneath the
philosophical surface, and to go beyond
initial insights to the refinement and
development of children's ideas. This
would represent an important step forward from the philosophical beginning
that was made this year.
While this year was only a beginning,
some philosophical progress has obviously been made. For one thing, the
children have arrived at a number of
genuine philosophical
discoveries.
Crude
and unfinished
as these
discoveries may be, they were a source
of much interest, and perhaps of some
enlightenment, for most of the children.
And despite the tendency toward superficiality in classroom discussions, there
were enough occasions when the
teachers took the children a few steps
beyond "discovery" for the children to
gain some sense of what it is to think
carefully and critically about their own
ideas. As a resuh, the children have
begun to develop an appreciation, and
some ''feel'' for the dialectic.
The response to the program from
both teachers and students has been
overwhelmingly positive. In evaluating
the project at the end of the year, ten of
the twelve teachers gave the program
high marks for success in achieving its
goals, and eleven teachers said they
would recommend the program to their
colleagues. While they were somewhat
critical of their own performance in
leading classroom discussions, nearly all
of the teachers were highly satisfied with
the curriculum material itself, both in
terms of its usefulness and its level of difficulty. The also gave high marks to the
summer workshop, for arousing their
philosophical interest and enhancing
their discussion skills. (Most of them felt
that the workshop was more valuable
than the bi-weekly seminars conducted
during the school year.) The highest
praise of all comes from the fact that all
but one of the teachers have asked to be
included in the program again this year.
The positive response of the teachers
to the program was matched by the
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response of the children, who were also
asked to evaluate the program at the end
of the year. A majority of the children
said that the class had made their
reading in other subjects more meaningful, and that they had learned to express themselves more clearly as a result
of the class. Most of the children felt that
the class had helped them to gain a better understanding of themselves, their
classmates, and their teachers. A
substantial majority said they felt they
were better able to accept the feelings
and viewpoints of others as a result of
the class, and an even larger majority
said that after having read Harry, they
understood better why they were expected to go to school. When asked
whether they would be interested in taking another philosophy course, 82 %
said yes, and 92% said they would
recommend the philosophy class to at
least some of their friends.
The children's positive judgment of
the value of their experience with
philosophy is supported by the results of
a variety of tests given the children
before and after the program. The
children were pre-tested in October, and
post-tested in May on reading comprehension, reasoning ability and ideational productivity. As a group, the
children showed improvement in all
three areas at a high level of statistical
significance. Comparison studies provide strongly suggestive evidence of the
effectiveness of the program in improving reasoning ability (in the form of
drawing formal inferences and discovering alternatives) and moderately suggestive evidence of the success of the
program in improving ideational productivity and reading comprehension.
There are, no doubt, many factors
that might help to explain these suggestive results. But the one that stood
out most in classroom observations was
the children's discovery of themselves as
thinkers. The program made the
children more aware of their abilities to
make intellectual discoveries, and to
"figure things out" for themselves. As a
result, new intellectual problems were
seen as a challenge, not a threat. One little girl at Kapiolani School expressed it
very clearly, in a conversation with a
couple of philosophers who had come to
visit her class. "All philosophers," she
said, "can learn things from children."
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What Do Students Think
of Philosophy for Children?
One way to find out is to ask. Children in
three communities (Newark, N.J., Pompton
Lakes, N.J., and Hilo, Hawaii) in which
philosophy for children programs had been
given for one year were asked to fill out a questionnaire and to return it unsigned. 'These are
the results.

1.

How muchhaveyou enjoyedthis program?
5th

Alot

Newark
Ith

Pompton

7th

5th

Lakn
81h

80%

47%

61%

49%

44%

Not so much

9%

36%

37%

49%

48%

Very little

9%

14%

2%

3%

4%

Not at all

2%

3%

2.

100%

-

4%

HIio
Totals

NWK

P.L

63%

65%

50%

27%

32%

41%

9%

2%

8%

1%

1%

1%

HIio
Totals

Doyou think as a resultof this course
you have/tamedto express
yourselfmoreclearly?
5th

Newark
Ith

Yes

69%

19%

No

31%

21%

Pompton
7th

100%

,_

5th

Lakn
81h

Totals

Ith

NWK

P.L

87%

83%

89%

83%

87%

86%

14%

13%

11%

17%

13%

13%

Blank

3.

Total1
8th

4%

1%

Doyou think this coursehas helpedmdreyour readingin othersu/!i«ts
moremeaningful?
N1war1'

5th

Ith

Pompton

7th

5th

Lakn
81h

HIio

8th

Totals

Yes

78%

61%

.73%

92%

52%

44%

77%

No

22%

39%

29%

8%

44%

57%

22%

Blank

4%

1%
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4.

Doyou Jul you understandyour dassmatu betteras a resultof this program?
Newartt
8th

5th

Pompton
5th

7th

Lakes
81h

Yes

76%

58%

56%

57%

30%

No

24%

41%

37%

41%

70%

2%

5%

3%

Blank

5.

HIio
Totala

8th

67%

100%

-

32%
1%

Doyou feel you understand
yourselfbetteras a resultofthis program?
5th

Newartt
8th

7th

Pompton
5th

Lakes
8th

HIio

Totala

Ith

Yes

80%

71%

78%

76%

44%

44%

73%

No

20%

29%

20%

24%

57%

57%

26%

Blank

6.

1%

2%

Doyou thinkyour classmaJesunderstand
you betteras a resultofthis program?
5th

Newartt
8th

7th

Pompton
5th

Lak..
8th

8th

100%

Yes

62%

41%

68%

46%

17%

No

38%

59%

30%

43%

83%

2%

11%

Blank

7.

56%

-

41%
3%

Doyou thinkyou understand
your teacherbetterthanyou did beforeas a resultofthis program?
5th

Yes

87%

No

13%

Blank

8.

HIio
Totala

Newartt
8th

77%
21%

7th

Pompton
5th

Lakes
8th

73%

73%

30%

27%

24%

70%

3%

8th

100%

-

4%

Total•
P.L
NWK

Hll9
Totala

79%

68%

80%

21%

32%

19%

2%

1%

1%

Doyou feel thatyou art betterableto accept1/ufttlings and viewpointsofothersas a resultofthis program?
Newartt
5th

8th

Pompton

5th

7th

Totals

Lakes

8th

8th

NWK

P.L.

Hilo
Totals

Yes

71%

68%

85%

81%

79%

89%

75%

83%

85%

No

27%

26%

15%

19%

17%

11%

23%

16%

14%

2%

1%

1%

Blank

9.

2%

3%

4%

Doyou think this programhas bmi a help toyou in:
5th

Math:Yes

Newartt
8th

7th

Pompton
5th

Lakes
8th

HIio

8th

Totals

60%

41%

66%

24%

17%

11%

4-0%

No

38%

55%

34%

73%

83%

89%

60%

Social Yes

44%

42%

54%

41%

9%

44%

51%

87%

56%

47%

Studies: No

51%

50%

46%

57%

Science: Yes

4-0%

23%

66%

51%

13%

11%

41%

53%

71%

34%

46%

83%

89%

57%

11%

19%

9%

8%

No
Blank

JO. Doyou euerdiscusswluu /uJ.ppmed
in philosophyclasswith otherchild.rmoutsideof class?
5th

Newartt
Ith

7th

Lakn
Ith

8th

Totala

100%

53%

Yes

38%

33%

78%

70%

44%

No

60%

65%

22%

27%

52%

2%

2%

3%

4%

Blank

Hilo

Pompton
&th

-

47%
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11. Doyou everdiscusswith adults (parentsorfriends) what happmedin phii6sophyclass?
5th

Newark
8th

7th

Pompton
6th

LakH
6th

Totals

8th

NWK

P.L.

HIio
Totals

Yes

67%

35%

98%

70%

61%

89%

67%

73%

60%

No

33%

62%

2%

27%

39%

11%

32%

26%

40%

1%

1%

Blank
12.

3%

3%

Wouldyou recommend
this programto:
6th

Newark
8th

7th

Pompton
6th

LakH
6th

13%

33%

All of your friends 20 %

17%

37%

22%

Most of them

Totals
8th

22%

20%

7%

30%

4%

44%

Some of them

44%

44%

49%

43%

65%

22%

None of them

9%

17%

6%

5%

18%

Blank

2%

3%

NWK

P.L.

HIio
Totals

20%
88%

92%

27%
46%

11%

8%

7%

2%

13. Having readHarry, doyou understandbetterwhy childrenareexpectedto go to school?
5th

Newark
8th

7th

Pompton
6th

Lakes
6th

Hilo

Totals
8th

NWK

P.L.

Totals

Yes

78%

80%

83%

81%

39%

67%

80%

62%

90%

No

22%

18%

17%

16%

61%

33%

19%

37%

10%

1%

1%

Blank
14.

2%

3%

How ofteneachweekwouldyou like to havephilosophyclass?
5th

Newark
8th

7th

Pompton
5th

LakH
8th

8th

HIio
Totals

Five

44%

21%

29%

16%

30%

78%

18%

Four

4%

8%

9%

14%

13%

22%

12%

Three

16%

17%

27%

41%

22%

30%

Two

18%

20%

12%

11%

26%

22%

One

13%

12%

17%

19%

9%

12%

Zero

2%

15%

5%

Blank

2%

6%

4%

15. Are Harryand hisfriends as realtoyou as someofthepeople
you know?
Newark
5th

6th

7th

Pompton
5th

Lakes
8th

HIio
Totals

8th

Yes

73%

56%

61%

78%

83%

22%

73%

No

27%

44%

39%

22%

17%

78%

26%

16.

Wouldyou he interestedin taking anothercoursedealingwith thefarther adventuresofHarryand hisfriends,
whm they are a few years older?
Pompton

Newark
5th

8th

7th

6th

Lakes
8th

8th

NWK

P.L

HIio
Totals

Totals

Yes

93%

71%

88%

87%

78%

56%

84%

74%

83%

No

7%

27%

12%

13%

22%

44%

15%

26%

17%

Blank

2%

1%
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Adrian Du Puls teaches philosophy at the
School of Education, Marquette University.

Philosophy,

Religion and Religious Education
Adrian Du Puis

of this article is to exT heaminepurpose
the relationship between philosophy and religion and to point up
some implications for religious education. The major emphasis, in respect to
religion, will be on the cognitive aspects
of religion rather than the affective.
Also, in order to limit the scope of this
article, I shall discuss this relationship
mainly within the context of Western
religions, especially the Christian
religion, although the same considerations apply to Islam and Judaism.
Oriental philosophies and religions are
found in a different cultural context and
call for analysis within that context.
An examination of the history of ideas
reveals that the link between philosophy
and religion has many and varied interpretations. These range from the one ex-

treme that philosophy and religion are
one and the same, to the other extreme
that there is no relationship between the
two. Perhaps the latter interpretation is
typical of the man-on-the-street's view
that sets religion off in a '' separate compartment'' of one's thinking and living.
But the relation between re1igion and
philosophy has always intrigued thinkers
and caused controversy. It might be
well, for the purpose of this paper, to
outline the origins and issues involved in
the different views concerning the relationship between religion (faith) and
philosophy (reason) as they have
developed in the Western World.
Plato suggested that true religion
could be identified with philosophy,
since the highest object of philosophical
speculation and religious worship were
for him one and the same: God. The ex-
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istence of God is evident from the order
and design in the entire universe such as
the structure of human and animal
organisms, the world of stars and
planets. From this "proor' for the existence of God, Plato is able to proceed
to the attributes of this supreme being,
such as omniscience, omnipotence, and
absolute goodness.
For Plato, then, religion is something
derived from philosophical reasoning,
rather than from faith, folklore or
revelation. Since Plato had no sacred
books containing the revealed truths of
religion, he reached his religious views
solely on the strength of reason. For
other thinkers, however, the single track
to religious belief was replaced by a double track, namely revelation (or some
similar source) and philosophy. A good
example of the attempt to stay on both
tracks is found in 1st century A.O.
Graeco-Jewish philosophy which influenced Christian
thought
considerably. This philosophy may be
described as an effort to harmonize the
sacred books of the Hebrews with the
tenets of Greek philosophy. Although
the Jews of Alexandria were adamant in
their belief that their sacred books con-
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tained truth and wisdom infinitely
superior to the wisdom of philosophers,
nevertheless, they were influenced by
and even admired Greek philosophy.
The result of this two-track ~pproach led
thei:n to state that: 1) revelation is the
highest possible philosophy; it includes
what is good in Greek philosophy. 2)
The Greeks derived their philosophical
doctrines from the Jewish scriptures or
at least from the Jewish tradition. 3) The
difference between the revealed doctrines and Greek philosophy lies chiefly
in the way the truths are expressed:
scripture uses symbols 'and figures
whereas philosophy expresses the same
truths in the form of rational concepts.
While some Jewish thinkers of the
time, were attempting to harmonize
philosophy and religion, some early
Christian writers rejected philosophy
outright, mainly because of its pagan
origins. Tertullian (160-240) exemplifies
this hostile attitude toward philosophy
and finds truth only in the revealed
dogmas of Christianity. But other
Christian thinkers of the time were not
at all negative in their appraisal of
philosophy.
For example, Origen
(185-254) assimilated into his exposition

of Christian
dogma philosophical
elements derived from Plato, Aristotle,
Philo Oewish) and the N eo-Platonists.
Perhaps the greatest thinker of the
early Christian era to wrestle with the
problem of the relationship of philosophy to religion was St: Augustine of
Hippo (354-430). His solution became
the accepted model until the Scholastic
era in the middle ages. Augustine's acceptance of Plato's philosophical system
along with the tenets of the Christian
religion made him the ideal of the philosopher-theologian. One cannot develop
a sound theology without a philosophical
base, but on the other hand one cannot
acquire complete wisdom from philosophy alone. Revealed truth is needed!
With the effects of the barbarian inroads and the emergence of the later
Middle Ages, Dark Ages philosophy
assumed an important role in the rebuilding of Western culture. Erigena
brought back Platonism in the 9th century. Alcuin already had established
schools a few years earlier to teach
grammar, dialectic and philosophy. The
Augustinian view of the relationship of
philosophy to religion was again considered the ideal by these early
scholastics. Anselm, Archbishop of
Canterbury, (11th century), put his official approval on the view that philosophy and theology do not contradict but
aid and need one another. As such, each
has its separate sphere. But Anselm and
his contemporaries did not draw a sharp
distinction between the two fields. It
wasn't until the 13th century that thinkers attempted to draw clear lines between the domains of philosophy and religion. Aquinas, for example, argues
that these are two distinct disciplines: 1)
Philosophy views knowledge (truth) in
the light of human reason alone, whereas religion views knowledge (truth) in
terms of revelation and/or faith. For example, one can present arguments for
the existence of God from reason alone
or from revelation. 2) Some knowledge
(truth)
belongs
excl usi vel y to
philosophy; some exclusively to religion
and some is common to both. Examples
of the first might be the many questions
of classical metaphysics, most of which
have no bearing on man's destiny or on
his relations with God. Examples of the
second might be knowledge of the
Divine Trinity, the dogma of original
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sin, etc., which are derived mainly from
revelation. The existence of God might
be cited as an example of knowledge
which can be derived from both
philosophy and religion. 3) Though
distinct, philosophy and religion do not
contradict one another, since the Author
of all truth cannot contradict Himself. 4)
Religion's knowledge can supplement or
strengthen rational knowledge. Thus,
philosophy may tell much about man's
nature and destiny, but religion can supplement and strengthen this knowledge.
For example, philosophy may lead to the
conclusion that immortality is the lot of
human beings, but religious belief in immortality not only strengthens that conclusion, but also may say something
about such matters as life after death,
and how one must live to attain eternal
happiness. Faith, then, for Aquinas,
adds to knowledge of reality rather than
negating or denying the knowledge
derived from philosophy.
Philosophy,
then, according to
Aquinas, can aid religion by furnishing
reasons for credibility, by establishing
the preambles of religion, by supplying
analogies which enable us to represent to
ourselves the truths of religion, and by
supplying arguments to show the
"reasonableness" of religion. The practical application of this view is found in
Aquinas' Summa Tluologica in which
Aristotelian philosophy serves at the rational foundation for the systematic exposition of religion.
Another significant contribution was
the application of elementary Aristotelian logic in the (cognitive) exposition of
religion. Aquinas and others used this
logic in the construction of theological
arguments, a feature generally not
found in earlier religious treatises. In
the later Middle Ages, study and mastery
of the elements of logic became a ''prerequisite'' for the study of religion. In
reality this emphasis on logic led some
thinkers to argue that if the conclusions
of theology were not arrived at by
logically valid arguments they could not
be considered ''true''. A reaction to this
extreme position was the attempt by
some thinkers (such as Nicolas of
Autrecourt, Petrarch, and Meister
Eckhart), to discredit philosophy as a
source of knowledge and to rely solely
on faith or revelation. AU knowledge acquired by human means (reason and

sense experience) was for these thinkers
untrustworthy!
Some forms of
mysticism reflect this view, and it has
carried over into the thinking of some
religious people today.
Although there are other views of the
relation of philosophy to religion, one
further position will be described which
has a special bearing on our topic. This
is the view that presents religious dogma
so that it looks and sounds like philosophy, when in point of fact it is no more
than religion's dogma clothed in philosophical language. In essence this approach destroys philosophy by giving it
no independent status as a discipline but
merely using it to supply the language of
religion. The implication of such a view
is that philosophy cannot be taught as a
discipline distinct from religion, since it
provides no knowledge of its own and
possesses no unique method.
This brief survey of the various views
of the relationship of philosophy to religion (reason to faith) shows that not at
any time has there been oneaccepted interpretation of this relationship. The situation today is no different from that
described above. Religious thinkers and
educators may not knowingly and explicity appeal to one or the other of the
classical views, although in practice they
usually adhere to one more than to another. The position which the religious
educator takes concerning the relationship of reason and faith will affect the
aims and the curriculum of the religious
education program.
Another important point is that, in
general, philosophy does not or at least
should not presuppose that one religion
necessarily flows from its tenets, nor
does one religion presuppose a specific
philosophical system. For example,
some Jewish philosophers adopted (and
adapted) Platonism; some Christian
thinkers were Neo-Platonists, others
were Aristotelians; some were nominalists, others realists. Thus it may be said
that philosophy is neutral. If it were not,
one would probably not find the great
variety of philosophical beliefs associated with religion (often the same religion)
throughout the ages.
If philosophy is accepted as an independent and unique discipline in its
own right, one that can be taught to or
learned by children (and adults}, what
role will it play in developing a religious
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education program for children and
adults?
In order to answer this question, one
must show how philosophy is related to
religion or what it can contribute to
religious studies. A number of connections between philosophy and religion
can be suggested, along with several
recommendations for religious education.
1. The decision to accept or reject
religious belief is philosophical; that
is, each individual must answer the
question, "Is faith (or revelation) a
valid source of knowledge?" Philosophy examines the foundations of
religious belief just as it examines the
basis of scientific ''belier'.
2. A very important contribution which
philosophy can make to religion lies
in the clarification of the language of
religion. What do you mean when
you say that God is omnipresent?
What do you mean when you say that
the angels will watch over you? This
function - clarification of meaning
is especially important, since
religious language is seldom the
language of everyday usage.
3. In a somewhat related view, philosophy can provide an understanding
of the intellectual context in which
religious belief arises. For example,
to know that the Judeo-Christian and
Islamic religions exist in Western
culture and to understand how the
concepts of that culture are woven into those religions can provide important insights for explaining the beliefs
of those religions. Some thinkers
maintain
that many Christians
devoted to spreading their religion in
oriental countries failed to recognize
this cultural difference and therefore
met with only limited success for all
their efforts. Had they analyzed the
situation more accurately, they
would have recognized how different
are the value systems and views of
reality underlying Oriental cultures.
4. By the application of logic, philosophy can point up contradictions
which arise in religious beliefs and
even in religious practice. Further,
logic and philosophy enable one to
construct a coherent religious system
(a theology) which may convince the
mind of the truth-seeker. Also such
coherent systems are less likely to be
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the target of the trained antagonist.
At least, a better defense can be
mounted against those who attack
religion if one begins from a position
contained in a logically coherent
system. Such systems are likely to
distinguish essential truth from myth
and folklore and religious doctrine
from pious practice.
5.Just as philosophy examines and
analyzes other forms of human experience, so too can it examine and
analyze religious experiences. For example, such examination
and
analysis might help to explain why
many human beings profess some
religious belief and why certain people are attracted to a specific religious
sect or set of beliefs.
Perhaps one might summarize the
points above by paraphrasing Alfred
North Whitehead's statement: In the
conditions of modern life, the rule is absolute; the religion which does not value
trained intelligence is doomed.
Does philosophy have a contribution
to make to religious education? As intimated earlier the religious educator
needs a philosophy of religious education just as the science educator needs a
philosophy of science education. Parenthetically, there are those who contend
that one cannot properly speak of a philosophyof religious education; there can
of religious education.
only be a Theology
But these educators also would reject the
notion that there is some relation between philosophy and religion, and such
is not the position advocated here.
Since most readers know what constitutes a philosophy of education in
general, it is not necessary to go into
much detail about what might be labeled
as a philosophy of religious education.
Examples of these can be found in the
brochures of religious schools, and in the
handbooks of teachers of religion. Such
sources usually contain statements about
the nature of education, the aims of the
school, the aims and curriculum of the
religious education program, the role of
the teacher and teaching method, evaluation, discipline and similar topics.
More than likely, however, philosophies

of religious education nowadays will
eschew any statements implying that
religious doctrine should be memorized
without understanding. It is in this connection that philosophy steps forward to
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aid the religious educator. In philosophy
(ideally), learners are assisted in
developing their power to think creatively and logically. They are not told what
to think. They learn, to varying degrees,
to search for and give reasons for
holding certain views on some issue.
The teachers of religion can utilize this
training in their classes and expect
students to exercise these same skills of
logic and reasoning in the study of
religion.
At this juncture many pedagogical
questions arise and many different
answers are given. Should the study of
philosophy be a "prerequisite" for the
study of religion at all levels or should it
be a prerequisite only for the advanced
study of religion? Should the teacher of
religion handle those philosophical concepts which are pertinent to the topic
under study in the religion class? For example, when students are talking about
the religious doctrine of the Divine Person, Christ, should the religion teacher
explain the meaning of personhood in
philosophy? Or should the philosophical
notion of personhood have been treated
earlier in a philosophy class? There are
many, many pedagogical and logistic
questions of this type which are not
within the scope of this paper.
Religious educators in the field have
devised many different approaches to
solve these practical problems and at the
same time implement their own
philosophy of religious education.
Materials on such programs can be obtained from the religious education offices of .the many denominations sponsoring them.
Perhaps it will suffice here to suggest a
few guidelines for religious education.
1. Children should learn philosophy as
early as possible in elementary school
so that the concepts and methods
learned might aid them in their study
of religion. Philosophy presupposes
and employs inquiry, a process which
is essential in all education, including
religious education.
2. Both teachers and students should
recognize and keep in mind the
distinction between the two fields. If
this distinction is clear to all, the faith
vs. reason conflict will not arise. Philosophy (reason) provides knowledge
(truths) derived from the human
mind. Revelation (faith) provides

knowledge (truths) beyond the scope
of the human mind. Nevertheless it is
the human mind which "assents" to
the authenticity and validity of these
extra-human sources.
3. Philosophy teaches the need for openness and serious discussion of the
issues involved in the topic under
consideration. Such discussions can
assist students to clarify the religious
doctrines being considered, rather
than simply memorizing them. Also,
since students learn to give reasonsfor
holding some position on a philosophical point, they will search for and
provide reasons for assenting to
religious doctrines. In this respect,
the example of the teacher is crucial:
teacher should not expect students to
accept religious doctrines solely on
the authority of the teacher. Good
reasons for accepting the doctrines
exist and should be provided.
4. Some teachers fear that the independent thinking
advocated
and
developed by philosophical study will
destroy faith. There is no doubt that
one takes a risk by encouraging
critical thinking on any issue. But if a
student "loses the faith" because he
or she begins thinking about it, the
chances are that his/her fiath was not
very well-grounded.
5. It is highly desirable for religion
teachers to have some background in
philosophy. As one who has taken
and supervised many religion classes,
I can assure you that if the teacher
does not raise the philosophical questions, the students usually will do so.
Much of educational value will be lost
if such questions are not handled in
the class.
6. When tbe points mentioned above
are considered in the context of
teaching about religion in the public
schools, it is obvious that one must
have even greater concern for openness, objectivity, presentation of
reasons for beliefs and the like. In
public education,
advocating a
religion is prohibited, but the objective study of religion is encouraged.
(See, U.S. Supreme Court Decision Abington vs .. Schemp ). Certainly the
philosophical considerations will be of
major importance in teaching about
religion in the context of public
education.
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~hoo! distri~ts interested in pilotmg mnovatlve programs that promise to meet local educational needs
should look into the "Adoption Grants"
provision of Title IV-C. These grants
generally provide relatively limited funding (such as $10,000 per school district)
for the purpose of experimenting with
improvements in local educational practice. States which presently have adoption grant provisions under Title IV-C
are as follows:

S

Alabama
Arizona
California
Connecticut
Florida
Illinois
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Michigan

Montana
New Jersey
New York
Ohio
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Texas
Washington

TITLE IV•C
ADOPTION
GRANTS
Deadlines for applying for these
grants differ from state to state. (For example, the deadline in New Jersey is
December 7, with winners to be announced by the following February.
Some fifty adoption grants are expected
to be given out in New Jersey, for a
maximum of$10,000 apiece.) Interested
districts should contact their state Title
IV-C office.· Here are the names and addresses to contact:
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Dr. Clark D. Williams
Coordinator of ESEA, Title IV
State Department of Education
Montgomery, Alabama 36104
(205) 832-3290

Mr. Ron Bedard
Educational Administrator
for ESEA IV
State Dept. of Education
Pouch F
Juneau, Alaska 99801
(907) 465-2825)

Mr. Bill Hunter
Director, ESEA Title IV
State Dept. of Education
1535 W. Jefferson Ave.
Phoenix, Arizona 85007
(602) 271-5415

Mr. Fay Bohannon
Coordinator, ESEA Title IV
State Dept. of Education
Arch Ford Education Bldg.
Little Rock, Arkansas 72201
(501) 371-1245

Dr. Ramiro Reyes
Office of Planning & Federal
Admin. Title IV
State Dept. of Education
Sacramento, California 95814
(916) 445-7492
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Dr. Richard Lappert
Coordinator, ESEA Title IV
State Dept. of Education
Box 2219
Hartford, Connecticut 06115
(203) 566-4989
Mr. Atwood F. Badman
State Supervisor
Administration & Management
of Federal Programs
State Dept of Public Instruction
Dover, Delaware 19901
(302) 678-4667
Mrs. Grace Davis
ESEA Title IV Coordinator
415 12th Street, N.W.
Suite 1006
Washington, D.C. 20004
(202) 724-4235
Dr. Rodney Smith
ESEA Title IV Coordinator
State Dept. of Education
Tallahassee, Florida 32304
Mr. Paul Goethe
Assistant Director
Division of Financial Services
State Dept of Education
Atlanta, Georgia 30334
(404) 656-2402
Mr. William A. Waters
Deputy Superintendent
ESEA Title IV Coordinator
State Dept. of Education
P.O. Box 2360
Honolulu, Hawaii 96804
(808) 548-4320
Mr. George H. Hunt
Supervisor, Special Projects
Division of Federal Programs
State Dept. of Education
Boise, Idaho 83720
(208) 384-2186
Dr. James Mendenhall
Director, Title IV
Illinois Office of Education
Springfield, lliinois 62777
(217) 782-5698
Mr. Ray Slaby

Ms. Betty Hinkle
Executive Director
Special Projects Unit
State Dept. of Education
Denver, Colorado 80203
(303) 839-2234

Associate Superintendent
for Federal Affairs

State Dept. of Public Instruction
Room 227, State House
Indianapolis, Indiana 46204
(317) 633-6610

Dr. James E. Mitchell
Deputy State Superintendent
State Dept. of Public Instruction
Des Moines, Iowa 50319
(515) 281-3436

Mr. Warren Bell, Director
State & Federal Programs
Administration
Kansas State Board of Education
120 E. Tenth St.
Topeka, Kansas 66612
(913) 296-2306

Mrs. Georgia Cole
Asst. Director, Division of Title IV
State Dept. of Education
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
(502) 564-6720
Dr. Daniel K. Lewis
Director. ESEA Title IV
State Dept. of Education
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70804
(504) 389-2501
Mr. Robert E. Brown
Director, Div. of Federal Programs
State Dept. of Educational
& Cultural Services
Agusta, Maine 04333
(207) 289-2475
Mr. Joseph L. Shilling
Deputy State Superintendent of Schools
State Dept. of Education
Baltimore-Washington Int •1Airport
P.O. Box 8717
Baltimore, Maryland 21240
(301) 796-8300 ext. 210
Dr. Percy V. Williams
Assistant State Superintendent
Div. of Compensatory, Urban and
Supplementary Programs
State Dept. of Education
Baltimore-Washington Int'l Airpon
P.O. Box 8717
Baltimore, Maryland 21240
(301) 796-8300 ext. 213
Ms. Katie Wright
ESEA Title IV Coordinator
State Dept of Education
Baltimore-Washington lnt'I Airpon
P.O. Box 8617
Baltimore, Maryland 21240
(301) 796-8300 ext. 233
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Dr. Max Bogan
Assoc. Commissioner
Div. of Curriculum & Instruction
State Dept. of Education
31 St. James Ave.
Boston, Massachusetts 02116

Dr. Dean Lusienski
Nebraska Agent for Nonpublic Schools
in Federal Programs, Inc.
10052 Corby Street
Omaha, Nebraska 68134
(402) 392-1940

(614) 466-4161

(617) 727-5759

Dr. James Phelps
Associate Supt. for Elementary
& Secondary Education
Dept. of Education
P.O. Box 420
Lansing, Michigan 48902
(517) 373-1823

Mr. James P. Costa
Deputy Supt. of Public Instruction
Nevada Dept. of Education
400 W. King Street
Carson City, Nevada 89701
(702) 885-5700 ext. 270
Mr. John Nay
Coordinator, Title IV
State Dept. of Education
64 N. Main

Concord, New Hampshire 03301
(603) 271-3481

Dr. Gregory Waddick
Assistant Commissioner
Div. of Planning & Development
State Dept. of Education
726 Capitol Square Building
St. Paul, Minnesota 55101
(612) 296-5061

Dr. Jack Gunn
Asst. Dir. for Instruction
State Dept. of Education
Jackson, Mississippi 39205
(601) 354-6960

Mr. Otis Baker
Coordinator, ESEA
State Dept. of Elementary
& Secondary Education
Jefferson City, Missouri 65101
(314) 751-3520

Dr. Joseph Picogna
State Director, ESEA Title IV
Office of the Deputy Commissioner
State Dept. of Education
225 W. State Street
P.O. Box 2019
Trenton, New Jersey 08625
(609) 292-4447 or 292-4498
Ms. Susan Brown
Coordinator, ESEA Title IV
State Dept. of Education
Santa Fe, New Mexico 87501
(505) 827-5441

Mr. Claudio R. Prieto
Coordinator, ESEA Title IV
State Education Dept.
Albany, New York 12234

Mr. William Elliott
Supervisor, ESEA Title IV
Office of the State Superintendent
of Public Instruction
Helena, Montana 59601
(406) 449-2059

Dr. Leroy Ireton
Administrator, Resource, Innovation
& Support Programs
State Dept. of Education
2500 N. Lincoln Blvd.
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73105
(405) 521-2956

Mr. Taylor C. Anthony
Director of Financial Services
University of Oklahoma
Office of Research Acmfuiistration
1000 Asp Avenue, Room 314
Norman, Oklahoma 73019
(405) 325-4757

Mr. George Katagiri
Coordinator, ESEA Title IV
Oregon Dept. of Education
942 Lancaster Drive, NE
Salem, Oregon 97310
(503) 378-3566

Mr. John Christopher
Director, Bureau of
Instructional Support Services
Pennsylvania Dept of Education
Box 911
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17126
(717) 787-7616

Mr. Weaver B. Rogers, Jr.
Program Coordinator, ESEA Title IV
Dept. of Public Instruction
Federal Relations, Education Bldg.
Raleigh, North Carolina 27611

Mr. Richard S. Harrington
Coordinator, Title IV
Rhode Island Dept of Education
Roger Williams Building
Room 308
Hayes Street
Providence, Rhode Island 02908

(919) 733-3614

(401) 277-2617

Mr. Elmer Huber
Director, Resources & Services
State Dept of Public Instruction
Bismarck, North Dakota 58501

Mr. John L. Seurynck
Director, Office of Federal Programs
State Dept. of Education
Columbia, South Carolina 29201

(518) 474-8761

Dr. Jim Winter, Director
School & Community Service Group
CEMREL, Inc.
3120 59th Street
St. Louis, Missouri 63139

Mr. Raymond A Hom
Director, Compensatory &
Habilitative Education
Ohio Dept. of Education
933 High Street
Worthington, Ohio 43085

(701) 224-2283

(803) 758-7782

Mr. JackH. Baillie
Administrator of Special Services
State Dept. of Education
301 Centennial Mall South
6th Floor
Lincoln, Nebraska 68509

Mr. Roger Lulow
Executive Director, Administration
Ohio Dept. of Education
65 S. Front Street
Columbus, Ohio 43215

Ms. Grace Ashmore
Assistant Supt. Financial Services
Div. of Elementary & Secondary Ed.
State Capitol Bldg.
Pierre, South Dakota 57501

(402)471-2481

(614) 466-3472

(605) 224-3426
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Mr. Chester Hill
Coordinator, ESEA Title IV
Burea of Admin & Instructional Svcs.
State Dept of Education
132A Cordell Hull Bldg.
Nashville, Tennessee 37219
(615) 741-1896 or 1951
Dr. Andrew T. Nutt
ESEA Title IV Coordinator
Texas Education Agency
Austin, Texas 78701
(512) 475-2581
Dr. Kenneth P. Lindsay
Coordinator, ESEA Title IV
Utah State Board of Education
250 E. Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 533-5891
Ms. Mary Ann Brennan
ESEA Title IV Coordinator
State Dept. of Education
State Office Bldg.
Montpelier, Vermont 05602
(802) 828-3124
Dr. Robert V. Turner
Special Assistant for Federal
Programs & Relations
Dept. of Education
Richmond, Virginia 23216
(804) 786-3170
Mr. Richard Boyd
Office of State Supt. for
Public Instruction
Olympia, Washington 98501
(206) 753-3220
Mr. Gene A. Maguran, Sr.
Administrative Assistant
Bureau of Services &
Federal Assistance
State Dept. of Education
Charleston, West Virginia 25305
(304)348-3085
Dr. Arnold M. Chand1er
Director, Bureau of
Instructional Specialists
State Dept of Public Instruction
Wisconsin Hall
126 Langdon Street
Madison, Wisconsin 53702
(608) 266-2630
Mr. Melvin H. Gillispie
Director, Program Services Unit
State Dept. of Education
Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002
(307) 777-74:11
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Mr. Sili M. Atuatasi
Federal Programs Coordinator
Dept. of Education
Pago Pago, Tutuila
American Samoa 96920
9-0 Overseas Operator 633-5673
Mr. Leroy Hirst
ESEA Title IV Coordinator
Dept. of Education
Agana, Guam 96910
Mrs. Iris Vazquez de Brunet
Assistant Sec. for Planning
And Educational Development
Dept. of Education
Hato Rey, Puerto Rico 00919
Mrs. Mavis H. Brady
Director, ESEA Title IV
Dept. of Education
Box 630
Charlotte Amalie
St. Thomas, Virgin Islands 00801
(9-809) 74:4:-5886
Mr. John C. Wade
Chief, Division of Educational
Assistance
Indian Education Resources Center
Bureau of Indian Affairs
P.O. Box 1788
Albuquerque, New Mexico 87103
(505) 766-24:27

The following is the relevant
passage of the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act as it applies to Title IV-8 and IV-C:
PublicLaw 95-561, Nov. 1, 1978 (Elementary and SecondaryEducation)
''PART B - Instructional Materials
and School Library Resources
Activities Authorized
"Sec. 421. The amounts allotted to each
State under section 403 for the purposes
of this part shall be used to provide
assistance to local educational agencies
within that State'' ( 1) for the acquisition of school library
resources, textbooks, and other printed
and published instructional materials for
the use of children and teachers in public
and private elementary and secondary
schools which shall be used for instructional purposes only; and
"(2) for the acquisition of instructional

equipment and materials suitable for use
in providing education in academic subjects for use by children and teachers in
elementary and secondary schools which
shall be used for instructional purposes
only.
Program Requirements

"Sec. 422. (a) Funds available to
a State under this part shall be
distributed among local educational
agencies in that State according to the
enrollments in public and nonpublic
schools within the school districts of
those agencies, adjusted, in accordance
with criteria prescribed by the Commissioner, to provide higher per pupil
allocations to ( 1) local educational agencies whose tax effort for education is
substantially greater than the State
average tax effort for education, but
whose per pupil expenditure (excluding
payments made under title 1 of this Act)
is no greater than the average per pupil
expenditure in the State, and (2) local
educational agencies which have the
greatest numbers or percentages of
children whose education imposes a
higher than average cost per child, such
as children from low-income families,
children living in sparsely populated
areas, and children from families in
which English is not the dominant
language.
' '(b) Local educational agencies shall
be given complete discretion (subject to
the provisions of section 406) in determining how funds they receive under
this part will be divided among the purposes described in section 421, except
that the State educational agency shall
insure that each local educational agency, in making that determination, has
adopted appropriate procedures, including periodic consultation with
teachers, librarians, media specialists
and other professional staff in the
schools, and private school officials, to
coordinate the selection of equipment
and materials under this part with curricula being carried out in the schools
within that agency.
Part CImprovement
Educational Practice
Activities

in Local

Authorized

"Sec. 431. (a) The amounts allotted
to each State under section 403 for the
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purpose of this part shall be used to provide assistance to local educational
agencies within the State for activities
that will improve the educational practices of those agencies, including' '(1) the development and demonstration of activities designed to address
serious educational problems in elementary and secondary schools, including"(A) the need for effective programs for
children with special needs, such as
educationally deprived children, gifted
and talented children, and handicapped
children.
''(B) high rates of children who do not
complete secondary school and"(C) the need of children in private
schools for improved educational services;
"(2) encouraging the development
and demonstration of improved means
of carrying out programs for educationally deprived children in school attendance areas having high concentrations of children from low-income
families;
''(3) activities designed to improve
the achievement of children in basic
skills;
"(4) activities to encourage the participation of parents in the education of
their children;
"(5) the development of programs to
diagnose learning problems and assess
the educational achievement of children,
including children in nonprofit private
schools;
"(6) developing and implementing
model plans to demonstrate effective
means of improving school management
and fully coordinating all the Federal,
State, and local resources available in a
school in a fashion designed to meet the
individual needs of every child in that
school;
"(7) professional development programs for teachers, administrators, and
other instructional personnel in the
schools of such agencies;
"(8) early childhood and family
education programs for children not yet
enrolled in kindergarten programs and
below age six for activities related to the
identification of potential barriers to
learning, the education of parents in
child development, home-based pro-

grams, and referral services; and
''(9) programs to extend the education
process beyond the school building
through the use of other resources in the
community,
such as museums,
businesses, cultural organizations, labor
unions, and governmental agencies.
"(b) (1) Funds available to the States
under this part shall also be used (pursuant to State plans approved under section 404) for the purpose of encouraging
innovation and improvement in compensatory educational efforts. Such efforts may include" (A) programs of grants to local
educational agencies for summer bridge
programs which provide students with
continued academic improvement and
stimulation during the summer months
in order to preserve and increase the
academic progress of such students in
regular school year programs;
"(B) programs of parent education
which enable parents to better contribute to their children's academic progress by such means as the conducting of
parent education or parenting programs
which promote partnership between
parents and teachers and help parents
develop the skills necessary to motivate
and assist such children;
"(C) programs that provide retraining to improve the skills of teachers and
other educational personnel to enable
such personnel to meet better the
specific educational
needs of the
children served by such personnel; and
"(D) programs to develop educational materials for use by children in
the home to improve student achievement in the basic skills.
"(2) Each State shall ensure that not
less than 50 per centum of those funds
appropriated for any fiscal year which
exceed the amount appropriated for this
part for the fiscal year ending September
30, 1979, will be used for the purposes of
programs described in paragraph (1).
Program Requirements

"Sec. 432. (a) Funds may be provided to a local educational agency under
this part for a particular activity for a
period of not to exceed five fiscal years
(excluding any period for which such
agency received a planning grant for
such activity), subject to the availability
of appropriations for this part of each
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fiscal year. The amount provided to a
local educational agency for any activity
under this part shall decline after the
third year, in accordance with criteria
prescribed by the Commissioner, in
order to ensure that successful practices
developed with assistance under this
part will be adopted and supported as
part of the regular program of such
agency.
'' (b) ( 1) From sums made available to
each State under this part, the following
sums shall be allocated for activities
under section 431 (a) (6), relating to
plans for improved school management
and the coordinated use in schools of all
available resources:
' ' (A) In fiscal year 1980, not less than
5 percent of any amount by which the
amount available for this part in fiscal
year 1980 exceeds the amount so
available in fiscal year 1979.
"(B) In fiscal year 1981 and in each
succeeding fiscal year, not less than 10
percent of any amount by which the
amount available for this part in such
year exceeds the amount so available in
fiscal year 1979.
"(2) No activity under section 431 (a)
(6) shall be approved by the State educational agency unless the proposal
therefor has been developed in consultation with, and has been approved by, a
committee composed of administrators,
teachrs, other staff at the school, and
parents whose children attend the
school.
"(c) Not less than 15 per centum of
the amount received by a State under
this part in any fiscal year shall be used
for special programs or projects meeting
the purposes of this part for the education of handicapped children. For the
purpose of this part, the term 'handicapped children' has the meaning set forth
in section 602(1) of the Education of the
Handicapped Act.
''(d) Subject to section 406(d) and (3),
a State educational agency shall not approve the application of a local educational agency for assistance under this
part unless the State educational agency
determines that in designing the proposal to which that application relates,
the needs of children in nonprofit
private schools have been taken into account through consultation with private
school officials and other means.''
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PHILOSOPHY
IN

LITERATURE

Is There Really A Cow
In The Field?
"The cow is there," said Ansell,
lighting a match and holding it out over
the carpet. No one spoke. He waited till
the end of the match fell off. Then he
said again, '' She is there, the cow.
There, now.''
''You have not proved it,'' said a
voice.
''I have proved it to myself.''
"I have proved to myself that she
isn't," said the voice. "The cow is not
there.'' Ansell frowned and lit another
match.
"She's there for me," he declared, "I
don't care whether she's there for you or
not. Whether I'm in Cambridge or
Iceland or dead, the cow will be there."
It was philosophy. They were discussing the existence of objects. Do they exist only when there is someone to look at
them? Or have they a real existence of
their own? It is all very interesting, but
at the same time it is difficult. Hence the
cow. She seemed to make things easier.
She was so familiar, so solid, that surely
the truths that she illustrated would in
time become familiar and solid also. Is
the cow there or not? This was better
than deciding between objectivity and

subjectivity. So at Oxford, just at the
same time, one was asking, "What do
our rooms look like in the vac. ?"
"Look here, Ansell. I'm there - in
the meadow - the cow's there. You're
there - the cow's there. Do you agree
so far?"
"Well?"
"Well, if you go, the cow stops; but if
I go, the cow goes. Then what will happen if you stop and I go?"
Several voices cried out that this was
quibbling.
"I know it is," said the speaker
brightly, and silence descended again,
while they tried honestly to think the
matter out ...
But what about the cow? He returned
to her with a start, for this would never
do. He also would try to think the matter out. Was she there or not? The cow.
There or not. He strained his eyes into
the night.
Either way it was attractive. If she was
there, other cows were there, too. The
darkness of Europe was dotted with
them, and in the far East their flanks
were shining in the rising sun. Great
herds of them stood browsing in
pastures where no man came nor need
ever come, or plashed knee-deep by the
brink of impassable rivers. And this,
moreover, was the view o'r Ansell. Yet
Tilliard's view had a good deal in it.
One might do worse than follow
Tilliard, and suppose the cow not to be
there unless oneself was there to see her.
A cowless world, then, stretched round
him on every side. yet he had only to
peep into a field, and, click! it would at
once become radiant with bovine life.
reprinted from E.M. Forster, The Longest
Journey, (New York: Random House, 1982)
pp. 1-3,with the kind permission of Alfred A.
Knopf, Inc.
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Coleridge on Democracy,
Discussion,
Philosophy
and
Education

magine to yourself the [a?] small
number qf pleasant cities with
Isquares,
public gardens and covered
walks, all speaking one common
language but each city an independent
state and a Republic. Add to this a
genial climate, sanguine constitutions,
and the practice of duelling, we will suppose, utterly unknown. Each separate
city indeed we may conceive as all too
ready to act on its neighbour Republic
by the terror of arms, but the citizens of
each Republic were in the habit of using
towards each other no other weapons
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than those of argument and persuasion.
All these little states are governed nearly
in the same way by one great common
council in which every adult male being
a freeborn citizen has an equal right to
deliver his opinion and to give his vote.
In each little Republic the jealousy of its
neighbours and the spirit of rivalry, ambition and revemge will not fail to produce a constant succession of important
subjects for public debate- peace and
war, defeat and victory, treaties made
and treaties broken, election of generals
and officers of state, impeachment,
defence, punishment,
remuneration.
You will agree with me I think that the
inhabitants of these little Republics
could scarcely fail of becoming an
argumentative, perhaps a disputatious,
certainly a talkative race. When there
happened to be no public news they
would debate on subjects of a more
private or a more general nature and
whatever they conversed on their conversation would be marked by the lively
manner,
the eagerness
and the
argumentative cast which their public
assemblies would have formed into a
habit and second nature with them. In
such a small state too the characters of
men and consequently the knowledge of
the springs and of the consequences of
action would become of real and practical importance to each individualthese of course would form the subjects
of frequent discussion in their public
walks and porches. Some loud talker
would often gather around him an increasing audience, each of whom would
feel the right. and not want the inclination to interrupt and question the main
speaker. This sort of public disputes,
arising ·thus accidentally, would among
this lively and good-natured people form
as frequent sources of amusement as
among us a boxing match in the streets,
or rather, to bring an instance less
disgraceful to our national manners,
think of our zealous field preachers and
the audiences they collect around them,
and instead of interrupted declamation
conceive animated and pertinacious
dialog~e.
From
discussing
the
characters of their magistrates or
generals, of their rich men and their
parasites, they would by the very nature
of the human mind and of human
language be soon led to think of action
in general, to generalize, to classify.
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This source of amusement,
once
discovered, would become no doubt a
favourite amusement with the more
refined and peaceable citizens, while the
turbulent and the coarse would crowd to
the exhibition of defamatory farces or
defamatory harangues. Such citizens as
eminently gratified the former would be
designated by some honorable name,
and by what name more appropriately
than by that of Philosophers or men who
loved general truth without reference to
personal attachment or personal hatred.
Citizens who excelled in gratifying the
baser passions would soon have their
distinguishing title, Satyrists, Comedians or Agitators. Thus in our imaginary Republic we have already arrived at the origin of Moral Philosophy and
Moral Philosophers.
We will now, if you please, imagine a
very much larger multitude of men
under a government purely and intensely despotic; one man sends out laws and
the remaining myriads learn and obey
them. Here men are acted upon incomparably more often and with incomparably greater intensity than they act.
Of course they would attach· little importance to themselves considered as the inhabitants of a particular state, little importance to their countrymen
in
general. The officers of state, military
and civil magistrates, would indeed by
necessary but they would all be the mere
representatives and symbols of the one
despot. As thejews had different names
for the Supreme Being, differing from
each other in sanctity and awfulness yet
all expressing the same Being, even so in
this Empire each and every Magistrate

and Grandee would be as it were only a
name more or less awful of the supreme
Magistrate. This one man would indeed
become of infinite importance to the
whole community, but his agency would
be of so unvaried a kind that it would
never become the subject of active
thought; so unvaried, so terrific and so
exceedingly disproportionate to human
agency in general that it would either
preclude thought, which grounds itself
on Analogies and the Classification of
facts by their Resemblances, and lead
inevitably to Superstition, which consists in the prostration of the mind
before an unanalysed anomaly. Under a
government such as we have been imagining Man would more often consider
the action of Nature upon him than of
Man, of the plants of Nature, of the
heavenly bodies. His thoughts on these
would be characterized however by the
gloom resulting from the aforementioned anomalous human agency. He wouldimagine spiritual powers residing and
acting in inanimate forms, a ghostly
Bashaw in every plant possessing or imagined to possess unusual powers; a
Sultan in every star, and all subjected to
one supernatural Caliph omnipresent in
his influence by an unlimited and invisible espionage.
Still, however, to
generalize, to classify, belongs to him as
a man whether he be the slave of a
Despot or the free citizen of a happy
Republic. The facts and phenomena of
Nature with all the appendages of superstition would soon be classified, and thus
we have arrived at the origin of Magic,
Theosophy and Cosmogony. By Magic,
we understand a system of powers
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residing in inanimate objects and of the
fanciful means which were supposed
capable of calling them into action; by
Theosophy a system of intelligent
spirits, malignant or gracious, believed
to reside in the objects of sense and considered as the cause of the powers which
we experience and on a proper solicitation of powers incomparably greater; by
Cosmogony a system of the origination
of all things, including an explanation of
their present state. Let us suppose a
series of benevolent and virtuous
Despots. A portion of Republican
security will be felt, a portion of
Republican activity excited, but it will
be naturally excited on the old stock of
Ideas, and still from the essential nature
of Despotism the characters and actions
of Men will be less interesting than the
phenomena of Nature and of their supposed supernatural causes- Magic and
Cosmogony would gradually improve
into a more rational system of
Chemistry, the Arts of Healing and
Astronomy and Theosophy would rise
into grand, simple and awful contemplations respecting the Deity• in his relation to Man and Man in relation to Deity. You will have perceived that in the
disguise of a supposition I have shadowed out to you the real history of the
origin of Moral Philosophy in Greece, of
Theology and Natural Philosophy in
Egypt and India. The early Sages of
Greece were Natural Philosophers and
Mythologists for they were the im ·
porters of Eastern Philosophy and if we
may allow ourselves a play upon words,
Philosophers in Greece rather than proper Grecian Philosophers. Ethics and
argumentative Metaphysics were the
offspring of democracies whom superior
courage and superior intellect had
rendered victorious over Despots, to
whom victory had given a season of
security and whom industry, genius,
and public spirit had placed in the
possession of comforts and elegancies.
I observed that you smiled when I
•Note-TM naturalprideand tlu instinctsof luJptreeeiDing little or no g,atifieationin tnei,P,esml state undn a
despotism,
IAegreatmassofIAein/aahitantswill be impelled to lookforward b9f"'d IAeg,aw. TM doctrineofim,nort,alityis naturalto man, it will be IAerefore
&0mmon
to
republies
and to despotismbul tlu impo,taneeattachedto
tlu doctrinewill befound, indepmdmllyof imitation at
least, womparablymoreintensein IAe/attn thanin tlu

fo,me,.

traced the origin of Moral Philosophy
out of the talkativeness incident to petty
Republics in a cheerful climate. In the
present day it is possible that the individuals who talk least may think most
but this must not be extended to nations
in the ruder period of the human race
and while language is as it were still
under the potter's wheel. General talkativeness will mould the common
language and give it strength, harmony,
flexibility and copiousness even to the
expression of the finest shades of meaning. Such a language may easily be
made an instrument of deceit as well as
of truth to a degree of which those
languages must need be unsusceptible in
which, as in most of the Oriental, the
forms of connexion are few and simple
and express merely annexment and disjunction, not the niceties of cause and
consequence, division and exception.
You cannot fail to see how great an influence this must have on philosophy in
general, but it leads us at once to the
particular
subject of our present
historical
disquisition.
Among a
talkative people a great number will talk
idly. Idle-talking will be felt as an evil
and the opposite excellence acquire an
additional value from the contrast.
When men have already generalized on
their actions and thoughts, they will be
induced by their scorn of the evil to
generalize on Discourse likewise; in
other words as they had previously
directed their attention to good and bad
actions and had with more or less success reduced their characteristic differences to General Rules they would
now find it convenient to make the same
attempt with good and bad conversation
and to reduce to General Rules the
characteristic differences of rational and
irrational, of true and deceptive, forms
of connection. This is Logic and this
would be the origin of Logic. In a
Democracy, where the varieties of
character and moral habit find sufficient
space and free playroom, some men will
gain a distinct and honorable name as
teacher~ of truth. Others from rivalry
and the mere lust of distinction will exert
their ingenuity in starting verbal objections calculated merely to perplex conversation and in no wise to affect the inward conviction unless indeed where
vicious habits literally decayed the intellectual faculties and moral feeling.
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The first class as I have already told you
were called Philosophers, the second,
Sophists. These were considered as irreconcilable enemies. The Philosophers,
and indeed all wise and good men, considered Sophists and Sophistry as an evil
and a nuisance and Logic was invented
as the proper amulet, as the specific
medicine. But as weapons originally in{ented for defence may be converted into weapons of offence, so Logic in its imperfect state proved an Implement still
more convenient to the Sophist than to
the Philosopher. After the Battle of
Chaerpnea when the forms and habits of
Grecian Democracy remained but all
the great and practically important supjects of discussion were removed from
their popular assemblies, the public
mind became proportionally enfeebled.
The Greeks, always great debators, now
found their best amusement in incessant
verbal disputation,
the Sophists
threatened to gain the upper hand, and
for the specific purpose of preventing
this evil Aristotle composed a more efficient Logic, his Organon, which in all
essentials contains the system in present
use, in the schools and universities of
Europe, excepting those of Republican
France where it has been made to give
way to the Logic of Condillac. • • I propose to draw out a sketch of the contents
of this extraordinary work, but that you
may be enabled the better to decide on
the degree of genius requisite for its production it will be necessary for me to
prefix some account of Logic as it existed before Aristotle under the different
names of the Eleatic, Megaric and
Socratic Logic. The permanent value of
the work will be a subject of direct and
separate discussion; but this question
will be illustrated, no doubt, by a history
of the attempts made to improve it by
Lully, Ramus,
Lord Bacon and
Descartes; and last of all by Condillac.
We shall answer two purposes by this;
we shall make ourselves acquainted with
an important part of philosophical
history and at the same time impress
upon our memory, and learn the habit
of applying the rules of that art, the
history of which we are attempting to
detail.
• •Note. It would be moreaecurateperhapsto say that tlu
study of Logiealtogetheris expiodedin F,anu, for Condillae's book is ,atAerpsyeluJlogieal
than logieal,bul of
this hereafter.
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Few disputes in philosophical history
have been more trifling than that
respecting the invention of Logic and
whether
the honour
is due to
Parmenides or the Eleatic Zeno. Zeno of
Elea, a city of Magna Grecia, flourished
about (?] B.C. and was the scholar of
Parmenides, who flourished about 505
B.C. If it were not too absurd to consider Logic in the Eleatic sense as having
been invented by any one, we might
fairly divide the honor between the
master and the scholar and put an
amicable conclusion to this important
controversy. The characteristics of the
Eleatic Logic have been preserved to us
by Proclus in his Commentaries on
Plato and by Laertius the Biographer.
His Art of Logic consisted of three divisions, viz. of Consequences, Colloquies
and Debates. His rule for the Deduction
of Consequences was the following. Put
any question or position- for instance,
Was Zeno the inventor of Logic? You
may either assume the affirmative or the
negative, by which assumption there
arise two hypotheses- if it be so and if it
not be so, for an assumption in only a
supposition in the disguise of an assertion. To each of these suppositions there
would attach three sorts of consequences, to wit, what may be deduced
from them, what cannot be deduced
from them and what can be deduced in
respect of one thing and what cannot in
respect to others, as it may be deduced
that I am a tall man with respect to
David, though a short one with respect
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of Goliath; the same being applied both
ways to the negative as well as to the affirmative, you thus gain six sorts of consequences; and because you may look at
each of these in four different aspectsof the thing in respect to itself, of the
thing in respect to others, of others in
respect to the thing, and fourthly of
others in respect to themselves- there
arise of the whole of course twenty-four
sorts of consequences. I will not emply
your time so idly as to give you instances- it is sufficient to observe that
this is called the Eleatic Method. Its
manifest
purpose
is to prevent
precipitate and premature assertions- a
sort of technical direction to the
understanding, how it may see any
given subject in all its bearings, without
which there can be no assurance in
deduction. The next division is that of
Dialogue or ColloquyDialectic,
Dialogic or Dialogistic art, i.e., the art
of arranging your thoughts well. Zeno
no doubt was well aware that though it
might be very serviceable to look at each
subject in twenty-four bearings in your
own mind, it would be very ridiculous
bona fide thus to subdivide when you
were talking with others. This Dialectic
Art, the rules of which as given by Zeno
have not been preserved to us as far as I
can discover, became however so
fashionable and was indeed so well
adapted to Republican manners that
almost all Philosophy was exhibited in
Dialogue, a circumstance which at times
gives an excellent grace to the writings

of Plato, but too often a prolixity which
not only wearies out the audience, but
perplexes and bewilders it. When well
conducted it seems to me the best manner of introducing truth into the mind,
but after the first elements have been
taught, and the scholar's mind finds
itself at ease with the terminology and
the forms of reasoning, I should prefer
the Aristotelian method improved by a
greater richness of illustration.
In weighing the advantages and disadvantages of Dialogues, do not suffer
yourself to be misled by the vulgar
schoolbooks, histories, and religious
tracts in the Dialogue form. These are
not Dialogues, but dull exhibitions of a
sort of Ventriloquism. One man is
speaking all the while, but every now
and then he alters his voice into a semisqueak and would fain make it appear to
proceed from some doll or man of straw
at some little distance from it. To instruct in the form of dialogue the one
great rule is the following: Remember
your own state of mind when the subject
was new to you- the different passions
of premature contempt, undue admiration, imaginations that you had understood what you had not or had only imperfectly understood, your objections,
your difficulties- place these in actual
language in the mouth of the scholar and
answer them as naturally in your own
character and present state of mind and
you will have formed a true Philosophical Dialogue for the purposes of instruction which does not require the
representation of different characters,
but of the same mind in two different
states made co-present by the natural
fiction of two persons, the one actually
in that state in which the other must
formerly have been if we take minds at
their averaged degree of power. There
does not exist a more important rule nor
one more fruitful in its consequences,
moral as well as logical, than the rule of
connecting our present mind with our
pastfrom the breach of it result
almost all the pernicious errors in our
education of children and indeed of our
general treatment of our fellow creatures. It is indeed the only cure of uncharitableness, intemperate expectation
and feelings of Positiveness imposing
themselves on the mind for a sense of
Certainty.
From the Bristol Notebook,Ch. 1.
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Last July, the Kansas City Star reported at
length on a philosophy for children program In operation at Loretto, a private
school In Kansas City. Taught by Prof.
Henry Frankel, of the philosophy department at the University of Missouri, Kansas
City, and by Mrs. Nelda Gosnell, the
students' regular teacher, the course was
devoted to ethical Inquiry, and Involved
students In grades 6-8. One bit of dialogue
cited by the author of the article (Andrew
C. MIiier, Education Editor of the Star) Is
especially worthy of note. Frankel had
asked what was meant by the phrase, "to
know oneself":
He means you should know your morals.''
answered one student. "He says you
should know your rules, but live by your
standards," added another. 11 But you have
to know why you believe In your standards,"
countered a third.
The first of the two articles that follow
is by Nelda Gosnell; the second Is by
Henry Frankel.

Can We Help

Children

Think?
Nelda Gosnell

ne day last year some of my col-

O leagues were attracted out of their

rooms to find me leaning against my
door - beaming in spite of the fact that
the sound behind me was outrageous,
even for one of my classes. What were
my students doing? They were thinking.
They were thinking about and trying to
determine whether or not two bodies can
occupy the same space. And many were
arguing for their side. Loudly and
logically.
Many other sessions of this class were
not nearly as loud. In fact, some were
filled with agonizing silences because the
question they were pondering was more
elusive - they couldn't stand on each
other's feet to determine the difference
between right and fair.
After sitting in on one of these classes,
a mother who was looking for the right

school for her creative child, said to me,
"This is the darndest class I've ever
seen. You are doing here what we have
to do at home to undowhat they've been
doing at school.''
What was she referring to? She was
talking about more than not giving the
students the answer; she was talking
about giving the students tools to help
them think.
My friend, Hank Frankel, and I team
taught the course to a group of 6th, 7th,
and 8th graders. We based it primarily
on the second of a series of books by
Matthew Lipman and the Institute for
the Advancement of Philosophy for
Children. These books are specifically
designed to teach logical thinking to
children.
Sound heavy?
The thought processes are heavy, I

guess, if you think a human being
should wait until she/he is at least 17 or
18 years old to learn to think logically.
Actually, my kids didn't get the heavy
bit. They thought the class was fun.
Lipman' s books interest students
because they're about kids like themselves facing an imperfect world. In
Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery, the first
book, a group of typical (is there such a
being?) 5th and 6th graders - of mixed
social and ethnic backgrounds - do
their thing and beginthinking aboutthinking. We find the same cast in junior high
in Lisa, the second book. Finally, in
Suki, our characters are high schoolers
dealing with budding romances and
moral dilemmas.
The books are appealing, like all wellwritten adolescent fiction, because the
people in them are real - the kids are
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doing things that kids do, facing problems and decisions that kids face. The
pages are filled with rewarding and
frustrating family interactions,
accidents, nightmares,
marriage and
divorce, live-in grandparents, death,
peer pressures, adolescent sexual attractions, and the ongoing flux we all experience - the changethat takes place
naturally with time in our relationships
with family and friends.
In the Lipman books, as Harry, Lisa,
and Suki and their friends grow up
physically, they also grow in their ability
to organize their thoughts, to evaluate
logically, and to inquire into - to question - the ethics involved in life experiences. They do this not through studying the great philosophers, but,
rather, through trying to explain ordinary experiences.
Harry, in HarryStottlemeier's
Discovery,
asks questions in class as all kids do but in this case his teacher and parents
help Harry find possible answers. This
is not true for many kids in the infamous
''real world'' where they are often told
there's no time for questions or that a
question is ''off the topic.'' Therefore,
serve as
the dialo§UeSin HarryStottlemeier
models for discussions in the classroom.
In Lisa, the section of class Hank and
I have taught, the kids are 7th and 8th
graders (my favorite age), and they are
struggling with changing bodies and
changing perceptions of the world. They
find themselves having to make decisions and they are realizing that thesedecisions are becoming increasingly
more difficult to make and require, increasingly, more personal reflection.
The students in the class, by identifying
with Harry, Lisa and the others, begin
to recognize and ponder moral issues in
their own lives. And, hopefully, with
guidance, the children in the classroom
begin an open-ended, continuous consideration of the values, standards and
practices by which people live and that
in doing so they learn to recognize that
alternatives exist and that other people
and their ideas deserve respect. The
students learn the importance of and the
reievance
ofclear logical thinking applied
to the experiences of their own lives and
that such thinking offers new options in
the problems they encounter.
The next book is Suki.As will happen,
the kids are growing up and are in high
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school now. I must admit that Suki is my
favorite of the three. Our friends are interacting around a new English class in
which the teacher is something of a
wierdo.
I can identify with this situation.
Mr. Newberry, the teacher, is
teaching appreciation of literature and
the techniques of composition through
"the search for meaning" - meaning
of words, meaning of thoughts, and
ultimately, of course, meaning of lives.
The book begins:
The first day In Mr. Newberry's
English class had been uneventful.
MIiiie said afterwards she thought
Mr. Newberry was cute, and Randy
claimed the teacher kept giving him
mean looks throughout the class. To
Fran, the teacher seemed somewhat
distracted. "Maybe we should try to
wake him up," she ventured.
But when the class began the next
day, Mr. Newberrytapped his fingers
sharply on the desk and said, In his
rasping voice, "Okay, let's get
started. You're not here Just to learn
to read and write. You're here to learn
to read and write literature."
Mickey smirked and said to Jane,
"There's going to be nobody here but
us authors!"
"In these days," Mr.Newberrycon•
tlnued, "when nothing uninentlonable goes unmentioned-"
Laura scowled, "What's he ta/kin'
about?"
" - we haveto askourselvessome
hard questions: Do we have anything
to say worth saying? If so, how can
we say It well?"
The class was silent now as If be·
Ing scolded, although no one was
conscious of having done anything
wrong. They waitedfor the teacher to
resume speaking, but he stared out
the window. Then he turned quickly
and said, "More Importantly, we've
got to learn how to tell the difference
between what's meaningful and
what's meaningless."
And so the class progresses. The kids
work or don't work on Newberry's assignments, fall in and out of love,
disagree with their parents, make decisions about whether or not they will stay
in school, and develop their ability to
reason about values and to think for
themselves.
Newberry seeks to have students
define the "Quality of Existence," the
"Shock of Existence," and the "Logic
of Existence" through examples of
literature, through writing exercises and
through thoughtful class discu~sions.

During the course, the class considers
the difference between the verbs ''to
be" and "to exist", and muses upon the
thought that "freedom has meaning only in constrast to restraint.'' At one
point, Suki asks, "Does prose communicate and poetry illuminate?" The
subplots involve Suki and Harry's
discovery of each other and Harry's
beginning understanding of the reality
of the meaning of the value of another
person's life.
Heavy stuff for the middle school?
Maybe. But they can handle it.
My teaching set-up is ideal for this
kind of learning. I teach in an openclassroom middle school. The· students
are accustomed to participating actively
in class discussion and to having their
ideas treated with respect. Lipman
stresses the "process of discussion;" so
do we. It is significant that the students
call us, the teachers, by our first names
- an indication that we act not as instructors, but, rather, as catalysts to the
students.
I encourage children to
discover ideas or insights or beauty or
ugliness for themselves, but I am willing
also to tell them some of the conclusions
others have reached or the reasons why
general beliefs exist - · hopefully, I do
this impartially and knowledgeably. I
must admit that I also believe that a sensitive teacher can, at times, give her/his
own personal point-of-view and that it is
better to name it as such than to disguise
it as something else. Beware. This is
dangerous. If you are audacious enough
to do this you must also be prepared to
defend your views, participate fairly in a
discussion of the views and also be
prepared to change your mind.
The school in which I teach encourages individual decision-making as one of
the most valuable life skills and our
philosophy jells with Lipman's in that
we agree that the amount of factual information a child acquires ''is less essential to his education than the development of his intellectual judgment.''
One can, of course, teach educated
thinking in a situation that is less than
ideal to begin with. A teacher creates
his/her own atmosphere. Discussions of
values, concerns, questions and observations can become more than the mere
expression
ofopinionsin agroup.When people listen, think, and reevaluate, much
more happens. A sense of mutual
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respect is established, and that respect,
in turn, creates an "ideal situation" for
serious thinking. An ideal situation for
- if you will - the great philosophical
themes.
· When students reflect upon other people's questions and answers; when
students ponder their own views in the
light of someone else's insights, then
they begin to grasp a more objective
view of the way things are and the way
things might become. When you can
help children learn to reinforce their
thoughts with reasons and when you can
help them to be impartial, you can help
them to think.

By Henry Frankel
the spring of 1978 Nelda
Gosnell and I taught a mini-course
During

for 6th through 8th graders using Lipman's material. The course met for forty minutes five days a week for six
weeks. I met with the students three
times a week and Nelda was present at
every session. What I should like to do
in this note is summarize what occurred
and offer several impressions.
AIMS: Ou; general aim was to promote
philosophical discussion and interest on
the part of the students. We wanted
them to develop and/or augment their
sensitivity for giving reasons for their
beliefs. The only specific technique I
wanted the stuqents to learn was how to
use Venn diagrams as a means for
testing the validity of ''Aristotelean''
argument forms. Otherwise, we simply
planned to use Lipman' s Lisa as a
springboard for philosophical discussion
- due to the shortness of the course we
used only Lisa. We did not attempt to
teach the students a particular
philosophical position. Obviously, certain positions were presupposed, but we
were not interested in producing young
nominalists, realists or idealists.
CONTENT: I spent the first two
weeks introducing the students to notions such as 'validity,' 'soundness,' the
square of .opposition and Venn
diagrams. We also began reading Lisa
during the first week. When the course
was over, we still had several chapters of

Lisa left. The students completed several
exercises on Venn diagrams, and wrote
short essays (300 to 500 words) on the
following topics: (1) Describe an occasion when you felt unfairly treated.
Here they were supposed to describe
what happened, and explain why they
felt they had been unfairly treated. (2)
Discuss a moral-dilemma that they had
personally experienced, isolate the issues
involved,
explicate
the various
arguments employed, and re-evaluate
the various arguments. (3) Delineate
what distinguishes the present from the
past and future, and discuss the differences among such activities as
remembering, perceiving and predicting. All of these assignments evolved out
of class discussions on various episodes
in Lisa.
Impressionsand Remarks
• By the end of the course almost every
student could use Venn diagrams and
had a fairly adequate understanding of
the notions
of 'validity'
and
'soundness.' Indeed, they understood
how to work with 'validity' and 'soundness' after the first few lectures - being
no different from college students - but
were unable to use Venn diagrams until
near the end of the course.
• As to be expected the quality of the
various essays was uneven. Most of
them had little problem describing some
past experience, but almost all of them
had difficulty in analyzing what was at
issue. Of course, they improved after
the first assignment. In general, class
discussion was at a higher level than
their written work. Occasionally, what
occurred was as good as what typically
goes on in a college-level introductory
philosophy course.
• Both Nelda. and I spent most of our
time clarifying their positions rather
than advancing our own, although I
sometimes would buttress positions or
introduce additional factors to enhance
the discussion. This doesn't mean that
w~ didh 't let them know that they were
wrong when they were. But, it does
mean that we dido 't spend the period
lecturing to them. Our basic modus
operandiwas to discuss what went on in
the given chapter, isolate one or two
themes, often sketch out a problem, and
let them hash it out.
• I was surprised that the students so
thoroughly enjoyed the material. Most
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of them were interested and willing to
work through various assignments. A
strong point in favor, of using Lipman' s
material is that it promotes and sustains
th~ir interest. He has an uncanny ability
to introduce philosophical issues in a
context which is interesting and meaningful to kids. His use of the novel as a
medium for introducing students to
philosophical issues is highly successful.
Lisa was interesting to the students in
and of itself, and the philosophical content did not get lost. The students found
it easy to identify with the various
characters and situations in the novel,
and to apply what was going on in the
novel to their own lives. Students
became somewhat introspective and attempted to uncover, develop and
evaluate personal standards. It is certainly to Lipman's credit that he seems
to know what is of concern to children of
this age, and is able to present the
material so ;5uccessfully.
• What I found least satisfactory about
Lipman's material is his use of Aristotelean logic. I see no reason why he
could not have used a bastardized version of the propositional calculus.
Rather than have the children in the
novel figure out valid Aristotelean argument forms, the square of opposition
and standardization of English into
Aristotelean logic, he could have had
them investigate similar issues with the
propositional calculus. They could have
isolated different argument forms,
developed truth tables, gone through
some standardization and discussed
various propositional equivalences. I say
this especially because Lipman sneaks in
some propositional calculus. Unfortunately, the logic sections remained, at
least in our class, fairly isolated from the
other material.
• By the end of the course the students
had a better appreciation for giving
reasons, would attempt to supply
reasons when appropriate and thereby
became more assertive: They often felt
that they had good· reasons for their
opinions.
Nelda and I plan to offer a similar
cour~ during the spring of 1979.
Needless to say, I believe there is much
merit in Lipman's approach.
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scarcely needs to defend the imO neportance
of critical thinking as a
desirable ingredient in human beings in
a democratic society. No matter what
views people hold either of personal
growth or of desirable society- they do
at least agree in general terms that people have to learn to think. Ever since the
precedent set by the Eight Year Study,
some reference pertaining to critical
thinking is practically a "must" for
statements of objectives in curriculum
manuals. In a society in which things

change fast people cannot depend on
routinized behaviour or traditions in
making decisions, whether on practical
every-day matters, moral values or
political issues. In a country in which
the destiny of the nation is presumably
hewed from the will of the peoplethere is a natural concern that individuals be capable of making intelligent and independent decisions
about social values and means of achieving them.
Yet, the task of developing critical
thinking in adolescents and young people is one on which schools perhaps have
done less than they should or couldand for a variety of reasons.
For one thing, too many teachers and
schools have taken too simplified a view
of critical thinking. They have therefore
tried to concentrate the training for it in
a few simple steps- such as the five
steps in problem solving- and called it
a job.

Not a Simple Task
Critical thinking is not a simple

gadget that can be taught and acquired
on the spot in one lesson, unit, or even
in one single subject. It is somewhat like
a way of life- involving many dispositions, skills and abilities in treating ideas
and facts. Each of its elements requires
time for continued practice and opportunity to do so in a variety of contexts. It
is, for example, not a simple matter to
learn to draw adequate generalizations
from factual or experiential data. Nor is
it possible to learn this process adequately by concentrating exclusively on problems and materials of science- and excluding all social materials which present different obstacles to clear thinking.
For example, research in recent years
has shown beyond doubt that clear
thinking 'in all social areas involves also
ability to look at feelings and attitudes as
facts. A training limited to conceptual
aspects alone seems not to produce people capable of critically thinking about
social and human problems.
Furthermore, the ability to think
critically is not a process that can be
taught all at once, iio matter how
thoroughly it is done at that time. We
are beginning to think in terms of
developmental processes in other areas
of growth, and it is necessary to see
critical thinking as a developmental process also, in which there is a
psychological learning sequence that
students need to follow. Because we
have not considered thinking as a
developmental process, in which certain
experiences are necessary preliminaries
to others, we have often tried to teach
thought processes in sequences that
make it impossible for students to acquire
these
processes.
Forcing
generalizations prematurely in discussions is one example of such an "upside
down" sequence. This is illustrated in
the following quotation:
''The nature of teachers' questions sometimes forced general appraisal or judgment ahead of allowing the experience of the group
to come into play and to be made
cumulative, or before allowing a
kind of refreshing or memory on
details to prepare for generalized
judgment. This happened in an
eighth grade where, to conclude a
study of British government, the
teacher asked, without success,
that pupils tell how it was like and
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unlike the United States government. Later analysis by the teacher showed that the difficulty lay in
the fact that these pupils had not
studied comparable aspects of the
United States government and
that no recapitulation of those aspects had preceeded comparison.
Often the mistake is in starting
analysis too soon by pressing
"why" questions after each student's statement. For example, if
only one person describes an incident, gives a fact, or presents an
idea, and a question as to "why"
(explanation), or "where does this
belong" (classification) follows it
immediately, discussion is cut off,
as (a) only one person in the class
is involved and could respond and
(b) the basis for judgment is
limited and hence such reactions
as come are meager in content. If,
instead, the discussion is kept open
by asking several students to add
on the same level as the first one,
more people can make connection
with the idea, and they will have a
fuller content from which to respond and to think about the
''why''. Many students have thus
had a chance to contribute particulars and to watch and partake
in the building up of concepts.
Each student
gets involved
because "his particular" becomes
a part of the concept.
For example, in one class, pupils
were reporting on their interviews
on what people meant by rights.
One pupil said that a religious
leader whom she had interviewed
listed the opportunity to hold jobs
and the right to vote for the party
in which one believed. Instead of
these two being placed in a list of
rights that other pupils had obtained from their interviewees- businessmen, labor leaders, teachersand then all of the listed rights
were represented, the teacher
questioned -this single statement
thus: ''What criticism would you
make of these?" Appearing when
it did, this question was premature
and cut off the class from listing
their findings and thinking about
them as a group. Instead, they became busy "fmding out" what the

teacher might have had in mind as
a proper definition of rights.
Many teachers attempt to shortcut
the development of generalizations
by themselves giving the pupils the
concept or generalization at the
beginning. '' 1
Third, critical thinking cannot be
developed adequately when carried on
by highly individualistic processes. it is
most fruitfully carried on in groups in
which a range of ideas can be matched,
and a variety of background can be
pooled to develop a fuller and richer picture. Yet, relatively little thought has
been given to the requirements
necessary to make group discussion anything more than a rather disorderly battle of wits and of differing opinions.
More experimentation is needed on how
to harness differences in knowledge, experience and attitudes towards evolving
richer more realistic ideas, how to introduce comparisons and contrasts to
give validity to group thinking and how
to integrate conflicting ideas and experiences into fuller comprehension. It
is not uncommon today to vote on conclusions or to allow the ideas of those
who speak the loudest and mostest to
carry.
However, a clearer understanding of
what critical thinking consists of and
how to provide developmentally for its
growth is not enough, important as that
is. There are many conditions in our
schools which combat realistic work in
developing young people with an inclination to think critically and the
techniques and habits for doing so.
Many of these have to do with the ways
we organize teaching and curriculum.
Obstacles to the Development

of Critical Thinking
One overwhelming difficulty lies in
the fact that curriculum content is usually organized for purposes other than
facilitation of critical thinking. Often the
organization creates a setting for learning that is an outright "obstacle course"
for thinking at all, let alone thinking
critically. For example, one cannot learn
to think without having something important to think about, and some ideas
and concepts to think with. We need,
therefore,
a curriculum
which is
organized around some concepts and
ideas, and in which materials are
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selected and combined for teaching so
that they contribute to the development
of these ideas and their use. Thus, in
teaching critical thinking in American
History, it makes a great deal of difference whether it is organized by concepts
to be developed
or by
chronological sequence or areas of
events. One can learn about people
coming to America as a series of rather
curious facts about Puritans, Germans,
or Irish, or one can examine the stream
of newcomers to America in the light of
some idea such as that American society
is a multigroup society, composed of
peoples of differenc sub-cultures- or by
postulating such questions as what are
the relative difficulties in accommodation to life in the United States for people coming from Anglo Saxon or nonAnglo Saxon backgrounds.
The latter method of organizing content about immigration gives meaning
and direction to interpretation of facts,
requires comparison and contrasting of
events in various historic periods. It furnishes some criteria for the selection of
pertinent facts and for their appraisal.
None of this is implicitly involved in
organization that teaches everything
about Puritans in one sequence and
everything about later immigrants in
another one.
The simple fact is that if curriculum
itself is organized as a hodge podge of
information, there is no realistic foundation for developing ideas or for thinking
with them. No matter what methods are
used, attention to critical thinking will
remain incidental. Both pupils and
teachers will be thrown back upon recall
as the chief mental function- either
recall of heterogeneous details, or recall
of verbalized generalizations that have
no meaning for them.
The fact that we tend to lay out curriculum by designating areas to be
covered, and not at the same time also
the problems to be dealt with, is another
handicap. During the war one class for
example, had chosen Japan for study.
When the outline of what was to be
studied was completed, it was wonderfully comprehensive. Everything from
various dynasties to methods of burying
the dead was included. But there were
two difficulties. First, the outline
covered so much that a year's study was
needed if justice was done to it. Second,
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the pupils complained that the books
contained too much on every topic and
they had no way of knowing what was
important and what was not. Only after
this ·class decided that ·the central purpose for studyingJ apan was to see how
it became an important enough nation
to challenge Western powers in war, was
it possible· to reduce the outline to a
reasonable size and to begin to develop
criteria by which to select facts and ideas
in books that were pertinent and those
that were not. Thus, the selection of a
problem to deal with avoided the kind of
crowding of. curriculum in which so
much is covered that it is impossible· to
think much about any of it.
A third problem rests with the sequence of curriculum. The usual
method of developing• curriculum sequence is to plan it in terms of a procession of different subjects to be covered
one after another. Seldom, if ever, is this
sequence planned to give continuity also
to the devleopment of such important
objectives as the growth in critical thinking, and by developmental steps. High
school students are often expected to
handle abstract generalizations in · a
given field, without first having had an
opportunity to handle experiential
materials in the same area through
which to establish meaning for these
abstractions. They are, for example, expected to be logical and insightful about
"democratic freedoms,, without sufficient exploration either of democracy or
freedom in contexts that give them concrete meanings. They are expected· to
understand the problems of rights•as expressed in the Magna Carta or the
Declaration of Independence without
first having had a chance.to explore the
intellectual ·and·. emotional meaning of
"having a right" in connection with
something they can really look at and
analyze. concretely.
If critical thinking is· considered as a
serious objective, one needs to. provide
sequential development·..for it throughout all grades. Secondary schools cannot
do justice to. it, if there is no continuity
on which to build.
The Need For Practice
Thinking is one thing one ·cannot
learn except by doing. Whatever
elements of it one considers - be it
deciding what is important ··to think

Thinking, The Journal of Philosophy for Children, Volume 1., Number 3 & 4 Combined

about, be it analysis of facts, be it
generalizing, logical steps from assumptions and facts. to conclusions, ·or comparing. and contrasting different sets •of
facts-- they can be learned only by consistent and repetitive practice. They
cannot be learned by precept.
Moreover, they can be learned only by
practice in a variety of contexts.
Cultivation of a causal form of thinking-· the inclination and ability to see
human behavior in terms of multiple
causes requires a persistent practice of
figuring out what has led to a give
behavior in a variety of situations.
To provide such continuity of practice
and in a. sufficient range of contexts
under present conditions ofhighly divided subjects, some means have to be
found for teamwork towards common
objectives across several subjects. For
example, a minimum range for developing the concept of multiple causation of
human behaviour might include explorations of personal behaviour-- presumably the subject for guidance, examination ofhow people behaveininstitutional contexts- presumably the subject for
social sciences, and the study of the role
of values and motives in ·behaviourpresumably · the subject for literature.
Somehow the emphasis in these different
areas need to be focused towards the
same idea of multiple causati9n and the
methods of• thinking learned in each
mailde consistent with each other.
Finally to state an old truth over
again- schools stress inevitably those
things that· are ·emphasized in evaluation
programs. In spite of the splendid experimental work done by the·..·Eight Year
that school
Study, there is little evidence·
systems or testing agencieshave taken seriously the.·.evaluation of critical thinking.
By and large•evaluation of achievement.is
still confined to· recallof information. and
academic skills quite out of balance with
other important areas. of achievement,
among them critical thinking.
· · Presumably the development of critical thinkingrequires teachers who themselves can think. Yet, many teachers,· in
their own trcUDing.have never had the
opportunity to do anything but follow
the routines of mastering lectures, texts
or sources. Those few who··can think •in
terms of. ideas, who can marshal facts
around important concepts, or who
know how ·to.solve intellectual problems

have by and large stumbled on it on
their own. Obviously, this "natural
selection'' inevitably limits the number
of critical thinkers among teachers and
makes their own processes stumblingly
experimental rather than surefooted.
The field workers in Intergroup Education, 2 in which organizing curriculum
and teaching around focusing ideas was
a .requirement, repetitively discovered
that large groups of teachers could not
state ideas or concepts nor recognize
them when they were· stated. They did
not have a faintest notion, furthermore,
of how to select ·from what they knew
about an area ·relevant to material for
either developing or illustrating these
ideas. They needed much training in
both processes.
Summary
To sum· up what seems to be needed
for a more> <realistic and adequate
de~elopment of critical thinking:
1. A clearer·and a more comprehensive concept ofwhat critical thinking involves and what are the psychological
factors and principles that affect learning· to think critically. ·We need to explore the processes of thinking as a constellation of many processes, and to examine it in the light of needed developmental. steps.
2. The very organization of curriculum both in a given subject and
across subjects has a bearing on how
adequate are the opportunities for learning to think ·clearly, objectively and
critically. Schools ..·need to develop a
of organization
that
framework
facilitates· critical thinking in ..place of
hindering it. Perhaps educators can
begin to· see that there. is no conflict between teaching content and developing
critical thinking, and that content which
does not contribute to the development
of concepts and which requires ''mastering" by processes other than those
aiding critical thinking, is not worth its
place in the curriculum.
3. Some attention is ..needed to prepare teachers to use content materials
for ideas and to carry on processes of
thinking as wellas in the psychology of
learning to think.
1. "Cu"/cu/um In Intergroup Relations," Intergroup Education In Cooperating Schools.
Amert.can Council on Education. pp 130-31.
2. •Intergroup Education In Cooperating Schools
and the. Center for Intergroup Education, University of Chicago.

Thinking, The journal of Philosophy for Children, Volume 1, Number 3 & 4 Combined

On Wit and Judgment
Maria Edgeworthand RichardLovell Edgeworth
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As one reads the late 18th century
works of Richard and Marla Edgeworth,
one Is Impressed by the pedagogical In·
sights regarding chlldren's potential to
reason well In a constructive and rational
environment. The Edgeworths cause one
to wonder why educational thinkers had to
wait untll the 20th century to heed what
they were saying In 1798,and why so
much time and energy was expended to
reinvent what the father and daughter had
already discovered through experiments•
tlon with chlldren.
Richard Edgeworth was the author of
Professional Education, and co-author,
with his daughter, Marla, of Practical
Education. The chapter on wit and Judg•
ment reprinted below Is from the latter
work, the title of which constituted a
challenge to the prevailing educational
methodology of the day. There Is no doubt
that the Edgeworths were strongly In·
fluenced by Rousseau's emphasis on
cult/vat/on of the senses In the early years
as well as on beginning with students' In•
terests and experience. However,.•there Is
much of RouBB8authat the Edgeworths
did not accept. "Children should not be
thus suffered to run wild /Ike colts for a
certain time and then be taken and broken
In by the most harsh,· violent and unskll/lu/
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methods." Parents should begin as early
as possible to cultivate the habits of good
reasoning and Judgment coupled with a
respect for the seriousness of Intellectual
work. "The truth Is that useful knowledge
cannot be obtained without labour, that
attention long continued is laborious, but
without this Jabour nothing excellent can
be accompllshed." Rather than extrinsic
rewards, children should be allowed to experience success. "Rousseau rewards
Emile with cakes when he Judges rightly;
success we think Is a better reward."
Practical Education was a/so highly Influenced by Locke and Priestley. Locke's
psychological principle of utility serves as
the criterion for estimating the value of
teaching a particular subject to a child.
The Edgeworths agree with Locke that
education should focus on the cultivation
of good reasoning habits, daily improvement and the formation of character In the
early years. (Maria also the author of
several novels for children, was aware of
the novel as a didactic medium for
teaching various disciplines, Including
ethics.)
In the preface to Practical Education,
the Edgeworths state, "We have chosen
the title of Practical Education to point
out that we rely entirely upon practice and
experience." They were convinced that all
children are capable of reasoning well.
Children do not lack the capacity to
reason; what they lack Is experience. If
one Is Interested In helping children make
better judgments, one should increase
their knowledge of the world and help
them cultivate the tools of inquiry and experimentation to understand their world.
Judgment Is dependent upon experience,
because it rests on the ability to compare
causes and effects. And it is the task of
education to provide the kinds of experience that willenable children to
observe first hand the world around them.
If children are closely observed, say the
authors, they can be seen to reason Inductively and deductively before they can express their conclusions In words. There Is
a strong connection between talking and
thinking, and It was for this reason that
the Edgeworths stressed the conversational mode of teaching. But this conversation must not be nonsense. Teachers
should pay careful attention to thinking
logically, giving reasons for one's views
and using words and concepts that both
student and teacher understand.
According to the Edgeworths, observing, comparing, discussing, inferring,
deducing should all precede judging. And
one must remember that one Is Interested
In producing skilled Judges, not advocates. Teachers should withhold their
own opinions when questioning chlldren,
In order to encourage them to think for
themselves. They should never play with
chlldrens' lack of experience by Inducing
them to believe fantastic tales, by teasing
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or by ridiculing them. Emphasis should be
on Inquiry for the purpose of discovering
truth, not on the use of clever arguments
or witty Insights. Children should be praised for candor, good sense,valid perceptions, Impartiality, and comprehensiveness
rather than for advocacy of a particular
view. They should never be ridiculed for
changing their minds if they have good
reason for doing so. Teachers should train
their ears to seize upon subjects that
naturally arise In children's conversations
and ut/1/ze these themes In helping
children reason better through dialogue,
rather than formally preparing the discussion beforehand.
At a time In which educational theory
was sharply divorced from educational
practice, when the role of conversation in
education was only dimly grasped by a
few, when the function of the curriculum
as the core and armature of the educational process was generally
misunderstood, when the child's ablllty to
reason was overlooked In favor of his or
her naturalness and spontaneity, the
Edgeworths were able to organize a comprehensive work on pedagogy which exhibited none of these failures. In Its sensible tactf u/ blending of practice and theory,
its avoidance of Ideology, its respect for
children as persons, its sound grasp of
pedagogy and the relevance of philosophy
to children's education, Practical Education /s remarkable evidence of the
pedagogical wisdom which we have found
it possible to overlook in the course of the
last two centuries.

has been shewn, that the powers of
Itmemory,
invention, and imagination,
ought to be rendered subservient to
judgment; it has been shewn, that reasoning and judgment abridge the labours
of memory, and are necessary to regulate the highest flights of imagination.
We shall now consider the power of reasoning in another point of view, as being
essential to our conduct in life. The object of reasoning is to adapt means to an
end, to attain the command of effects by
the discovery of the causes on which
they depend.
Until children have acquired some
knowledge of effects, they cannot inquire into causes. Observation must
precede reasoning; and as judgment is
nothing more than the perception of the
result of comparison, we should never
urge our pupils to judge, until they have
acquired some portion of experience.

To teach children to compare objects
exactly, we should place the things to be
examined distinctly before them. Every
thing that is superfluous should be taken
away, and a sufficient motive should be
given to excite the pupil's attention. We
need not here repeat the advice that has
formerly been given respecting the
choice of proper motives to excite and
fix attention; or the precautions necessary to prevent the pain of fatigue, and
of unsuccessful application. If comparison be early rendered a task to children,
they will dislike and avoid this exercise
of the mind, and they will consequently
shew an inaptitude to reason: if comparing objects be made interesting and
amusing to our pupils, they will soon become expert in discovering resemblances and differences; and thus they will be
prepared for reasoning.
Rousseau has judiciously advised,
that the sensesof children should be cultivated with the utmost care. In proportion to the distinctness of their perceptions will be accuracy of their memory,
and probably, also the precision of their
judgment. A child, who sees imperfectly, cannot reason justly about the objects
of sight, because he has not sufficient
data. A child, who does not hear distinctly, cannot judge well of sounds; and, if
we could suppose the sense of touch to
be twice as accurate in one child as in
another, we might conclude, that the
judgment of these children must differ in
a similar proportion. The defects in
organization are not within the power of
the preceptor; but we may observe, that
inattention, and want of exercise, are
frequently the causes of what appear to
be natural defects; and, on the contrary,
increased attention and cultivation
sometimes produce that quickness of eye
and ear, and that consequent readiness
of judgment, which we are apt to attribute to natural superiority of organization or capacity. Even amongst
children we may early observe a considerable difference between the quickness
of their senses and of their reasoning
upon subjects where they have had experience, and upon those on which they
have not been exercised.
The first exercises for judgment of
children should, as Rousseau recommends, relate to visible and tangible
substances. Let them compare the size
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and shape of different objects; let them
frequently try what they can lift; what
they can reach; at what distance they
can see objects; at what distance they
can hear sounds: by these exercises they
will learn to judge of distances and
weight; and they may learn to judge of
the solid contents of bodies of different
shapes, by comparing the observations
of their sense of feeling and of sight. The
measure of hollow bodies can be easily
taken by pouring liquids into them, and
the comparing the quantities of the liquids that fill vessels of different shapes.
This is a very simple method of exercising the judgment of children; and, if
they are allowed to try these little experiments for themselves, the amusement will fix the facts in their memory,
and will associate pleasure with the
habits of comparison. Rousseau rewards
Emilius with cakes when he judges
rightly; success, we think, is a better
reward. Rousseau was himself childishly
fond of cakes and cream.
The step which immediately follows
comparison, is deduction. The cat is
larger than the kitten; then a hole
through which the cat can go, must be
larger than a hole through which the kitten can go. Long before a child can put
this reasoning into words, he is capable
of forming the conclusion, and we need
not be in haste to make him announce it
in mode and figure. We may see by the
various methods which young children
employ to reach what is above them, to
drag, to push, to lift different bodies;
that they reason; that is to say, that they
adapt means to an end, before they can
explain their own designs in words.
Look at a child building a house of
cards: he dexterously balances every
card as he floors the edifice; he raises
story over story, and shews us that he
has some design in view, though he
would be utterly incapable of describing
his intentions previously in words. We
have formerly endeavoured to show how
the vocabulary of our pupils may be
gradually enlarged, exactly in proportion to their real knowledge. A great
deal depends upon our attention to this
proportion; if children have not a sufficient number of words to make their
thoughts intelligible, we cannot assist
them to reason by our conversation, we
cannot communicate to them the result
of our experience; they will have a great

deal of useless labour in comparing objects, because they will not be able to
understand the evidence of others, as
they do not understand their language;
and at last, the reasonings which they
carry on in their own minds will be confused for want of signs to keep them
distinct. On the contrary, if their
vocabulary exceed their ideas, if they are
taught a variety of words to which they
connect no accurate meaning, it is impossible that they should express their
thoughts with precision. As this is one of
the most common errors in education,
we shall dwell upon it more particularly.
We have pointed out the mischief
which is done to the understanding of
children by the nonsensical conversation
of common acquaintance. ''Should you
like to be a king? What are you to be?
Are you to be a bishop, or a judge? Had
you rather be a general, or an admiral,
my little dear?" are some of the questions which every one has probably
heard proposed to children of five or six
years old. Children who have not learned by rote the expected answers to such
interrogatories, stand in amazed silence
upon these occasions; or else answer at
random, having no possible means of
forming any judgment upon such subjects. We have often thought, in listen-

''Children will never
reasonif they are
allowedto hear or
to talk nonsense.
ing to the conversations of grown up
people with children, that the children
reasoned infinitely better than their opponents. People who are not interested
in the education of children do not care
what arguments they use, what absurdities they utter in talking to them; they
usually talk to them of things which are
totally above their comprehension; and
they instill error and prejudice, without
the smallest degree of compunction; indeed, without in the least knowing what
they are about. We earnestly repeat our
advice to parents, to keep their children
as much as possible from such conversation: children will never reason if they
are allowed to hear or to talk nonsense.
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When we say, that children should
not be suffered to talk nonsense, we
should observe, that unless they have
been in the habit of hearing foolish conversation,
they very seldom talk
nonsense. They may express themselves
in a manner which we do not understand, or they may make mistakes from
not accurately comprehending
the
words of others; but in these cases we
should not reprove or silence them, we
should patiently endeavour to find out
their hidden meaning. If we rebuke or
ridicule them, we shall intimidate them,
and either lessen their confidence in
themselves or in us. In the one case we
prevent them from thinking, in the other
we deter them from communicating
their thoughts; and thus we preclude
ourselves from the possibility of assisting
them in reasoning. To show parents the
nature of the mistakes which children
make from their imperfect knowledge of
words, we shall give a few examples
from real life.
S-, at five years old, when he heard
some one speak of bay horses, said, he
supposed that the bay horses must be the
best horses. Upon cross-questioning
him, it appeared that he was led to this
conclusion by the analogy between the
sound of the words bay and ob9. A few
days previous to this his father had told
him, that spirited horses were always the
most ready to obey.
These erroneous analogies between
the sound of words and their sense frequently mislead children in reasoning;
we should,
therefore,
encourage
children to explain themselves fully, that
we may rectify their errors.
When S- was between four and five
years old, a lady who had taken him
upon her lap playfully, put her hands
before his eyes, and (we believe) asked if
he liked to be blinded. S- said no; and
he looked very thoughtful. After a
pause, he added "Smellie says, that
children like better to be blinded than to
have their legs tied. "(S- had read this
in Smellie two or three days before.)
Father. "Are you of Smellie's opinion?''
S- hesitated.
Father. "Would you rather be blinded, or have your legs tied?"
S- ''I would rather have my legs tied
not quite tight."
Father. "Do you know what is meant
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by hlindetP.''
S-"Having their eyes put out."
Father. "How do you mean?"
S- ''To put something into the eye
to make the blood burst out; and then
the blood would come all over it, and
cover it, and stick to it, and hinder them
from seeing, I don't.know how."
It is obvious, that whilst this boy's im •
agination pictured to him a bloody orb
when he heard the word blinded,he was
perfectly right in his reasoning in preferring to have his legs tied; but he did not
judge of the proposition meant to be laid
before him; he judged of another which
he had formed for himself. His father
explained to him, that Smellie meant
blindfolded, instead of blinded; a handkerchief was then tied round the boy's
head so as to hinder him from seeing,
and he was made perfectly to understand the meaning of the word blindfolded.
In such trifles as these it may appear
of little consequence to rectify the verbal
errors of children; but exactly the same
species of mistake will prevent them
from reasoning accurately in matters of
consequence. It will not cost us much
trouble to detect these mistakes when the
causes of them are yet recent; but it will
give us infmite trouble to retrace
thoughts which have passed in infancy.
When prejudices, or the habits of
reasoning inaccurately, have been formed, we cannot easily discover or remedy
the remote trilling origin of the evil.
When children begin to inquire about
causes, they are not able to distinguish
between coincidence and causation; we
formerly observed the effect which this
ignorance produces upon their temper;
we must now observe its effect upon
their understanding. A little reflection
upon our own minds will prevent us
from feeling that stupid amazement, or
from expressing that insulting contempt, which the natural thoughts of
children sometimes excite in persons,
· who have frequently less understanding
than their pupils. What account can we
give of the connexion between cause and
effect? How is the idea, that one thing is
the cause of another, f11'8tproduced in
our minds? All that we know is, that
amongst human events those which
precede are, in some cases, supposed to
produce what follow. When we have
observed, in several instances, that one
event constantly precedes another, we
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believe, and expect, that these events
will in future recur together. Before
children have had experience, it is
scarcely possible that they should
distinguish between fortuitous circum·
stances and causation; accidental coincidences of time, and juxtaposition, continually lead them into error. We should
not accuse children of reasoning ill, we
should not imagine that they are defective in judgment, when they make
mistakes from deficient experience; we
should only endeavour to make them
delay to decide until they have repeated
their experiments; and, at all events, we
should encourage them to lay open their
minds to us, that we may assist them by
our superior knowledge.
This spring, little W- (three years
old) was looking at a man who was
mowing the grass before the door. It had
been raining, and when the sun shone
the vapour began to rise from the grass.
"Does the man mowing makethe smoke
rise from the grass?" said the little boy.
He was not laughed at for this simple
question. The man's mowing immediately preceded the. rising of the vapour;
the child had never observed a man
mowing before, and it was absolutely
impossible that he could tell what effects
might be produced by it; he very naturally imagined, that the event which immediately preceded the rising of the vapour, was the cause of its rise; the sun
was at a distance; the scythe was near
the grass. The little boy shewed by the
tone of his inquiry, that he was in the
philosophic state of doubt; had he been
ridiculed for his question, hadhe been
told that he talkednonsense, he would
not upon another occasion have told his
thoughts, and he certainly could not
have improved in reasoning.
The way to improve children in their
judgment with respect to causation, is to
increase their knowledge, and to lead
them to try experiments by which they
may discover what circumstances are essential to the production of any given effect, and what are merely accessory, unimportant concomitants of the event.
A child, who for the fint time sees
blue and red paints mixed together to
produce purple, could not be certain,
that the pallet on which these coloun
were mixed, the spatulawith which they
were tempered, were not necessary circumstances. In many cases the vessels in

which things are mixed are essential;
therefore, a sensible child would repeat
the experiment exactly in the same manner in which he had seen it succeed.
This exactness should not be suffered to
become indolent imitation, or superstitious adherence to particular forms.
Children should be excited to add or
deduct particulars in trying experiments, and to observe the effects of these
changes.
In ''Chemistry,''
and
"Mechanics," we have pointed out a
variety of occupations, in which the
judgment of children may be exercised
upon the immediate objects of their
senses.
It is natural, perhaps, that we should
expect our pupils to shew surprise at
those things, which excite surprise in
our minds; but we should consider, that
almost every thing is new to children,
and therefore there is scarcely any
gradation in their astonishment. A child
of three or four years old would be as
much amused, and, probably, as much
surprised, by seeing a paper kite fly, as
he could by beholding the ascent of a
balloon. We should not attribute this to
stupidity or want of judgment, but
simply to ignorance.
A few days ago, W- (three years
old), who was learning his letters, was
let sow an o in the garden with mustard
seed. W- was much pleased with the
operation. When the green plants ap•
peared above ground, it was expected
that W- would be much surprised at
seeing the exact shape of his o. He was
taken to look at it; but he shewed no surprise, no sort of emotion.
We have advised, that the judgment
of children should be exercised upon the
objects of their senses. It is scarcely
possible, that they should reason upon
the subjects which are sometimes proposed to them; with respect to manners
and society, they have had no experience, consequently they can form no
judgments. By imprudently endeavouring to tum the attention of children to
conversation that is unsuited to them,
people may give the app,aranu
of early
intelligence, and a certain readiness of
repartee and fluency of expression; but
these are transient advantages. Smart,
witty children amuse the circle for a few
houn, and are forgotten; and we may
observe, that almost all children who are
praised and admired for sprightliness
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and wit, reason absurdly, and continue
ignorant. Wit and judgment depend upon different opposite habits of the mind.
Wit searches for remote resemblances
between objects or thoughts apparently
dissimilar. Judgment compares the objects placed before it, in order to fmd out
their differences rather than their
resemblances.

education; and it is butjust to warn parents against expecting inconsistent qualities from their pupils. Those who steadily prefer the solid advantages of judgment, to the transient brilliancy of wit,
should not be mortified when they see
their children, perhaps, deficient at nine
or ten years old in the showy talents for
general conversation; they must bear to

''Wit andjudgment dependupon differentopposite
habits of the mind. Wit searches
for remote
resemblances
betweenobjectsor thoughtsapparently
dissimilar.Judgment comparesthe objectsplaced
beforeit,
in ordertofind out their differences
rather than their resemblances.
''
The comparisons of judgment may be
slow; those of wit must be rapid. The
same power ofattention in children may
produce either wit or judgment. Parents
must decide in which faculty, or rather,
in whicli of these habits of the mind,
they wish their pupils to excel; and they
must conduct their education accordingly. Those who are desirous to make their
pupils witty, must sacrifice some portion
of their judgment to the acquisition of
the talent for wit; they must allow their
children to talk frequently at random.
Amongst a multitude of hazarded observations a happy hit is now and then
made: for these happy hits children who
are to be made wits should be praised;
and they must acquire sufficient courage
to speak from a cursory view of things;
therefore the mistakes they make from
superficial examination must not be
pointed out to them; their attention
must be turned to the comic, rather than
to the seriGus side of objects; they must
study the different meanings and powers
of words; they should hear witty conversation, read epigrams, and comedies;
and in all company they should be exercised before numbers in smart dialogue
and repartee.
When we mention the methods of educating a child to be witty, we at the
same time point out the dangers of this

see their pupils appear slov.:; they must
bear the contrast of flippant gaiety and
sober simplicity; thye must pursue ex•
actly an opposite coune to that which
has been recommended for the education of wits; they must never praise their
pupils for hazarding observations; they
must cautiously point out any mistakes
that are made from a precipitate survey
of objects; they should not harden their
pupils against that feeling of shame,
which arises in the mind from the perception of having uttered an absurdity;
they should never encourage their pupils
to play upon words; and their admiration of wit should never be vehemently
or enthusiastically expressed .....
In stating any question to a child, we
should avoid letting our own opinion be
known, lest we lead or intimidate his
mind. We should also avoid all appearance of anxiety, all impati~nce for the
answer; our pupil's mind should be in a
calm state when he is to judge: if we tum
his sympathetic ·attention to our hopes
and fears, we agitate him, and he will
judge by our countenances rather than
by comparing the objects or propositions
which are laid before him. Some people,
in arguing with children, teach them to
be disingenuous by the uncandid manner in which they proceed; they shew a
desire for victory, rather than for truth;
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they state the arguments only on their
own side of the question, and they will
not allow the force of those which are
brought against them. Children are thus
piqued, instead of being convinced, and
in their turn they become zealots in support of the own opinions; they hunt only
for arguments in their own favour, and
they are mortified when a good reason is
brought on the opposite side of the question to that on which they happen to
have enlisted. To prevent this we should
never argue, or suffer others to argue for
victory with our pupils; we should not
praise them for their cleverness in fmding out arguments in support of their
own opinion; but we should praise their
candour and good sense when they
perceive and acknowledge the force of
their opponent's
arguments.
They
should not be exercised as advocates,
but as judges; they should be encouraged to keep their minds impartial, to sum
up the reasons which they have heard,
and to form their opinion from these
without regard to what they may have
originally asserted. We should never
triumph over children for changing their
opinion. ''I thought you were on my side
of the question;" or, "I thought you
were on the other side of the question
just now!" is sometimes tauntingly said
to an ingenuous child, who changes his
opinion when he hears a new argument.
You think it a proof of his want of judgment, that he changes his opinion in this
manner; that he vibrates continually
from side to side: let him vibrate,
presently he will be fixed. Do you think
it a proof that your scales are bad,
because they vibrate with every additional weight that is added to either side?
Idle people
sometimes
amuse
themselves with trying the judgment of
children, by telling them improbable,
extravagant stories, and then ask the
simple listeners whether they believe
what has been told them. The readiness
of belief in children will always be proportioned to their experience of the
veracity of those with whom they converse; consequently children, who live
with those who speak truth to them, will
scarcely ever be inclined to doubt the
veracity of strangers. Such trials of the
judgment of our pupils should never be
permitted. Why should the example of
lying be set before the honest minds of
children, who are far from silly when
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they shew simplicity? They guide
themselves by the best rules, by which
even a philosopher in familiar circumstances could guide himself. The
things asserted are extraordinary, but
the children believe them, because they
have never had any experience of the
falsehood of human testimony.
The Socratic mode of reasoning is frequently practiced upon children. People
arrange questions artfully, .so as to bring
them to whatever conclusion they
please. In this mode of reasoning much
depends upon getting the first move; the
child has very little change of having it,
his preceptor usually begins first with a
preemptory voice, "Now answer me
this question?" The pupil, who knows
that the interrogatories are put with a
design to entrap him, is immediately
alarmed, and instead of giving a direct
candid answer to the question, is always
looking forward to the possible consequences of his reply; or he is considering
how he may evade the snare that is laid
for him. Under these circumstances he is
in imminent danger of learning the shuffling habits of cunning; he has little
chance of learning the nature of open,
manly investigation.
Preceptors, who imagine that it is
necessary to put on very grave faces,
and to use much learned apparatus in
teaching the art of reasoning, are not
nearly so likely to succeed as those are,
who have the happy art of encouraging
children to lay open their minds freely,
and who can make every pleasing trifle
an exercise for the understanding. If it

"The king's stag hounds," (says Mr.
White of Selborne, in his entertaining
observations on quadrupeds,) the king's
stag hounds came down to Alton, attended by a huntsman and six yeoman
prickers with horns, to try for the stag
that has haunted Hartley-wood and its
environs for so long a time. Many hundreds of people, horse and foot, attended
the dogs to see the deer unharboured;
but though the huntsman drew Hartleywood, and Long-coppice, and Shrubwood, and Temple-hangers, and in their
way back, Hartley, and Ward-ledhamhangers, yet no stag could be found.
''The royal pack, accustomedto have the
deerturnedout beforethem, never drew the
coverts with any address and spirit.''
Children, who are accustomed to
have the game started and turned out
before them by their preceptors, may
perhaps, like the royal pack, lose their
wonted address and spirit, and may be
disgracefully at a fault in the public
chase. Preceptors should not help their
pupils out in argument, they should excite them to explain and support their
own observations.
Many ladies shew in general conversation the powers of easy raillery joined
to reasoning, unincumbered
with
pedantry. If they would employ these
talents in the education of their children,
they would probably be as well repaid
for their exertions, as they can possibly
be by the polite, but transient applause,
of the visitors to whom they usually
devote their powers of entertaining. A
little praise or blame, a smile from a

''Preceptors
... are not nearlyso likely to
succeedas thoseare, who have the happy
art of encouragingchildrento lay open
their mindsfreely, and who can make
everypleasing trifle an exercise
for
the understanding.''
be playfully pointed out to a child that
he reasons ill, he smiles and corrects
himself; but you run the hazard of making him positive in error, if you reprove
or ridicule him with severity. It is better
to seize the subjects that accidentally
arise in conversation, than formally to
prepare subjects for discussion.

mother, or a frown, a moment's attention, or a look of cold neglect, have the
happy, or the fatal power of repressing
or of exciting the energy of a child, of
directing his understanding to useful or
pernicious purposes. Scarcely a day
passes in which children do not make
some attempt to reason about the little

events which interest them, and upon
these occasions a mother, who joins in
conversation with her children, may instruct them in the art of reasoning
without the parade of logical disquisitions.
Mr. Locke has done mankind an
essential service, by the candid manner
in which he has spoken of some of the
learned forms of argumentation. A great
proportion of society, he observes, are
unacquainted with these forms, and
have never heard the name of Aristotle;
yet without the aid of syllogisms, they
can reason sufficiently well for all the
useful purposes of life, often much better
than tho,e who have been disciplined in
the schools. It would indeed "be putting
one man sadly over the head of
another,''
to confine the reasoning
faculty to the disciples of Aristotle, to
any sect or system, or to any forms of
disputation. Mr. Locke has very clearly
shewn, that syllogisms do not assist the
mind in the perception-Of the agreement
or disagreement of ideas; but, on the
contrary, that they invert the natural
order in which the thoughts should be
placed, and in which they must be placed, before we can draw a just conclusion. To children who are not familiarised with scholastic terms, the sound of
harsh words, and quaint language,
unlike any thing that they hear in common conversation, is alone sufficient to
alarm their imagination with some confused apprehension of difficulty. In this
state of alarm they are seldom sufficiently masters of themselves, either to deny
or acknowledge an adept' s major,
mim;,r, or conclusion. Even those who
are most expert in syllogistical reasoning
do not often apply it to the common affairs of life, in which reasoning is just as
much wanted as it is in the abstract
questions of philosophy; and many
argue, and conduct themselves with
great prudence and precision, who
might, perhaps, be caught on the horns
of a dilemma, or who would infallibly
fall victims to the crocodile.
Young people should not be ignorant,
however, of these boasted forms of
argumentation; and it may, as they advance in the knowledge of words, be a
useful exercise to resist the attacks of
sophistry. No ingenuous person would
wish to teach a child to employ them. As
defensive weapons, it is necessary, that
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young people should have the command
of logical terms; as offensive weapons,
these should never be used. They should
know the evolutions, and be able to perform the exercise of a logician, according to the custom of the times, according
to the usage of different nations; but
they should not attach any undue importance to this technical art: they
should not trust to it in the day of battle.
We have seen syllogisms, crocodiles,
enthimemes, sorites, etc. explained and
tried upon a boy of nine or ten years old
in playful conversation, so that he
became accustomed to the terms without
learning to be pedantic in the abuse of
them; and his quickness in reasoning
was increased by exercise in detecting
puerile sophisms: such as that of the
Cretans- Gorgias and his bargain about
the winning of his first cause. In the
following stories of Themistocles "My son commands his mother; his
mother commands me; I command the
Athenians; the Athenians command
Greece; Greece commands Europe;
Europe commands the whole earth;
therefore my son commands the whole
earth" - the sophism depends upon the
inaccurate use of the word commands,
which is employed in different senses in
the different propositions. This error
was without difficulty detected by S- at
ten years old; and we make no doubt
that any unprejudiced boy of the same
age would immediately point out the
fallacy without hesitation; but we do not
feel quite sure that a boy exercised in
logic, who had been taught to admire
and reverence the ancient figures of
rhetoric, would with equal readiness
detect the sophism. Perhaps it may seem
surprising, that the same boy, who judged so well of this sorites of Themistocles,
should a few months before have been
easily trapped by the following simple
dilemma:
M-. "We should avoid what gives
us pain.''
S-. "Yes to be sure."
M-. "Whatever burns us gives us
pain.,,
S-. "Yes, that it does!"
M-. "We should then avoid whatever bums us.''
To this conclusion Sheartily
assented, for he had but just recovered
from the pain of a burn.
M-. "Fire bums us."

S-. "Yes, I know that."
M-. "We should then avoid fire."
S-. "Yes."
This hasty yes was extorted from the
boy by the mode of interrogatory; but he
soon perceived his mistake.
M-. "We should avoid fire. What
when we are very cold?"
S-. "Oh, no; I meant to say, that we
should avoid a certain degree of fire. We
should not go too near the fire. We
should not go so near as to burn ourselves.''
Children who have but little experience frequently admit assertions to be
true in general, which are only true in
particular instances; and this is often attributed to their want of judgment: it
should be attributed to their want of experience. Experience, and nothing else,
can rectify these mistakes: if we attempt
to correct them by words, we shall merely teach our pupils to argue about terms
not to reason. Some of the questions and
themes which are given to boys may afford us instances of this injudicious
education. ''Is eloquence advantageous,
or hurtful to a state?" What a vast range
of ideas, what variety of experience in
men and things should a person possess,
who is to discuss this question! Yet it is
often discussed by unfortunate scholars
of eleven or twelve years old. ''What is
the greatest good?" The answer expected by a preceptor to this question,
obviously is, virtue: and, if a boy can in
decent language write a page or two
about pleasure's being a transient, and
virtue's being a permanent good, his
master flatters himself that he has early
taught him to reason philosophically.
But what ideas does the youth annex to
the words pleasure and virtue? Or docs
he annex any? If he annex no idea to the
words, he is merely talking about
sounds.
All reasoning ultimately refers to matters of fact; to judge whether any piece
of reasoning be within the comprehension of a child, we must consider
whether the facts to which it refers are
within his experience. The more we increase his knowledge of facts, the more
we should exercise him in reasoning
upon them; but we should teach him to
examine carefully before he admits any
thing to be a fact, or any assertion to be
true. Experiment, as to substances, is
the test of truth; and attention to his own
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feelings, as to matters of feeling. Comparison of the evidence of others with
the general laws of nature, which he has
learned from his own observation, is
another mode of obtaining an accurate
knowledge of facts. M. Condillac, in his
Art of Reasoning, maintains, that the
evidence of reason depends solely upon
our perception of the identity,or, to us a
less formidable word, sameness,of one
proposition
with another.
"A
demonstration," he says, "is only a
chain of propositions, in which the same
ideas passing from one to the other differ
only because they are differently expressed; the evidence of any reasoning
consists solely in its identity.''
M. Condillac exemplifies this doctrine by translating this proposition,
''The measure of every triangle is the
product of its height by half its base,"
into self-evident, or, as he calls them,
identical proportions.
The whole
ultimately referring to the ideas which
we have obtained by our senses of a
triangle; of its base, of measure, height,
and number. If a child had not previously acquired any one of these ideas, it
would be in vain to explain one term by
another, or to translate one phrase or
proposition into another; they might be
identical, but they would not be selfevident propositions to the pupil; and no
conclusion, except what relates merely
to words, could be formed from such
reasoning. The moral which we should
draw from Condillac's observations for
Practical Education must be, that clear
ideas should first be acquired by the exercise of the senses, and that afterwards,
when we reason about things in words,
we should use few and accurate terms,
that we may have as little trouble as
possible in changing or translating one
phrase or proposition into another.
Children, if they are not overawed by
authority, if they are encouraged in the
habit of observing their own sensations,
and if they are taught precision in the
use of the words by which they describe
them, will probably reason accurately
where their own feelings are concerned.
In appreciating the testimony of
others, and in judging of chances and
probability, we must not expect our
pupils to proceed very rapidly. There is
more danger that they should overrate,
than that they should undervalue the
evidence of others; because, as we
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formerly stated, we take it for granted,
that they have had little experience of
falsehood. We should, to preserve them
from credulity, excite them, in all cases
where it can be obtained, never to rest
satisfied without the strongest species of
evidence, that of their own senses. If a
child says, "I am sure of such a thing,"
we should immediately examine into his
reasons for believing it. "Mr. A. or Mr.
B. told me so,'' is not a sufficient cause
of belief, unless the child has had long
experience of A. and B. 's truth and accuracy; and, at all events, the indolent
habit of relying upon the assertions of
others, instead of verifying them, should
not be indulged.

tion. On hearing extraordinary facts
some children will not be satisfied with
vague assertions,
others content
themselves with saying, "It is so, I read
it in a book.'' We should have little
hopes of those who swallow every thing
they read in a book; we are always pleased to see a child hesitate and doubt, and
require positive proof before he believes.
The taste for the marvellous is strong in
ignorant minds, the wish to account for
every new appearance characterises the
cultivated pupil.
A lady told a boy of nine years old
(S-) the following story, which she had
just met with in ''The Curiosities of
Literature." An officer, who was con-

''Children, if they are not overawedby
authority.. . . will probablyreason
accuratelywheretheirownfeelings
are concerned.
''
It would be waste of time to repeat
those experiments, of the truth of which
the uniform experience of our lives has
convinced us; we run no hazard, for instance, in believing any one who simply
asserts, that they have seen an apple fall
from a tree; this assertion agrees with
the great natural law of g,aoily, or, in
other words, with the uniform experience of maukio,_: but if any body
told us, that they had seen an apple
hanging self-poised in the air, we should
reasonably suspect the truth ·of their
observation, or of their evidence. This is
the first rule which we can most readily
teach our pupils in judging of evidence.
We are not speaking of children from
four to six years old, for every thing is
almost equally extraordinary to them;
but when children are about ten or
eleven, they have acquired a sufficient
variety of facts to form comparisons,
and to judge to a certain degree of the
probability of any new fact that is
related. In reading and in conversation
we should now exercise them in forming
judgments, where we know that they
have the means of comparison. ''Do you
believe such a thing to be true? and why
do you believe it? Can you account for
such a thing?'' are questions we should
often ask at this period of their educa-

fmed in the Bastille, used to amuse himself by playing on the flute: one day he
observed, that a number of spiders came
down from their webs, and hung round
him as if listening to his music; a
number of mice also came from their
holes and retired as soon as he stopped.
The officer had a great dislike for mice,
he procured a cat from the keeper of the
prison, and when the mice were entrancedby his musi~, he let the cat out
amongst them.
S- was much. displeased by this
man's treacherousconduct towards the
poor mice, and hisindignationfor some
moments suspended his reasoning faculty; but, when S- had sufficiently expressed his indignation against the officer in the aft'airof the mice, he began
to question the truth of the story; and he
said, thathe did not thinkit was certain,
that the mice and spiden came to listen
to the music. "I do not know about the
mice," said he, "but I think, perhaps,
when the officer played upon the ftute,
he set the air in motion, and shook the
cobwebs, so as to disturbthe spiders.''
We do not, or did the child think, that
this was a satisfactoryaccount of the
matter, but we mention it as an instance
of the love of investigation, which we
wish to encourage.

The difficulty of judging concerning
the truth of evidence increases, when we
take moral causes into the account. If we
had any suspicion, that a man who told
us that he had seen an apple fall from a
tree, had himself pulled the apple down
and stolen it, we should set the probability of his telling a falsehood, and his
motive for doing so, against his
evidence; and though, according to the
natural physical course of things, there
would be no improbability in his story,
yet there might arise improbability from
his character for dishonesty; and thus we
should feel ourselves in doubt concerning the fact. But if two people agreed in
the same testimony our doubt would
vanish, and dishonest man's doubtful
evidence would be corroborated, and we
should believe, notwithstanding his
general character, in the truth of his
assertion in this instance. We could
make the matter infmitely more complicated, but what has been said will be
sufficient to suggest to preceptors the
difficulty, which their young and inexperienced pupils must feel, in forming
judgments of facts where physical and
moral probabilities
in direct opposition to each other.
We wish that a writer equal to such a
talk would write trials for children as exercises for their judgment; beginning
with the simplest, and proceeding
gradually to the more complicated cases
in which moral reasonings can be used.
We do not mean, that it would be advisable to initiate young readers in the
technical forms of law; but the general
principles of justice, upon which all law
is founded, might, we think, be advantageously exemplified. Such trials would
entertain children extremely. There is a
slight attempt at this kind of composition, we mean in a little trial in Evenings
at Home; and we have seen children
read it with great avidity. Cyrus'sjudgment about the two coats, and the ingenious story of the olive merchant's
cause rejudged by the sensible child in
the Arabian Tales, have been found
highly interesting to a young audience.
We should prefer truth to fiction; if
we could select any instances from real
life, any trials suited to the capacity of
young people, they would be preferable
to any· which the most ingenious writer
could invent for our purpose. A
gentleman, who ~ taken his two sons,

are
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one of them ten, and the other fifteen
years old, to hear trials at his county
assizes, .found by the account which the
boys gave of what they had heard, that
they had been interested, and that they
were capable of understanding the
business.
Allowance must be made at first for
the bustle and noise of a public place,
and for the variety of objects which
distract the attention.
Much of die readiness of forming
judgments depends upon the power of
discarding and obliterating from· our
mind all the superfluous circumstances;
it may be useful to exercise our pupils,
by telling them now and then stories in
the confused manner in which they are
sometimes related by puzzled witnesses;
let them reduce the heterogeneous circumstances to order, make a clear statement of the case for themselves, and try
if they can point out the facts on which
the decision principally rests. This is not
merely education for a lawyer, the
powers of reasoning and judgment,
when they have been exercised in this
manner, may be turned to any art or
profession. We should, ifwe were to try
the judgment of children, observe,
whether in unusual circumstances they
can apply their former principles, and
compare the new objects that are placed
before them without perplexity. We
have sometimes found, that on subjects
entirely new to them, children, who
have not been used to reason, can lay
aside the circumstances that are not
essential, and form a distinct judgment
for themselves, independently of the
opinion of others.
Last winter the entertaining life of the
celebrated miser Mr. Elwes was read
aloud in a family, in which there were a
numberofchildren.Mr.Elwes,once,as
he was walkinghome on a dark night, in
London, ran against a c6air pole and
bruised both his shins. His friends sent
for a surgeon. Elwes was alarmed at the
idea of the expence, and he laid the
surgeon the amoung of his bill, that the
leg which .he took under his own protection would get well sooner than that
which was put under the surgeon's care;
at the same time Mr. Elwes promised to
put nothing to the leg of which he took
· charge. Mr. Elwes's favourite leg got
well sooner than that which the surgeon
had undertaken to cure, and Mr. Elwes

won his wager. In a note upon this
transaction his biographer says, ''This
wager would have been a bubble bet if it
had been brought before the Jockeyclub, because Mr. Elwes, though he
promised to put nothing to the leg under
his own protection, took Velnos'
vegetable sirup during the time of its
cure."
C- (a girl of 12 years old), observed
when this anecdote was read, that, "still
the wager was a fair wager, because the
medicinewhich Mr. Elwes took, if it was
of any use, must have been of use to
both legs; therefore the surgeon and Mr.
Elwes had equal advantage from it.''
C- had never heard of the Jockey club,
or of bubble bets before, and she used
the word medicine,because she forgot the
name of Velnos' vegetable sirup.
We have observed that the works of
criticism are unfit for children, and
teach them rather to remember what
others say of authors, than to judge of
the books themselves impartially; but,
when we objected to works of criticism,
we did not mean to object to criticism;
we think it an excellent exercise for the
judgment, and we have ourselves been
so well corrected, and so kindly ~ssisted
by the observations of young critics, that
we cannot doubt their capacity. When
young people have acquired a command
of language, we must be careful lest
their fluency and their ready use of
synonymous expressions should lessen
the accuracy of their reasoning. Mr.
Home Tooke has ably shewn the connection between the study of language
and the art of reasoning. It is not
necessary to make our pupils profound
grammarians, or etymologists, but attention to the origin, abbreviations, and
various meanings of words, will assist
them not only to speak, but to think and
argue with precision. This is not a study
of abstract speculation, but of practical,,
dally utility; half the disputes, and much
of the misery of the world, originate and
perpetuate themselves by the innacurate
use of words, One party uses a word in
tkis sense, the opposite party uses the
same word in another sense; all their
reasonings appear absurd to each.other;
and, instead of explaining them, they
quarrel. This is not the case merely in
philosophicaldisputes, betewen authors,
but it happens continually in the busy
active scenes oflife. Even whilst we were
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writing this passa~, in the newspaper of
to-day we met with an instance, that is
sufficiently striking.
''The accusation against me,'' says
Sir. Sidney Smith, in his excellent letter
to Pichegru, expostulating upon his
unmerited confinement, "brought forward by your justice of the peace, was,
that I was the enemy of the n;public.
You know, general, that with military
men the word enemy has merely a
technical signification, without ~ressing the least character of hatred. You
will readily admit this principle, the
resultof which is, that I ought not to be
persecuted for the injury I have been
enabled to do whilst I carried arms
against you."
Here the argument between two
generals, one of whom is pleading for his
liberty, if not for his life, turns upon the
meanin, and construction of a single
word. Accuracy of reasoning, and some
knowledge oflanguage, may, it appears,
be of essential service in all professions.
It is not only necessary to attend to
the exact meaning which is avowedly affixed to any terms used in argument,
but it is also useful to attend to the
thoughts which are aften suggested to
the disputants by certain words. Thus,
the words happiness, and beauty, suggest in conversation very different ideas
to different men, and in arguing concerning these they could never come to a
conclusion: even persons who agree in
the same definition of a word, frequently, do not sufficiently attend to the ideas
which the word suggests; to the association of thoughts and emotions which it
excites; and, consequently, they cannot
strictly abide by their own definition, or
can they discover where the error lies.
We have observed that the imagination
is powerfully affected by words that suggest long trains of ideas; our reasonings
are influenced in the same manner, and
the elliptical figures of speech are used in
reasoning as well as in poetry.
''I would do so and so,if I were Alexander.''
"And so would I, if I were
Parmenio: ''
is a short reply, which suggests a
number of ideas, and a train of reasoning. To those who cannot supply the in•
termediate ideas the answer would not
appear either sublime or rational.
Young people, when they appear to ad-
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mire any compressed reasoning, should
be encouraged to shew, that they can
supply the thoughts and reasons that are
not expressed. Vivacious children will
be disgusted, however, if they are required to detail upon the subject; all that
is necessary is, to be sure that they actually comprehend what they admire.
Sometimes a question that appears
simple involves the consideration of
others which are difficult. Whenever a
preceptor cannot go to the bottom of the
business, he will do wisely to say so at
once to his pupil, instead of attempting a
superficial or evasive reply. For instance, if a child was to hear that the
Dutch bum and destroy quantities of
spice, the produce of their India islands,
he would probably express some surprise, and perhaps some indignation. If
a preceptor were to say, ''The Dutch
have a right to do what they please with
what is their own, and the spice is their
own,'' his pupil would not yet be
satisfied; he would probably say, "Yes,
they have a right to do what they please
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with what is their own; but why should
they destroy what is useful?'' The
preceptor might answer, if he chose to
make a foolish answer, ''The Dutch
follow their own interest in burning the
spice; they sell what remains at a higher
price; the market would be overstocked
if they did not bum some of their
spice.'' Even supposing the child to
understand the terms, this would not be
a satisfactory answer; or could a satisfactory answer be given without discussing
the nature of commerce, and the justice
of monopolies. Where one question in
this manner involves another, we should
postpone the discussion if it cannot be
completely made; the road may be just
pointed out, and the pupil's curiosity
may be excited to future inquiry. It is
even better to be ignorant, than to have
superficial knowledge.
A philosopher, who himself excelled
in accuracy of reasoning, recommends
the study of mathematics to improve the
acuteness and precision of the reasoning
faculty. To study any thing accurately

will have an excellent effect upon the
mind, and we may afterwards direct the
judgment to whatever purposes we
please. It has often been remarked, as a
reproach upon men of science and
literature, that those who judge extremely well of books, and of abstract
philosophical questions, do not shew the
same judgment in the active business of
life; a man, undoubtedly, may be a good
mathemetician, a good critic, an excellent writer, and may yet not shew, or
rather not employ, much judgment in
his conduct: his powers of reasoning
cannot be deficient, the habit of employing those powers in conducting himself
he s~ould have been taught by early
education. Moral reasoning, and the
habit of acting in consequence of the
conviction of the judgment, we call
prudence; a virtue of so much consequence to all the other virtues, a virtue
of so much consequence to ourselves and
to our friends, that it surely merits a
whole chapter to itself in Practical
Education.
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have no direct connection with the Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children at Montclair State
College, Montclair, New Jersey, but
like Matthew Lipman, its founder and
director, I have long believed that philosophy can be taught to children in such
a way that it will improve their logical
skills. As a Doctoral student in Education at North Texas State University, I
was able to obtain permission to teach
philosophy to children in an elementary
school; and as an experienced community college philosophy teacher with a
Master's degree in Philosophy, and two
children of my own, I was eager to try. I
decided, therefore, in the spring of
1979, to replicate Lipman' s 1970 field
experiment which he conducted in the
Rand School, Montclair, New Jersey
(Lipman, 1976), at Stonegate Elementary School in Bedford, Texas, a suburb
of Fort Worth. I pretested 32 fifth-grade
students, randomly selected from the
available pool of fifth-graders at Stonegate school, using the sub-tests on
logical skills (Opposites, Similarities,
Analogies and Inferences) from the
California Test of Mental Maturity,
1963 Revised Long Form. These 32
students were randomly divided into

I

two groups of 16 each (an experimental
group and a control group). Unfortunately, since the experiment was conducted at the end of the school year, the
post-test was given two days before
school closed for the summer and three
of the children had already left school for
the year. Complete data are available,
therefore, for only 14 children from the
experimental group and 15 from the
control group.
The experimental group met with me
twice a week (40-minute sessions) for
seven and a half weeks ( 15 sessions).
The control group continued in their
regularly scheduled class at that hourlanguage arts reinforcement. We read
and discussed the philosophical novel for
children, Harry Stottlemeier'sDiscovery,
emphasizing the logical aspects of the
book. Discussion among 10-year-olds in
a group the size of mine did not appear
to me to be especially productive, at
least in regard to teaching the more
logical aspects of Harry. So I introduced
a series of in-class paper and pencil exercises and homework assignments designed to reinforce the logical principles
presented in the book. Some of these exercises were from the instructional
manual (Lipman and Sharp, 1975) and
some were my own.

The children seemed to work much
better on an individual basis, but discussion was not dropped altogether. The
balance overall between discussion and
paper-pencil exercises was approximately 40 % discussion and 50 % paperpencil exercises. (The remaining 10%
was devoted to informal lecturing by
me.) Work as individualized as much as
possible. The children worked through
the exercises at their own rate of speed.
While they worked, I circulated among
them, answering questions and explaining various points, on an individual
basis. Peer tutoring was utilized. When
the faster students got more than two exercises ahead of the slower ones, they
were asked to help those who asked for
help. This approach seemed to work
well for all concerned.
One of my biggest problems in the
class was in the area of classroom
management. I knew nothing about my
students before the class began and
wanted to know nothing in order to
avoid any Pygmalion effect. I even
scored the pretests "blind." But after
several surprising disruptions and
hostile reactions from two of the
children, I spoke to the principal and she
informed me that my random sample
had managed to pull in a couple of
students who were well-known as
"discipline problems" in the school.
One of these was a child who had been
transferred from another school because
of her inability "to get along with
anyone there.'' To make matters worse,
the class met from 2: 30 to 3: 10 PM (the
last period of the day- a difficult period
to teach as any elementary school
teacher can testify); and we met right
after the children had their physical
education class (which made "settling
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down'' a real problem for my hot and
sweaty kids). In addition, the program
began very late in the school year
(again, a bad time to teach- children
really do seem to get "spring fever,,)
and ran only seven and a half weeks
rather than nine weeks as I had originally planned. And it was interrupted by a
one-week spring break, a field day, a
flash flood, and a track meet.
At mid-point in the program I
despaired that any progress would or
could be made by my students, but
about the end of the fifth week, I began
to see signs of positive results; e.g., a
class discussion on the need for rules
regarding classroom behavior in which
for such
the children discussed the reasons
rules in terms of whether or not particular reasons presented were good
reasons or not and why/why not; and an
apparently improved grasp of the nature
of logical thinking as evidenced by the
children's more rapid responses to my
explanations. At first, they had tended
simply to look at me with puzzled expressions when I explained that one
sentence could imply another even if the
first sentence were false. Later on in the
course, when I said (for example), "If
all dogs are black and Spot is a dog, then
Spot must be black. Right?" and a student replied, "But it's not true! Not all

dogs are black!" Several of the other
children piped up, "We're talking about
meaning,stupid!" (Unfortunately, I had
little success in controlling things like
name-calling - their favorite epithet
apparently being, "stupid.") At any
rate, despite all the problems, progress
was made as indicated by the results of
the post-test which consisted of the same
subtests of the CTMM used in the
pretest. Results of the post-test are
discussed below.
Statistical Design and Results
The statistical model used was that of
a randomized pretest/post-test control
group design, utilizing a t-test for two
independent samples. The test of the
null hypothesis is recorded below.
Scores shown are post/pre-test differences.

>

1. H:.u1= U2
A:.U1 U2
2. t-test for independent samples:
n1= 14, n2= 15.
3. 05. level, one-tailed, dt = 27.
R: t z 1.703

4. Sample 1 (Experimental Group):

2, -1,0, 1,2,8,7,5,3,5,6,3,2,2.
n1 =14, M1 =3.21, SS1 =90.36
Sample 2 (Control Group):

1,3,-4,2,5,3,3,-1,8,0, 1,-1,2,
-3,1.
n2 =15, M2 =1.33, SS2=127.33
90.36+127.33(1

_

14 + 15 t = 3.21 -

----

+_

2(14

1)

:::1.06

15)

1.33

1.06

= 1.77

5. Reject the null hypothesis. There is a
significant difference in the means of the
two samples at the .05 level of
significance. The data suggest that the
experimental treatment (philosophy for
children) enabled the subjects to
significantly improve their scores on
tests of logical thinking.
Problems with Replication
Although the results of the current
study lend support to the claims made
by Lipman in regard to gains in logical
skills, it is not the case that the current
study exactly replicates the previous
one. First of all, since the study began
late in the year, the class ran for only
seven and a half weeks for a total of only
ten hours of instruction. Lipman met his
class for nine weeks for a total of 13 ½
hours. However, this difference is not
damaging since it demonstrates that
even fewer hours than Lipman taught
can produce significant results. Still, the
difference does represent a deviation
from the original study.
Secondly, the 1970 Rand School class
of 20 children was taught by Dr. Lipman and two aides who were graduate
students in psychology. Since the present project was unfunded, I taught my
class of 16 randomly selected fifthgraders alone. Again, this difference is
not damaging since it, too, appears to
strengthen Lipman's claims.
Thirdly, because of the difficulties I
encountered in conducting meaningful
discussions with my group of 16 active
ten-:year-olds, I leaned heavily on written exercises and homework assignments, while in Lipman's project
''There was no homework, no grades,
no written classwork - it was all discussion." (Lipman 1976, p. 33). This difference in approach which produced
similar results suggests that further
research needs to be done on ap-

propriate methodology for teaching
children logical skills. There is even a
suggestion here that results may be excessively teacher-centered, results being
attained because both Lipman and I are
trained philosophers and not because of
particular materials or approach used.
Another difference is that the Rand
School is located in an area populated
largely by low-income and lowermiddle-income black families, while
Stonegate Elementary School is located
in a predominantly white middle and
upper-middle income area. However,
the Stonegate class was chosen randomly
and did include high, middle and low
achievers, hence demonstrating the
value of the philosophical approach for
children at all levels. The significance of
Lipman's study on this score is that it involved minority
and low-income
children.
Further, nowhere in any of the many
articles written by and about Lipman's
project (and subsequent projects) is
there any mention of any "discipline"
problem occurring in his class. I had
them from the very first day and taught
the class through constant· interruptions
and distractions from charming but
unruly youngsters. I blamed my lack of
experience teaching children but was
counseled by a very cooperative and
understanding principal that ''children
are different today.'' Perhaps they are.
(See, for example, Niensted 1979, and
Divoky 1979 for some reflections on this
possibility). At any rate, I believe that
this difference between my experience
and Lipman's enhances the importance
of the current
study
since it
demonstrates
the relevance
of
philosophy as a teaching methodology
for today's children, including those
who have been labelled "discipline problems."
Far more serious to the problem of
replication is the fact that the original
research report on the Rand School
study quoted by Lipman ( 1976, p. 32)
has never been published and was not
available to me. Without access to the
report and the original data, it is impossible to resolve what appear to be inaccuracies and inconsistencies in the
material Lipman quotes from the
original report. Unfortunately, these inaccuracies and inconsistencies may
never be cleared up since Lipman
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reports that the data on which the
original report was based are '' no longer
available" (1976, p.33.) [One of the
graduateassistants in the 1970 experiment
reportedthaJthe data had hem lost. This was
sometimeafterBierman1s reporthad bun completed. Ed. ]
Following are some of them:
1. The original report, as quoted by
Lipman, states that four specific test
parts of the CTMM (1963 Rev. Long
Form) were used to pretest both the
experimental group and the control
group and that "both
groups
demonstrated above average scores in
the results" (Lipman 1976, p. 32).
However, the four test parts of the
CTMM specific to logical skills are
tests on Opposites, Similarities,
Analogies and Inferences, and these
sub-tests have not been provided
norms, either singly or as a grouped
sub-section, for such a comparison.
The only way one could say the
CTMM
scores
were
"above
average'' would be if the entire
CTMM were given, or if a normed
sub-section (e.g., Language or NonLanguage) were given. But the tests
on Opposites,
Similarities
and
Analogi~s are only part of the NonLanguage section, and the test on inferences is just one part of the
Language section. Norms are not
given for these parts. Therefore, the
claim that both groups scored "above
average" is questionable.
2. The report states that at the end of
nine weeks both groups were tested
using ''the same four tests of the
California
Test
of Mental
Maturity ... except that the items were
extracted from the Short Form (1963

Revision) of the test" (Lipman 1976,
p.32). However, the Short Form of
the CTMM does not include all four
of the sub-tests on logical skills. It
omits the test on inferences. Therefore, the claim that the same four
tests were used is either false, or the
test on inferences was not one of the
four sub-tests given as a pre-test,
which would invalidate claims made
about logical skills since the inference
test is the test most relevant to the
kind of skills taught in the class.
3. The report states that the experimental group showed an increase of 27
months in mental age at the end of
the nine-week program. However, if
only the four tests on logical skills
were given (as claimed), it would be
impossible to calculate mental age,
for the same reason that claims about
scores being "above average" are
impossible. Therefore, the claim that
the experimental group gained 27
months in mental age is questionable.
Conclusion
I believe that the current study provides reliable data to support Lipman's
claim that a philosophical approach can
be utilized to teach children logical
skills. The data may or may not support
claims regarding the superiority of Lipman's discussion methodology. More
research needs to be done in this area.
And, if philosophical approaches are to
be used in teaching children logical
skills, research needs to be conducted into the best ways to teach elementary
school teachers how to teach philosophically (since, obviously, universitytrained philosophers are not going to
become standard fixtures in elementary
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schools). An apparent advantage to Lipman's approach which stressed dialogue
(rather than paper and pencil work) is
that it produced substantial improvement in the children's reading skills as
evidenced in both Bierman' s follow-up
study and in the 1975 Newark study.
However, in the present study, I did not
test the children's reading skills, so I
cannot say that my paper-and-pencil approach did or did not have an effect in
this area. Lipman, of course, stresses
dialogue as the primary tool of sharpening thinking skills. Lipman also stresses
the need for teacher-training aimed
primarily at developing the teacher's
ability to use the dialogue approach with
children, training which I did not have
prior to my experience. Perhaps my difficulties in conducting meaningful classroom discussions with the children
reflect this Jack.
Finally, the generalizability of the
present study is obviously severely limited. But it does demonstrate that a philosopher with no special prior training in
teaching philosophy to children can succeed in doing so, and that at least some
children can improve their ability to
think logically through an experience
with philosophical teaching. I have no
doubt that as a result of my experience
with the children, I could now do a
much better job; but the essential part of
my experience was that it occurred in an
elementary school classroom. The insights and support of the principal at
Stonegate, Mrs. Linni Jo Blair; my elementary education adviser at North
Texas State University, Dr. Betty Mason; and my counselor friend, Dori English, were invaluable in helping me explore that previously unknown territory.
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WIii/am Godwin (1756-1836was a soc/al
reformer and political Journalist who
typified the Enlightenment conviction that
human beings could rely wholly on their
reason for guidance In life. Human rights,
according to Godwin, are reducible to the
right of private Judgment, since people
must know the reasons which require their
acting for the common good. The selec·
tlon that follows, taken from The Enquirer
(1797),Is suggestive of Godwin's views on
moral education.

OF REASONING
CONTENTION.

William Godwin

here is a vice, frequently occurring
of those who depend upon us, which is ludicrous in its
appearance, but attended with the most
painful consequences to those who are
the objects of it. This is, when we set out
with an intention of fairness and equality with respect to them, which we find
ourselves afterwards unable to maintain.
Let it be supposed that a parent, accustomed to exercise a high authority
over his children, and to require from
them the most uncontending submission, has recently been convinced of the

T in our treatment

AND

impropriety of his conduct. He calls
them together, and confesses his error.
He has now discovered that they are rational beings as well as himself, that he
ought to act the part of their friend, and
not of their master; and he encourages
them, when they differ in opinion with
him as to the conduct they ought to p:ursue, to state their reasons, and proceed
to a fair and equal examination of the
subject.
If this mode of proceeding can ever be
salutary, it must be to a real discussion
that they are invited, and not to the
humiliating scene of a mock discussion.
The terms must be just and impartial.
If either party convince the other,
there is then no difficulty in the case.
The difference of opinion is vanished,
and the proceeding to be held will be
correspondent.

But it perhaps more frequently happens, in the tangled skein of human affairs, if both parties without indolence or
ill faith endeavour to do justice to their
respective opinions, that no immediate
change of sentiment is produced, and
that both seem to leave off where they
began. What is to be the result in this
case?
If the terms are impartial, the child is
then to be victorious. For the conduct to
be held is his, and ought therefore, so far
as equality is concerned, to be regulated
by the dictates of his judgment.
But it is more frequent for the parent
to say, No, I have heard you out; you
have not convinced me; and therefore
nothing remains for you but to submit.
Now in this case, putting myself in the
place of the child, I have no hesitation to
reply: Upon these terms I cannot enter
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''Do not fill me with the sublime emotions of
independence, and teach me to take up my rest
among the stars of heaven, if your ultimate
purpose be to draw closer my fetters, and pull
me down unwillingly to the surface of the
earth.''
the lists with you. I had rather a thousand times know at once what it is to
which I must submit, and comply with a
grace, than have my mind warmed with
the discussion, be incited to recollect and
to state with force a whole series of arguments, and then be obliged to quit the
field with disgrace, and follow at the
chariot-wheels of my antagonist.
But the case is in reality worse than
this. The child may be unprejudiced and
open to conviction. But it is little probable that the parent does not bring a
judgment already formed to the discussion, so as to leave a small chance that
the arguments of the child will be able to
change it. The child will scarcely be able
to offer any thing new, and has to contend with an antagonist equally beyond
his match in powers of mind and body.
The terms of the debate therefore are,
first, If you do not convince me, you
must act as if I had convinced you. Secondly, I enter the lists with all the
weight of long practice and all the pride
of added years, and there is scarcely the
shadow of a hope that you will convince
me.
The result of such a system of proceeding will be extreme unhappiness.
Where the parent is not prepared to
grant a real and bonafide equality, it is of
the utmost importance that he should
avoid the semblance of it. Do not open a
treaty as between independent states,
when you are both able and willing to
treat the neighbour-state as a conquered
province.
Place me in the condition of a slave, I
shall perhaps be able to endure it.
Human nature is capable of accommodating itself to a state of subjection,
especially when the authority of the matter is exercised with mildness, and seems
to be directed in a considerable degree to
promote the welfare of the dependent.
The situation I deprecate is that of a
slave, who is endowed with the show and
appearance of freedom. What I ask at

your hand is, that you would not,
without a good and solid meaning,
waken all the secret springs of my
nature, and call forth the swelling ambition of my soul. Do not fill me with the
sublime emotions of independence, and
teach me to take up my rest among the
stars of heaven, if your ultimate purpose
be to draw closer my fetters, and pull me
down unwillingly to the surface of the
earth. This is a torture more exquisite
and refined than all that Sicilian tyrants
ever invented.
The person who has been thus
treated, turns restless upon the bed of
his dungeon. He feels every thing that
can give poignancy to his fate. He burns
with indignation against the hourly
events of his life. His sense of suffering,
which would otherwise be blunted, is by
this refinement, like the vitals of Prometheus, for ever preyed upon, and for
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amusement. But he heaps up for himself
hours of bitterness. He will be rugged,
harsh, tempestuous and untractable;
and he will learn to loath almost the consciousness of existence.
The way to avoid this error in the
treatment of youth, is to fix in our mind
those points from which we may
perceive that we shall not ultimately
recede, and, whenever they occur, to
prescribe them with mildness of
behaviour, but with firmness of decision. It is not necessary that in so doing
we should really subtract any thing from
the independence of youth. They should
no doubt have a large portion of independence; it should be restricted only
in cases of extreme emergency; but its
boundaries should be clear, evident and
unequivocal. It is not necessary that,
like some foolish parents, we should
tenaciously adhere to every thing that
we have once laid down, and prefer that
heaven should perish rather than we
stand convicted of error. We should
acknowledge ourselves fallible; we
should admit no quackery and false airs
of dignity and wisdom into our system of
proceeding; we should retract unaffectedly and with grace whenever we
find that we have fallen into mistake.
But we should rather shun, than

" ... as parents, ..... we should acknowledge
ourselvesfallible . ... we should retract unaffectedly and with grace whenever we find that
we have ,fallen into mistake . .. ''
ever renewed.
The child, whose education has been
thus mistaken, will be distinguished by a
contentious and mutinous spirit. His activity will at first be excited by the invitation perpetually to debate the commands he receives. He will exercise his
ingenuity in the invention of objections,
and will take care not to lose his office of
deliberating counsellor by any neglect of
the functions that characterise it. He will
acquire a habit of finding difficulties and
disadvantages in every thing. He will be
pleased to involve you in perpetual
dispute, and to show that the acuteness
of his talent is not inferior to yours. He
will become indifferent to the question
of truth and falsehood, and will exhibit
the arts of a practiced sophister. In this
he will at first find gratification and

invite, controversy into matters that will
probably at last be decided from
authority. Thus conducting ourselves,
we shall generate no resentful passions
in the breasts of our juniors. They will
submit themselves to our peremptory
decisions, in the same spirit as they submit to the laws of inanimate necessity.
It were to be wished that no human
creature were obliged to do anything but
from the dictates of his own understanding. But this seems to be, for the present
at least, impracticable in the education
of youth. If we cannot avoid some exercise of empire and despotism, all that remains for us is, that we take care that it
not be exercised with asperity, and that
we do not add an insulting familiarity or
unnecessary contention, to the indispensible assertion of superiority.
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Educating

for
Moral
Strength
Konstantin
Kolenda
Konstantin Kolenda Is Professor of
Philosophy at Rice University.

few years ago I wrote a text for high
entitled, Ethics for
the Young. Since its publication it has
been used in two of Houston's public
schools, Madison and Westbury. It is no
secret to anyone who attempts to introduce a new subject into school curricula that there is a reluctance to try the
untried. State agencies and school
boards tend to be conservative bodies,
not eager to move in new directions, but
personal initiative may make a difference. In the case of Madison High, it
was the school principal who was willing
to respond to a challenge to introduce
philosophy; in the case of Westbury
High, it was a teacher who persuaded
the principal to allow a modification of
her course. In both cases, the teaching of
ethics is taking place in a context of
another subject - social science and
psychology, respectively. Nevertheless,
the innovation took hold: Madison has
offered the course for three years,
Westbury, starting later, for two years
in a row.
As a visiting participant in both
courses, I was reconfirmed in my conviction that high school students are not
only ready but eager to give serious attention to the subject. They are not at all
reluctant, even to a surprising degree, to
bring up matters from their personal
lives, sensing correctly that the importance of an issue does not disqualify it

Aschool students,
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from being discussed in a thoughtful,
objective manner. Their enthusiasm
about the opportunity to discuss ethical
questions may reflect the expected
youthful exuberance directed to any new
area, especially an area that allows one
to air types of questions usually shied
away from in other formal studies.
Nevertheless, the responses are indicative of a satisfaction derived from
having been credited with the ability to
venture into this area of thought. Here
is a sample of rather typical responses:
"This class helped me a great deal. It
has helped me take a different and
better outlook on llfe.The book along
with the discussions made me In a
way flght for my bellefs, but It also let
me see other bellefs and reasons be·
hind them. It opened up a whole new
world. There were situations and
topics I have never thought of. This
class has made me consider these
aspects of llfe and let me decide for
myself how I feel about a situation
before It Is thrown at me when I cannot consider It carefully. It Is a class
that everyone should have the opportunity to take."
"I fInd I am more aware of the world
that surrounds me. I am more confl·
dent In not only myself but also In
others. I can relate to people with
whom I never related before and I am
beginning to reallze how others see
me. I am happier with everyone I
know,but most ImportantlyI am happier with myself."
"Time after time, situations would
make me recall my Philosophyclass.
I was not sure I would find the class
Interesting, but I enjoyed It very much
and have really gained from It. The
book helped a lot. It was written on
our level and gave examples and
situations I could relate to. I am glad
to fInd out that there wlll be Philosophy offered for students next year."
"The course has made me aware of
many things that I am going to have
to deal with In llfe. I have also learned
how to use my ethical Judgment In
these matters and not to worry what
other people think."
"Everybodyneeds this course before
leaving high school. It really helps
you understand yourself and others
as well."
"The course really made me think."
"We were able to talk about a lot of
subjects that everyone would llke to
bring up but doesn't know how to go
about It."
"I first took this course to get out of
an Algebra class. But since I have
been In here .I have learned a lot
about thlnlclngfor myself."
In my opinion, the choice of the text
to be used in a high school ethics course

is not of crucial importance. The text
approach may vary and may introduce
the student to the subject from many directions. As long as the objective is to
stimulate a student's critical powers in
this area, almost any competent text will
do, provided it does not presuppose previous philosophical sophistication in the
technical sense. In any area of study it is
important to start with an identification
of data and situations - factual and institutional - within which questions are
raised and answers sought. A completely
unstructured, free-wheeling, and wholly
open-ended discussion, with no control
of perimeters within which it is to move,
is likely to be unproductive or boring or
both, even though it may generate spontaneous ''self-expression.'' One pedagogical device, used successfully by
Mrs. Violet Lee at Westbury, was to
assign a section of the book to a student,
who was then expected to come to class
prepared to summarize the content of
the section, to answer some questions
which followed the expository material,
and to act as a moderator of the discussion by the whole class.
Having raised the question of the content of a course on ethics, le~ me offer a
few comments on my text. One of its objectives is to dispel the common assumption that ethics or morality (I use these
terms interchangeably) is restricted to a
small comer of life and deals only with
special phenomena, such as sex or
crime. For some people morality has a
connotation derived from such phrases
as "he was arrested on a morals
charge.'' It is not too difficult - and
highly desirable, I believe - to show
how moral questions pervade every corner of daily life. Part of moral education
consists in learning that moral problems
arise in various kinds of contexts and
that it is useful to distinguish among
them. Here moral educatign merges
with the wider philosophical objective of
introducing a certain sense of categorial
order into our understanding of the
world.
The contexts in which ethical thinking
is to be done are characterized in separate chapters, each adding a new level of
complexity. The first chapter, entitled
''Managing Things,'' deals with physical, bodily aspects of life: food, clothing,
shelter, sex, stimulants (the last topic
dealing with the role of substances that
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affect our bodies from inside). Then we
move to "Living With Others," where
by "others" are meant persons with
whom a close, even intimate contact is
normally established: parents, siblings,
relatives, peers, teachers. The next
chapter discusses "Relating To Institutions": schools, government, industry
and business, entertainment world,
voluntary associations. The transition
from the personal to institutional way of
being related to other people calls for a
recognition of a corresponding change
in the character of the moral bond, the
existence of which often tends to be overlooked in the academic contexts, in
media, and in public life. A still wider
circle is drawn in the chapter entitled
''Taking Part In History,'' where the
objective is to show that it is desirable to
become aware oflarger forces that play a
role in our personal and social destinies.
Here the student is introduced to the
following topics: geographic orientation,
historical consciousness, community
participation, political involvement, and
global awareness.
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moral principles as either operating in a
social vacuum or in the recesses of subjective solitude. Instead, he will realize
that they are concretely applicable to
life.
Throughout the book the student is
encouraged to recognize that thinking
about moral issues can be conclusive
without always favoring simple answers.
At the end of each section numerous
questions are constructed around imaginary situations, inviting the student
to think about possible solutions, in
many cases leaving it clear that there are
cases in which one can be quite confident about the rightness or wrongness of
a proposed solution. There are only occasional references to some prominent
philosophers or schools of thought; at
this stage it seems more appropriate to
deal with the subject itself rather than
with philosophical theories about it.
Nevertheless, it is not unlikely that a
reflective approach to ethical questions
in early stages of one's education will
lead to a continued cultivation of one's
whole mind.

''We were able to talk about a lot of subjects that everyone would like to bring up
but doesn't know how to go about it.''
• • •
The objective pursued in all these
chapters is to characterize the circumstances which open us up to various
spheres of life, each giving rise to a variety of ethical questions. With all of this
as a background it seems desirable to
turn to topics that traditionally have
been regarded as of primary interest to
moral education. The fmal chapter is
called ''Finding Oneself'' and covers the
following phenomena: forming a character, developing a personality, choosing a career, steering a new course, and
shaping a way of life. The first section
contains a discussion of some explicitly
ethical virtues, such as honesty, courage, loyalty, kindness. The main reason
for treating the person-oriented topics at
the end rather than at the beginning of
the book is that the student will have
been introduced to many contexts where
personal ethical orientation may be relevant. He may be less tempted to regard

of moral education is to
Ifectf thetheaimwhole
mind of a young per-

af-

son, then it may be necessary to take a
second look at the distinction between
the philosophical and psychological approaches, made by Professor Henry C.
Johnson, Jr. in the first issue of this
Journal. He is right in claiming that the
psychological approach, by concerning
itself primarily with the emotional side
of our choices - with what we want, are
inclined or are likely to do - fails to
consider the role of reasoning, of thinking
about valµes. It is one thing to be motivated, and another thing to bejustified. If
our choices are not subjected to a rational appraisal, to a careful sorting out
and a competent understanding of alternatives, they are likely to be blind
and to suffer unforeseen and unwelcome
consequences.
To introduce the factor of reflection,
thinking, and understanding into the

arena of our wants, desires, interests,
and emotional needs is to indicate that
in moral education we are not faced with
two mutually exclusive ·alternatives either one uses a philosophical approach
or a psychological one. I want to claim
that both approaches have the same objective: to strengtl,ena personmorally.This
can be put another way: if one's motives
and choices are subjected to reflection
and prepared by thoughtfulness and
understanding, a person is likely to be
stronger in the sense of being more effective in reaching his or her acknowledged objectives.
In this connection it should be noted
that the adjective "philosophical," as
used to describe the features that characterize the element of reason, of thinking
in moral decisions, need not be seen as
an invention of a special tribe of people
called philosophers. On the contrary,
the philosophical capacity is no more
than the capacity for reasoning and
thinking, and h is universally present in
all persons, including children. It is a
mistake
to leave that capacity
unemployed in such an important area
of life as morality. We have seen some
spectacular successes when the opportunity to reason philosophically was introduced even on the elementary school
level.
The principle on which I want to base
my argument is the one propounded
centuries ago by Francis Bacon: knowledge is power. Quite appropriately, we
think of this principle mainly in the context of science and technology - topics
of central importance to Bacon himself.
But the principle was a wider scope of
application. It even is related, I believe,
to the Scriptural saying: you shall know
the truth and the truth will make you
free. Freedom and power are closely related. To possess the truth is to be free of
the encumbrances and obstacles of error
and ignorance; it means to sec clearly
and confidently the path and the alternatives before us. But to see clearly what
and how something is possible is to be in
a position to utilize that knowledge in
one's actions. That is how knowledge,
freedom, and power interconnect.
By power is understood not physical
force but psychological strength derived
from confidence about the facts surrounding us. Such a confidence is not
blind if it has at its disposal and as its
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guide a correct appraisal of actualities
and possibilities. Action taken from such
a thoughtful awareness can be supported
and justified by reference to known
facts. This possibility makes a discussion
about moral issues open to public debate
and verification. Such a debate may obviously include a reference to shared
moral principles, and it is also a matter
of ascertainable fact whether the invoked principles are shared. When the
discussion turns on the validity or applicability of principles, the need for examining their factual consequences
becomes a part of the situation to be
clarified.
In morality, as in other areas of life
where thinking is not only in order but
imperative, it is possible and desirable to
be knowledgeable about relevant facts
and principles. Psychological assurance
based on ignorance or shortsightedness
is a fraud and soon betrays its weaknesses. A belief maintained vehemently but
blindly, with no regard for such factors
as its source, its background, its testability by rational considerations, and its
likely consequences, sooner or later is
bound to lead to frustration, confusion,
uncertainty, fear. In actual life we cannot easily escape these factors, for we are
accountable, and usually are held uncountable for the way we act on our
beliefs. When undesirable consequences
flow from our beliefs and actions we are
rightly expected to explain and to justify
ourselves. A part of moral education
consists in making such a self-justification rational and plausible. To lack the
ability to offer such a justification is to
be morally at sea - incompetent, inarticulate, or merely opinionated. But to
be at sea, as this metaphorical expression intends to convey, is to be imperiled, vulnerable, powerless.
The objective of moral education is to
enable a person to be strong in the sense
just described. More specifically, it is to
prepare young persons to act with confidence in the light of competent discernment and proper understanding. If
moral convictions are the result of well
informed, carefully reflected on, intelligently supported, rational judgments, then it is not the question of
whosevalues or whosemoral truth is to be
disseminated. It is not a matter of competition between family and church,
church and school, or family and
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church. Each can contribute positively
to the process of strengthening moral
capabilities of children. We lose sight of
the problem when we transform it into
the question of whose values are to
count, or who is to exercise the dominant influence. Only if one thinks that
morality consists in holding on to a small
collection of static precepts and plugging
them in unreflectively into some sticky
points in one's journey through life, will
one be inclined to guard jealously and
intolerantly the particular set one happens to favor.
Moral competence does require the
adoption and appreciation of principles
and precepts, but it also requires an attention to facts and relationships in
which these principles are to do their
work. At all times, and especially at
times of rapid change, such as ours,
there is a need to examine the ways in
which the tried and true principles fit the
new circumstances. It is difficult to keep
a moral code closed and static in a social
situation that is admittedly open and
dynamic. Social changes are bound to
bring about changes in moral outlook as
well, and it is not a foregone conclusion
that these changes will always be for the
worse. The ongoing debate about difficult issues concerning our basic institutions and practices is not forced on us
onesidedly by evil persons; they have
arisen from the complexities of modem
life in a world in which intense exchanges of beliefs, values, opinions, and
life styles proliferate. To try to stop this
process or to be oblivious to its impact,
for better or for worse, is to act like an
ostrich.
We should begin by granting that all
parties - parents, teachers, churches,
and countless other social institutions have one common moral goal: to encourage in the young generation a confident, knowledgeable, thoughtful discernment of the moral consequences and
implications of our actions. Shortcuts
are usually shortsighted and often harmful. When a young person is encouraged
to look at morality as a mere depository
of static, stock answers, his moral
strength remains undeveloped, leaving
him insecure and vulnerable to specious
argument or slick persuasion. Insecurity
in tum breeds distrust, isolation, and
sometimes panic, or, as a defensive reaction, it is transformed into intolerance,

elitism, and exclusivism.
In devising a program in moral
education we should ask ourselves
whether it would contribute to the objective of making our children more sensitive to their options and opportunities,
more thoughtful and more confident
about choices they cannot escape making. We should do all we can to encourage in young persons the emergence
of competences that can help them to
reach the state of moral maturity, when
both the emotions and the intellect are
morally educated and when they can act
from principles they understand and appreciate - in other words, when they
are in a position to defend their beliefs
and choices by thoughtful, informed,
considered judgment.
To agree on this one overriding objective is to steer away from invidious
distinctions concerning the competence
of various groups to contribute to the
moral development of children. Neither
the family, nor the church, nor the
school can do the job properly all by
itself. Each must do what it can, and
what it can do best depends on the kind
of contact it has with the members of the
new generation. Each group has its
special obligations, assets, and limitations, and no one can do the work of the
others. But they can all unite in trying to
help our children to become morally
stronger.
To say that moral education belongs
either in the home or in the school is to
utter a half-truth, and we would do well
to grant each source of moral strength its
proper weight. It may be the case, as
some charge, tbat as a society we do not
do enough to attract to the teaching profession our ablest or soundest men and
women. The teachers, on the other
hand, can return the compliment to
society at large (or to those who purport
to speak in the name ofit): "you ain't so
handsome yourself.''
To say that
schools alone are responsible for various
ills that worry us - truancy, run-aways,
smoking, alcoholism, drugs, high crime
rate, high divorce rate - is to put on an
undeserved halo. We must bury our
hatchets and reconcile our differences if
we are to make a hopeful start toward
helping our children to become morally
stronger. Our future, and theirs, may
depend on how well we perform this
task.
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Since social facts consist of ways of
thinking, feeling and acting, it Is not surprising to find that, for Durkheim, the Improvement of society can come about
through Improved ways of thinking. Education for rationality therefore has, from his
point of view, a ma/or role to play In social
reform, as well as In the conservation of
the best among society's traditions.
Durkheim was a professor of education
as well as of sociology. He taught
pedagogy all his life, giving weekly onehour lectures on the subject from 1887 to
1902 In the Faculty of Letters at Bordeaux,
where his audience consisted mainly of
primary school teachers. At the Sorbonne,
at least a third, and often two-thirds of his
teaching was In the area of pedagogy.
One course which he presente<J was entitled "Intellectual Education In the Primary
School." It was completely written out,
and Is summarized by Paul Fauconnet In
his Introduction to the original edition of
Durkheim's Education and Sociology. Unfortunately the manuscript, which was
never published, seems to have completely disappeared. Perhaps we can get a
glimpse of Its content from the final
paragraph of Fauconnet's discussion of
the course:

Learning
To
Reason
Emile Durkheim

Emile Durkheim (1858-1917)was one of
the pioneers of sociology. In order that
the study of society be non-reductive, he
argued that certain occurrences are
"social facts". Such facts consist of
''ways of a.ctint,lmnking, andfeeling, ·cdmulJlo t/,e
individualandnuit,wed will, a powerofeoertitm,by
rtdSOt1 of whidi lhq amlrol him. Tll4Seways of thinking tauld not 1Mco,ifusedwill, l,ioltJgiad/JMtUnnffl4,
sinu lhq eonsul of rep,utnlalu,ns
andof aaimu;MT
with psyc/u,"1giad
p"4tunnma,which aist on!,in t/,e
individualeonuiownusand throughil. TM.,constiluu,
thw, a 111W oaridy of pl,enomena;and il is lo t/,e,n exelwioe{, that t/,e term 'soeial'ougAIto he applied."
(The Rules of Sociological Method.)

''Durklaeim's con&eption
ofteadiing... prouidest/,e
prineiplewhieh alonewill make ii possil,leto resolvet/,e
diffieultits with whieh our primaryand secondary
tduealionis struggling,tom httwtm mcyeloptdie
aspirationsand t/,e fair smst oft/,e dangerslo which
lhq give rise.E«h oft/,e jundamenlaJdisciplinesimplies a launt phiwsophy, that is to say, a systnn ofuudinal notionswhich sum upthemostgeneral
charadnistiesof things as we conceivethem, andwhieh
gooemtheir interpretalion.It is this phiwsophy,p,odua
of t/,e eumulativework of gn,e,atwns, that mwt he
transmiutd to t/,e child, h«aust ii constitutest/,e ony
framework oft/,e inttlligma. Philosophical and
elementary are not mutual{, exclusivetmns. Quitelo
theeomra,y:the most elemmlatyeducationmust ht the
mostphiwsophieal.But il goeswithout sayingthat
what is htrt ,ailed phiwsophyshouldnot ht expounded
in al,straetform. It shouldtmtrgtfrom themost
familiar ttaehing, without totr hnngformulated.But in
ortkr so lo tmtrgt, it mustfirst inspiresuch teaching."

Although we are unable to present an
excerpt from Durkheim's work on Intellectual education In the primary school, we
have the consolation of being able to read
Durkheim on education for rationality In
the final chapter of his study of the
history of secondary education In France,
translated as The Evolution of Educational
Thought. The passage that follows Is from
pages 339 to 348 of that work, and Is
reprinted here with permission of
Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., London.
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he educational value of the study of
literature resides not solely in the
aesthetic merits of the works. If this were
the case the domination of our own academic system which has for so long been
exercised by Latin would be inexplicable. The value of these works is that
they show man in all his aspects and
consequently reveal his nature. But the
sciences are also human achievements;
they too are a product of the mind, and
consequently manifest its nature.
Science is human reasoning in action.
Once we have empirical science,
literature can no longer constitute the
exclusive subject-matter of even a purely
human education, for there is a whole
area of humanity which is being excluded. If it is essential for us to know the extreme diversity of feelings which have
stirred the human heart, that we should
have lived them through thought, as
well as the great moral religious and
aesthetic beliefs which men have held, it
is no less important that we should be initiated into the advances and procedures
whereby human reason has progressively taken control of the world.
This initiation is not of purely
theoretical and speculative interest;
these processes of scientific thought
must be known not simply for the
satisfaction which knowing them provides, but in order that we can
assimilate them ourselves. Science contains ways of thinking and reasoning
which we cannot learn in any other
school and of which we should know
nothing if science did not exist. It is a
mistake to think that all the logical
faculties, all the intellectual operations
which science uses, exist in us readymade; and that it is consequently only a
question of becoming aware of them, of
exercising them, and of applying them,
as the Scholastics thought. If this were
the case, would logic have undergone all
the successive variations which it has
seen in the past? Did man have any idea
of what the inductive method was, or experimental reasoning, before the experimental sciences became established?
Even in the seventeenth century a man
like Bacon only had a very vague and
vacillating notion of induction. Similarly it was only when the mathematical
sciences had reached a certain degree of
development that the nature of deductive reasoning was fully understood. In-

T
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deed there is no science whose principal
advances have not consisted in the fortifying, refining and perfecting of the
logic of its own procedures. There is a
whole area of logic which is by no means
the least complex nor the least important, and whose discovery was the result
of science and certainly did not precede
it. Consequently it is only by living the
scientific life that we can acquire an
understanding of this logic. This is
because science is not the work of
isolated individuals; it is the product of
co-operative enterprise in which scientists of all kinds and of all places come
together. Thus it represents, at each moment of its history, a kind of resume of
human experience as this has been concentrated and accumulated year after
year, from generation to generation. Its
intellectual worth is consequently and
quite naturally infinitely greater than
that of individual minds operating on
their own and without recourse to
anything other than themselves. This
explains why it is from science that we
have everything to learn; in science we
find a kind of exemplary rationality
which is the ideal model upon which our
individual rationalities should seek to
model themselves. Philosophers have
often speculated that, beyond the
bounds of human understanding, there
is a kind of universal and impersonal
understanding
in which individual
minds seek to participate by mystical
means; well, this kind of understanding
exists, and it exists not in any transcendent world but in this world itself.
It exists in the world of science; or at
least that is where it progressively realises itself; and it constitutes the ultimate
source of logical vitality to which individual human rationality can attain.
Teaching of the sciences serves not
only to render the world familiar and,
consequently, to perfect our understanding of man; it is an additionally invaluable tool in the development of logical thinking. And here we have the
means of filling the serious gap - which
we have had occasion to note - in our
secondary education. In fact, we have
seen how the training in logic which had
been instituted by the Scholastics was
swept away by the Humanist revolution
without anything being put in its place.
Now, it is difficult to regard as being entirely normal an educational system

which interests itself so little in the development of those faculties which make for
logical thought. Of course, there is no
question of going back upon our unequivocally expressed condemnation of
Scholastic formalism. Scholasticism was
a response to an age in which the experimental method was unknown, and in
which thought could only make contact
with external reality via the medium of
those opinions which men formed concerning it, by confronting these opinions
with one another by means of argument.
Today, thanks to the experimental
method, we can reason about things directly and without any intermediary;
new forms of argument have been born,
a new kind of training in logic has become possible, that training which is
generated by scientific life itself. In
order for this kind of training to become
organised and as fertile as can be expected it is, in addition, necessary that the
teacher feels the necessity of it. He must,
that is, realise that his job is not confined
to expounding the particular results of
the science for which he is responsible;
he must also and above all explain the
methods, the mental operations, the logical mechanisms of which these results
are the product. The methodology of the
sciences, which today is touched upon in
the philosophy class alone, should not be
divorced from the teaching of the particular sciences. On the one hand, only
he who has practised the sciences is
equipped with the necessary competence
to render its methods intelligible. On the
other, this method can only be really
understood by the pupils if they see it in
action, if they have it explained to them
at the same time as it is being applied, if
they are trained to practise and apply it
themselves. It will thus be up to the
teacher of the sciences to teach the methods which he uses, the reasoning underlying them, and the principles upon
which they are grounded. Unfortunately, we know only too well that in this
sphere everything remains to be done.
Training in this kind of reasoning is
all the more valuable because it can be
put to work not only in the study of
material things but in the study of man
himself. The idea, indeed, is becoming
increasingly well established that man is
not a world within a world, that he is not
separated by a void from the rest of the
universe. Increasingly the tendency is to
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see the human domain as simply the
natural domain which, of course, has its
special features just as the biological domain has its special features by comparison with the domains of physics and
chemistry, but which is subject to the
same essential laws as the other realms
of nature. If that is the case there can exist no special privileged procedures for
understanding
it, no mysterious
avenues which allow us to dispense with
the tortuous and toilsome roads which
physicists, chemists and biologists are
forced to follow in their invest_igations. If
human reality is a reality like any other,
then in order to discover its laws it will
not be enough to tum oneself inwards,
to meditate internally and to make deductions. Rather must one observe it in
the same way as we observe things in the
external world, that is to say from the
outside; we must experiment and make
use of deduction or, if experimentation
in the strict sense is in practice impossible, we must find a way of setting up
objective comparisons which can fulfil
the same logical functions.
These new methods and the key ideas
from which they derive: where can they
be learned except at the school of the
sciences, which have already advanced
them to such a high degree of perfection? Everything points to the fact that
the gre~t gulf which still separates the
study of physical nature and the study of
human nature is no~ nothing but a
relict which is destined to disappear.
The day will soon come, and we must
seek to hasten it, when the idea of trying
to educate an historian or a linguist
without first of all initiating him into the
discipline of the natural sciences will appear to be a veritable aberration. It is
obvious that, to the same extent that we
think it necessary to adopt the same attitude in regard to ourselves as the scientist adopts in regard to things, we must
train our children in the 91cus
to take up
this essential attitude towai-ds the world
of persons. A sound scientific education
seems to be an indispensable condition
of all truly human education.
Thus the study of the sciences, far
from constituting a kind of intrusive and
alien element in our educational system,
far from being an outsider to it and a
threat to its economy, is in reality a
valuable auxiliary, and an essential element in the older humanistic education

which for so long was completely predominant. Although it is orientated towards the outside it leads us away from
ourselves only to bring us back to ourselves; but it brings us back armed with,
and enriched by, precious insights which
cast new light upon our own nature. Between these two kinds of discipline there
exists close solidarity. This solidarity is
even more absolute than might appear
from what has already been said, for it is
reciprocal. Not only is it the case, as we
have just seen, that natural science helps
us to understand mankind better; but
the study of things human, in addition
to being intrinsically indispensable, is
also a necessary preparation for the
study of the world.
Indeed, the logical training which
emerges from the practice of the positive
sciences is not enough on its own; it presupposes something else which is more
elementary and which must be sought at
a different source. In order to derive
value from an initiation into the natural
sciences one must already possess a certain mastery over one's own thinking;
one must have already acquired a certain
aptitude for clear, distinct and coherent
thought. This requires a whole education
which must begin before scientific education, and which must be pursued for
many years in parallel with it.
Naturally, thought presents itself to
the mind in a global and confused form.
It is not an organised series of clear
ideas, not a chain in which the rings are
firmly linked to one another; rather it is
that the diverse representations which
we experience simultaneously are lost
amongst one another so that we cannot
say where one begins and the other fmishes. They are so intimately interpenetrated that they exchange their identities. The affective state in which we
fmd ourselves at any · given moment
adds its own colouring to the ideas with
which our consciousness is filled at the
time, so that everything seems sad or
gay to us depending on whether we ourselves are feeling sad or gay. Impressions vary completely, depending on
those which have gone immediately before: this is known as the law of contrasts. In this way the images which an
object may have left in our memory
come to mingle with the sensation which
we are presently experiencing so that together they form a confused whole in
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which it is impossible to distinguish
what derives from the past and what is
due to immediate experience.
This vagueness reaches maximum intensity in the child, who cannot distinguish sensations from one another, who
cannot even locate them at specific
points in space. Because this confusion
is fundamental it permanently inheres in
the natural movement of thought. When
we reflect on a subject or a question,
what we notice first of all are vast blocks
of vague ideas, of representations which
are synthetic and consequently confused. Logical thought, by contrast, is
made up of specific conceptions capable
of being formulated by defmitions which
map the boundaries separating them
from related but different conceptions,
and which, by means of such a limitation, avoid the mix-ups, the interpenetrations, all the symptoms of contamination by illogicality whose consequence is
confusion. Between the point of departure anJ the point of arrival, between
spontaneous thought in the state of
nature and logical thought which is
reflective, self-disciplined and selfconscious, there is thus a great gulf fixed. How has man been able to bridge it?
Principally by means of language. It
is words that introduce distinctions into
the thread of our thinking. For the word
is a discrete entity; it has a defmite individuality and sharply-defmed limits.
In order to express our ideas by means
of words we must separate them out; we
must shatter the natural nebulousness of
our thought and resolve it into its elements. In a sense, language does
violence to thought; it denatures it and
mutilates it since it expresses in discontinuous terms what is essentially continuous. This is why it is true to say that we
never succeed in fully expressing our
thought; it's because the contents of
consciousness cannot be translated by
language except approximately, just as
the continuity of geometrical sizes can
only be approximately
expressed
through the series of numerals. Of
course, it would be quite erro~eous to
say that language must do everything,
that it is the sole agent of distinctiveness
and clairty. Nothing can absolve
consciousness from the task of grasping
a confused collection of thoughts, of
isolating it, of concentrating upon it all
the light which it can command, and of
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illuminating it in such a way as to make
plain the unperceived elements of which
it is composed. It is that tentativeness
and concentration which are the active
tools of all intellectual analysis.
However, the results of this analysis
would remain remarkably precarious,
they would very soon evaporate, and
thought would return to its original state
of confusion, if they were not cemented
by words; for words give them a consistent and individual existence :which
enables them to survive. From another
point of view, in order to "think clearly
and distinctively it is not enough to
analyse our ideas. We must additionally
bring back together the different
elements which we have dissected in
order to reconstruct the natural whole to
which they belong. This reconstruction
does not consist in assembling things
mechanically from the outside; for these
fragments of thoughts are parts of a living whole. They vibrate in unison with
one another, they call out to one
another, they are mutually sympathetic
and converge upon one another; between them there exists all kinds of relationships, relationships which may run
parallel, be those of dependency, be
oblique or otherwise. But how could we
represent to ourselves with anything approaching clarity these niceties (which
are so complex and so fleeting) if we had
not had at our disposal the artifice of
language, of verbal flexions, of grammatical agreements, of rules of construction, and even special terms to express
certain of these relations (notably
prepositions and conjunctions)?
If we owe to language the introduction into our mind of distinctness and
logical organisation, the study of
languages is obviously the best way of
accustoming the child to distinguish and
to organise his ideas logically. It is by
making him reflect on words, meanings
and grammatical forms that we can best
train him to think lucidly, that is to say
to grasp the elements and relationships
of thought. It is this which constitutes
the great service rendered by the
linguistic exercises which still play such
a large part in our classes. There is no
question but that, from this point of
view, the classical languages offer
special advantages. Precisely because
the classical peoples are far removed
from ourselves in time, their manner of
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analysing their thought was very different from our own; and it is this very
difference which renders Latin and
Greek an exceptionally
effective
stimulant for this special kind of reflection. A French word, an English word
and even, most commonly a German
word overlap exactly, at least in the
generality of cases, and this overlapping
is bound to be constantly increasing.
The result is that transposing a term in
one language into the other can be done
:asily and almost unconsciously. The
case is quite different with Latin and
Greek. Here the pupil is forced to make
a quite special effort in order to become
aware of the thought expressed by the
words he is translating from French into
Latin or vice versa. This fact alone
trains him in the making of distinctions
and the habit of clarity. Similarly and
for the same reason the pract~ce of
translating Greek and Latin from and
into French, because their grammar is
so very different from our own, forces
the child to be constantly engaged in
logical analysis; he must be perpetually
aware of relationships which exist between ideas as these are expressed
through grammatical forms.
But it is not the case that Latin and
Greek are irreplaceable. It is possible to
find valuable substitutes for these classical exercises. Whatever may have been
said about it, I do not believe that we
should place too much confidence in liv- •
ing languages; first of all, there is the
reason I have just indicated, namely the
ancestry which these languages have in
common with our own. And then there
is the reason that the use of direct
methods demotes translation and prose
· composition to secondary roles and, by
definition, virtually excludes all exercises in transposition. But what would
be possible would be deliberately to institute methodical and repeated exercises in vocabulary. Why not train the
child to a perpetual awareness of the
meaning of the words he is using? It
would be necessary somehow to get him
at each age to define the terms in his
vocabulary, to stimulate him incessantly
and by every means available to make
himself conscious of his ideas.
Moreover, these exercises would be
more beneficial for not being undertaken haphazardly; the words to which
his attention would be directed could be

grouped rationally according to their
etymological relationships or according
to the relationships of their meaning,
depending on the particular case: all the
possible combinations must be used. A
whole discipline, of which I can do no
more than sketch the principle, is
waiting to be instituted with this goal in
mind. It could prove most fruitful if it
were applied systematically
and
methodically.
Similarly, instead of the automatic
logical analysis which is required by
classical prose translations, we could
have recourse to repeated exercises in
logifal analysis in the ~trict sense, provided this did not consist in something
that was merely arid, blind and mechanical. There is nothing more instructive
than getting children to understand how
a proposition or a sentence is made up,
how the elements which comprise it tie
in with one another, how certain of them
gravitate in the orbit of the others, how
some of them command while others are
commanded. We should inculcate this
understanding in them by way of repeated exercises in which, however, repetition does not render the exercise of intelligence otiose. In short, grammatical
culture, rightly understood, ought to regain something of the place which it used to occupy in our schools, and which it
has long since lost.
These initial exercises constitute only
a first stage which we must get beyond
as quickly as possible. From the sentence and the proposition we must move
on to paragraphs. We must confront the
~ild with a piece of developed writing
and incite him to resolve it in its elements. The lessons which he is given in
history or other subjects should be conducted with the same end in view. They
should be constructed in such a way that
he can clearly see the composition. In
the first place, we would begin by showing it to him, not by means of summaries which are compacted and hence
indigestible, but by means of plans
which would show clearly how the
thought was linked together; in other
cases we would encourage the pupil to
discover this for himself. In a word, we
must take as our overriding concern
during the early years the constant
multiplication of opportunities for letting the child dissect and reconstruct his
own thinking. In this way we shall arrive
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progressively but without haste at stylistic practice proper. For stylistic training should be understood, first and foremost, not as a means of teaching children to write elegantly and eloquently,
but as a more complex exercise in
analysis and logical synthesis. If we need
to get him to deliver narratives in ·his
own language, it is not only so that he
may know how to express himself gracefully; it is above all because there is no
better way of teaching him to speak
lucidly, and this is a consequence of the
special role which language plays in intellectual life. And as the habit of lucid
thought is a prerequisite for the study of
the sciences it is clear that a training in
style is no less essential for scientific
education than for so-called 'literary'
education. This is why the study of style
- that is to say of grammar and of
language - constitutes the common
basis of all education.
When I began this work, my principal
object was to pose the problem of secondary education as a unity. We are today
in a position to see what is the source of
this unity; it is man. All education is
necessarily anthropocentric, which is
something the Humanists understood
full well. However, man is only a part of
the universe and he cannot be detached
from it. From this it followsthat an education in things human presupposes an
education in the things of nature. Since
the relationship between nature and
man is not solely one of neighbourliness
but rather of close kinship, since man
exists in nature and emerges from it, not
only do these two kinds of education
complement one another, they also interpenetrate one another, they act and
react upon one another. They exchange
good offices with one another so that the
study of nature finds in the study of
language - which is something supremely human - an essential preparation; and the study of man discovers in
the study of nature some key conceptions and the methods with which it
ought to be informed. Thus if these two
kinds of discipline can be unequally developed; if it is possible in particular cases to lay emphasis now on the one, now
on the other; if, in this regard, there is a
case for introducing a certain amount of
diversity into the academic system,
there can still be no education which is
capable of omitting either the one or the

other.
In this way we can see the sense in
which education ought to be encyclopaedic. The idea of encyclopaedic culture we have seen surviving and developing with such persistence from the
earliest origins of our academic evolution that it is impossible that it should be
a mere fantasy. It constitutes a response
to that very profound insight that the
part cannot be understood without some
conception of the whole from which it
emerges. However, the only form of encyclopaedic knowledge which is both
desirable and practicable is not that
about which Rabelais, for example, used to dream; nothing is more a waste of
time than the attempt to cram the entire
subject-matter of human knowledge into
the brains of young people. But what is
possible is to acquaint their minds with
all the diverse intellectual attitudes with
which they will need to be equipped
when one day they come to confront the
different categories of things. Under
these conditions an encyclopaedic education would not need to be either overambitious or overloaded.
Thus we come quite naturally to the
word, to the formula, which sums up
this educational ideal and which will
constitute our conclusion. Our goal
must be not to turn each one of our pu•
pils into a perfect polymath but to render, in each one of them, the faculty of
reason comprehensive. Humanism, in
its most elevated form, in its Cartesian
form with Port-Royal, the Oratory and
their imitators, set itself the task of
moulding the reason; but it was the reason of mathematicians who could only
see things in simplified and idealised
form, who reduced man to clear thinking and the world to its geometrical
forms. Still today, we must remain Cartesians in the sense that we must fashion
rationalists, that is to say men who are
concerned with clarity of thought; but
they must be rationalists of a new kind
who know that things, whether human
or physical, are irreducibly complex and
who are yet able to look unfalteringly into the face of this complexity. Our
children must continue to be trained to
think lucidly, for this is the essential attribute of our race; it is our national
quality, and the qualities of our
language and our style are only a result
of it. But we must give up mistaking
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simple conceptual combinations for reality as a whole; we must feel more vividly
the infinite richness of reality, we must
understand that we can only succeed in
thinking about it slowly, progressively
and always imperfectly. This should be
the goal of the triadic culture which is
implied by an education concerned with
the development of the whole man
through the most effective methods:
linguistic culture, scientific culture, and
historical culture, such as we have defined them.
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Review Essay:
john Wilson's
Contributionto
Moral Education
William C. Fish
ince 1965, John Wilson, now with

Sthe Institute of Educational Studies,
Oxford, has been working at developing

a scheme for moral education which is
both conceptually and empirically
sound. First under the sponsorship of
the Farmington Trust (1965-1972), then
under the Warborough Trust, in conjunction with the Oxford University
Department of Educational Studies,
Wilson and his colleagues have produced some dozen publications, six of which
have been selected for review and comment here. The accelerating interest in
moral education in this country and
Canada might be enriched by a closer
acquaintance with this substantial body
of work. It is rather different from the
more popular domestic moral education
projects in that it marries an. intricate
conceptual analysis to psychological and
sociological research in the development
of both theory and practical recommendations. In view of the fact that our
domestic projects ae often criticized for
being either conceptually weak or empirically untested, we have much to
learn from the strengths and weaknesses
of this effort.

The Books In Brief
Introduction to Moral Education

John Wilson
Norman Williams, BarrySugarman.
Baltimore:Penguin,1967. 463 pgs.
Conceptual groundwork on the need
for a new kind of moral education: one
based on reason rather than external
authority. Initial development of the
logically necessary components of the
morally educated person. Additional
sections by a psychologist, Norman
Williams, and a sociologist, Barry
Sugarman, on what those disciplines can
contribute empirically to the development of the morally educated person. A
brief treatment of the relevant methods
and curricula for schools, emphasizing
close personal contact, reasonable use of
school rules, encouraging the autonomy
of the student and cooperation. Appropriate context as important as content. A stimulating, occasionally tedious
example of some genuinely interdisciplinary research in the field.
Education in Religion and the Emotions

John Wilson
London:Heinemann,1971. 268 pgs.
An expansion and reformulation of
the thesis the earlier book, here focused
on the education of the emotions- i.e.,
becoming more reasonable in the sphere
of the emotions- and religious education as one area of that sphere. A suggestive, insightful, occasionally perplexing effort to bring emotion within the
scope of deliberate education. The tax-
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onomy of the earlier book is expanded to
account for the role of unconscious emotions. Discussion of the content, context
and methods of schooling directed
towards these ends. An excellent essay
in the appendix on the concept of insight
and its use in understanding
"unconscious'' emotions.

The Assessment cifMorality
John Wilson
Slough, NFER, 1973. 115 pgs.
Primarily intended for psychologists
and social scientists who want to do
research in the area of moral education,
though useful to others who want a more
detailed understanding
of the components, here expanded
from the
original four to sixteen! Lengthy discussion of assessment problems in the
cognitive and affective domains.
A Teacher's Guide to Moral Education
john Wilson
London: Chapman, 1973. 141 pgs.
This book is divided into two parts.
The first is a simplified treatment of the
conceptual analyses and conclusions of
the earlier works, dealing with common
misunderstandings
of the nature of
morality, the concept of moral education
as "being reasonable" in moral matters,
the relation of religion to moral education, the principles and problems of
assessment, and the contribution of
psychological and sociological evidence.
The second part spells out the practical
implications of the theory and suggests
several methods for teaching. Helpful
list of other readings, projects, and
sources in the appendix. Probably the
best book to stan with. May only be obtainable in England.
Practical Methods of Moral Education
john Wilson
London: Heinemann, 1972. 152 pgs.
A more extensive treatment of the
four methods of moral education described in the previ9us book. The "direct
method'' aims at teaching the methodology of making moral judgments and
directly cultivating the components. A
second method develops competence in
the use of language, including the rules
for rational discussion. The third
method focuses on the use of contracts
and rules in decision procedures. The
founh method involves structuring the

school community to enhance development of the components. As a whole, the
book aims at giving teachers criteria for
selecting what is relevant from the
wealth of more practical clas~room
materials already available.

Moral Education and the Curriculum
John Wilson
Oxford: Pergamon, 1969. 3 7 pgs.
A brief handbook with sample chans
to help teachers and researchers assess
curricular practices according to the
aims of moral education and the education of the emotions. By itself, this book
does not give a sufficient account of the
conceptual analysis which lies behind
the framework. It should be used only in
conjunction with one of the other books
above.

The moral education industry in this
country has gained so much momentum
in the plethora of recent projects' that
professional attention is largely focused
on the development of curricular and
assessment materials. The question of
the legitimacy of the enterprise is, for
the moment, faintly heard. As the projects multiply and Moral Education
Associations are formed, spinning off
more journals, tests and curricula, we
may expect the increased visibility to
provoke a response from those fearful of
the illegitimate imposition of moral
beliefs in the public schools. Carl
Bereiter has recently challenged the propriety of moral education in the schools
on First Amendment grounds. He
doubts that current moral education
projectsValues Clarification and
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Kohlberg's Cognitive Developmental
Scheme, in particularcan in fact
"develop moral persons without imposing on them any sort of moral beliefs,' ' 2
as they claim. Public School parents and
teachers do not yet seem to share
Bereiter's disquiet, as indicated by a
Gallup Poll' in which 84 % of the
parents interviewed favored instruction
in morals and moral behavior in the
public schools. A poll by Phi Delta Kappa• of a sample of its membership found
88 % in favor of an active program of
moral education in the schools. The appearance of a mandate in these figures is
deceptive when one considers that those
who respond affirmatively to these polls
probably have in mind a program which
would ( 1) control unruly behavior and
(2) enforce their own particular moral
ideas. The possibility that moral education might promote moral ideas different from or even in criticism of their
own ideas probably doesn't occur to
many, but it is not only possible, it is inevitable. When more parents and
teachers come to experience this threat
to their own moral ideas as programs are
actually put in place, Bereiter's disquiet
may crescendo. Is it possible to conceive
a form of moral education which is
neither partisan, imposing particular
moral beliefs, nor vacuous, merely
descriptive of moral ideas? John Wilson
thinks there is.
Wilson would be sympathetic with
Bereiter's disquiet, but disagree with his
conclusion, namely, to maintain the
moral neutrality of the public school by
delimiting discussion of morality as
much as possible. Not only does the
delimiting alternative fail to teach
anything which might be called moral
education, it seems to be grounded in a
naive view of neutrality. In order to
answer the question, can moral education be non-partisan or neutral, we have
first to consider. what various meanings
"neutral" might have.
''Neutral'' might mean ( 1) ''fair to all
relevant points of view'' or (2) ''devoid
of any point of view. '' It is difficult to
imagine saying anything worth saying

about moral education (or anything else)
which is devoid of any point of view.
Mere descriptions without criticism or
commitment would be neither educational nor moral. Beingfair to all points
of view might be impossible, or at least
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deceptive, if the points of view one is
trying to be fair to make exclusive claims
to truth. Is a third form of neutrality
possible, namely, that of being ''reasonable" about all such claims- weighing
their claims against the available
evidence, using logic and clear language
to explicate and compare their claims,
and then arriving at one's own conclusions about what makes the most sense?
It is this third form of neutrality which
Wilson urges upon us since it allows us
to do moral education in a way which is
genuinely educational yet non-partisan.
Taking his lead from the work ofR.S.
Peters, Wilson begins with the premise
that the concept of education logically
entails the notion of becoming more
reasonable. Moral education, then, is a
name for becoming more reasonable
about moral matters. Since education
intrinsically entails the aim of becoming
more reasonable, this view of moral
education is not an imposition of partisan ideas; it is simply a matter of what
it means to be educated. Since there is a
normative element in being able to
distinguish what is reasonable from
what is unreasonable, this view of moral
education is not vacuously descriptive; it
demarcates what is successful from what
is a failure in moral behavior according
to the criteria of rationality.
What "being reasonable'' means,
then, becomes the key issue, the fulcrum
on the conceptual analysis on which the
rest of the scheme depends. It is dealt
with in all the books, most thoroughly in
the Introductionto Moral Educationbut
most clearly and simply in A Teaeher's
Guideto Moral Education.It includes the
familiar sort of considerations, such as
using the laws of logic, using words correctly and for their correct meaning, and
attending to the relevant facts in a situation. More controversial are the "particular principles" which Wilson claims
to derive from the general one of ''being
reasonable in moral matters." They are
cast as qualities or attributes of the
morally educated person, aJ1 of which
are necessary, and if all obtain, are sufficient. In my own summary form, they
are:

( 1) having a reason for the action (which
means by autonomous, not acting
according to an external authority, and
acting intentionally, not reacting).
(2) having certain kinds of relevant

knowledge (of emotions- in oneself and
in others- and of other relevant empirical matters, eg., health effects).
(3) having certain emotions (the ''right''
feeling to accompany the act, eg.,
gratitude rather than resentment in
receiving an honor).
(4) having certain skills (of "reading"
emotions,
of utilizing
relevant
knowledge, of using the laws of logic, of
communication and proper use of
language, and of being able to make a
decision and act on it).
(5) having certain attitudes (Wilson's
term) or beliefs (my term), especially
regarding the equality of persons (''giving the same weight to the wants and
needs of other people as to one's
own' ' 5), such attitudes or beliefs being
consistent with the reasons for acting.
The veracity of these components is
dependent upon a fair exposure to the
details of Wilson's argumentation for
the reasonableness of each quality. Tom
out of context they are denuded of the
examples and counter-examples by
which Wilson tries to establish their
credibility. Moreover a critical appreciation of any one component is
dependent on a grasp of the set as a
whole into which the component fits.
Having entered this caveat against what
follows, it may be well to examine
critically some of the claims Wilson
makes for these components, if only to
reveal the limits of my understanding:
(1) Are they actually non-partisan?
(2) Are they clear and coherent?
(3) Do they lead to clear-cut selections
of teaching methods, curricula and
means of assessment?
The crux of Wilson's claim of nonpartisanship lies in the fifth component
above, the assertion that a belief in the
equality of persons is entailed by a
reasonable analysis of what it•means to
be a person. In defense of the nonpartisan claim, it is true that the assertion of the equality of persons is not the
''property'' of any one religion or moral
point of view. One need not be a Christian, Marxist or Existentialist to hold it.
On the other hand, it is not as selfevident as Wilson claims that equality is
intrinsic to the ordinary conceptual
meaning of "person": " ... people are
equals because there are good reasons

for thinking so. It is a matter of commonsense or simple logic. Anyone who
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is willing to think about it for a bit
should see the point.'' 6 Would that it
were so! Wilson explains away the obvious discrepancy between his claim that
equality is commonsense and the abundant evidence that people do not so commonly treat each other as equals on the
grounds that ''we are not very good at
remembering
the point when we come to
deal with other people. " 7 Such a view
trivializes or distorts the formal (eg.,
Social Darwinism)
and informal
(Egoism) ways in which thoughtful people intentionally assert their inequality.
Wilson is right in the sense that the concept of person entails recognizing that
other persons have interests and needs,
but he claims too much in insisting that
this recognition requires me to give
equal weight or worth to those interests
and needs. On empirical grounds it is
probably not the case that all persons
value the satisfaction of their interests
and needs equally. Even if we did, it
would not follow logically that we must
assign to our equally strongly held interests equal worth. More is needed
from Wilson on this point since it is the
crux on which his claim of non-partisanship stands or falls. I happen to agree
with Wilson that we should view persons
as equals but I take that to be a shaping
of my view of persons by the moral ideal
of equality, not a conceptual truth. In
my view, Wilson's scheme is not nonpartisan but it is still viable for use in
American schools on the grounds that
we have an historical and constitutional
mandate to bepartisan toward the moral
ideal of equality of persons.

Some Difficulties
Are the components logically clear
and coherent? As formulated in all the

books, but especially in the Introduction,
it is possible to see clear connections between the components , i.e., how they all
apply to what it means to be a reason-

able person in moral matters, but this
does not establish their coherence. They
are clearly of different sorts of things: attitudes, beliefs, skills, feelings, bodies of
knowledge, procedures and capacities.
Wilson's effort to include all the relevant
factors involved in human behavior is
laudable, but the effect is to obfuscate
the logical identity of specific components. The components tend to be
open-ended and often over-lap. GIG,
the label for relevant empirical knowledge, also stands for communication
skills; as such it seems devoid of boundary since it isn't clear which facts
should be rules out of consideration.
EMP, the label for awareness of the
emotions, is also described as a skill; yet
it too would seem to include a kind of
knowledge. KRA T, the label for bringing all the components together in decision and act, includes skills, feeling and
procedures. It is possible to make one's
own summary of the components, as I
have above, but the lack of conceptual
clarity in the texts present further problems for educational practice and
assessment and weakens the coherence
of the whole.
In all of the books Wilson asserts the
need for clear aims in moral education
so that teachers may have logical criteria
for selecting their methods, curricula
and means of assessment. Yet the
vagueness of the components' logical
status makes it difficult to take clear
aim. What is one to aim at? Wilson
asserts that .the components cannot be
hypostatized into "psychological entities,"
"forces"
or "forms
of
thought"; they are logical constructs.
Even logical constructs, however,
should be amenable ·to clear description
in terms of empirical objectives or they
cannot serve well as aims. Moreover,
how the components relate needs much
more attention for understanding the actual process of decision-making. Finally,
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it isn't clear from simply listing the components whether each component
deserved equal educational attention.
To be sure, the answer depends on the
particular attributes particular students
have or lack, but it would seem that,
conceptually, PHIL (the attitude or
belief in the equality of persons) is the
most important in making the education
moral.
As Wilson freely admits, not much
has yet been done in the way of empirical assessment of these components.
Although his co-researchers at the
Farmington Trust have produced useful
books 8 in which the component typology
is used, deliberate attempts to educate
for these aims were not assessed as such.
The difficulties of assessment are well
explicated throughout The Assessmentof
Morality, especially in regard to holding
all of the components constant save the
one being a.ssessed. If the components
are labels for overlapping skills, attitudes and bodies of knowledge, control
may be an insurmountable problem.
This is a major weakness in the scheme
to date.
The criticism in the review is by no
means a disparagement of the considerable work that has been done. The
attention to the whole set of characteristics which are distinctive about being
morally educated, the focus on understanding the role of the emotions in being moral, the delineation of potentially
assessable sub-skills, the continual marrying of conceptual and empirical concerns - all seem as right as they are difficult and unfmished. One may find
much to quarrel with in Wilson's particular conclusions to date, but his attempt to formulate a conceptual model
which meets both philosophical and empirical criteria of validity is one to be
emulated, not discarded. The moral
education industry must someday meet
eiqually rigorous criteria in this country.

FOOTNOTES
(1)Someof the projects described In the Mora/ Education Forum over the
last two years are: the "Values Education Project" of SouthernOntarta.the
"Magic Circle" or "Human Development Program" In California, the
"Ethlcal Issues In Decision-Making" ProJectof Scarsdale-Mamaroneck,the
"C8megle-MellonCivic Education Project" of Pittsburg, the "Dlsaemlna•
tlon of Materials Center'' of Brookline, the "Association for Values Educatlon and Research"of British Columbia, the "Minnesota Moral Research
Projects"·and "Values Education Program" of Guidance Associates, the
"Sierra Project" of the University of California, tha "Moral Education CurrlculumProJect"of the National Endowmentof the Humanities.We can add
the HarvardCurriculum ProJect,the Ontario Institute for Studies In Educa•
tlon, the Institute for the Advancementof Philosophy for Children at Montclalr State College - all of which are developingmaterials and conducting
workshopsdlrectly or Indirectly related to moral education.

(2) "Morality and Moral Education" The Hastings Center Repon, Volume 8,

Number2, April, 1978.pp 20-25.
(3) as reported In the New York Times, April 18, 1978.

(4)Kevin Ryanand Michael G. Thompson,"Moral Education's Muddle Man•
data: Comments on a Survey of Phi Delta Kappans," Phi Delta Ksppan,
June, 1975.
(5)A TeachersGulde to Moral Education, p. 28
(8) Ibid., p. 30
(7) Ibid.
(8) Barry Sugarman,The School and Moral Development,New York: Barnes
& Noble, 1973. Reviewed In the Teach9f8 College Record, Volume 75,
Number 4, May, 1974.
Norman and Shella Wllllams, The Moral Developmentof Children, Mac•
Millan, 1970.
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ExcerptsFrom A Philosophy
Class With Six Graders
Jonathan E. Adler

JonatlumE. Adler is AssistantProfessorof Philosophy
al BrooklynCollege.

The fol/owing dialogue took place In
Berea, Kentucky with a gifted six grade
class. I was In Berea for a two-week train·
Ing program on teaching children
philosophy. During the second week a
local class was brought In and half of
Chapter 5 In Suki was read to them. The
rest of the hour was taken up with discussion of the mater/al In the text. Despite
the fact that that they had had no
previous acquaintance with the program,
nor did they even have copies of Suki to
look over, they actively participated In the
discussion. It was felt worthwhile to pursue the discussion further, and to have
one of us, In training, do the class. I
volunteered.
I was extremely anxious about what
would happen with the class the next day.
Not only had I never taught a six grade
class, but I have barely had eye contact
with an·ypersons under college age for a
long time. My main Incl/nation was to try

to pursue a philosophical Idea or set of
Ideas that arose In a part of the story. The
main Idea was that of the persistence of
an object through changes. For example,
the person remains bas/cal/y the same
despite growing taller, etc. A number of
phl/osophlcal problems are connected to
this Idea. My presentation for the class
was greatly enhanced by Fred Oscanyan's
gently pointing out to me that one plan I
had for the class was more appropriate to
a college seminar In metaphysics. After
our talk late that night, I went back and
somewhat revised my plan. ,.Thenext momIng at 10 the class came In. I had an hour
with them.
[On the board was drawn a pizza and a
short poem they already knew. I asked the
students to compare a shift of plus slices
with a shift of /Ines of the poem In order
to focus attention on a part of the
preceding day's discussion and to start
them thinking about Issues of Identity.}
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If I took this pizza pie,
right? ... that's how we sliced them in New York, I
know you slice them different here. . . if I took this
slice and put it here and took
this slice and put it here,
OK? ... would the pizza be
the same or different?

Jonathan - ...

-It depends on wh~t kind of
pizza you have. [laughter
and others joining in.]
Jonathan -And
so it may depend.
Anybody else?
Child
-It matters if the two pizzas
are the same size.
Jonathan -Let's say they are, let's say I
cut it absolutely perfect, so
they both fit in.
Child
-They could be half and
half ...
Child
-It would be the same, you
could just trade the pizzas.
Jonathan -It would be the same .. .
Child
-Well
some pizzas ... you
know, like one square has
mushrooms on it and on has
pepperoni.
Jonathan -All right, so if they had different material on it, it
would effect it ... if I switched them around, put one
here and one here and this
one here.
Child
-It would change the order of
them.
Jonathan -It might change the order,
Child

but it might not change the
content.
Children -no, no ...
Jonathan -No? Why not?
-Well, because you weren't
Child
taking anything away from
them, all you were doing was
changing, is taking one piece
and putting it here and taking one piece and putting it
here. You aren't changing
anything m it except the
order ...
Jonathan -OK, so just changing them
around...
.OK,
what
about ... let's take a look at a
poem.... we had a poem
yesterday, I guess, the one
on Suki. What was that
poem
about?
Um ...
Rosalee?
- ''Gardeners,
roses think,
never die."
on the board)
Jonathan -[writing
Now ... what ifl would have
just taken this and put it up
here and said, ''Gardeners
never
die,
roses
think'' ... would I have
changed the poem, would it
have been the same? Will I
be changing it the same way
I changed the pizza?
Children -No ... No ... No ...
Jonathan -What do you think ... am I
changing it more or am I
changing it less?
-You
're changing it more Child
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you're rewriting the poem,
basically.
see... so you think that
Jonathan -I
somehow altering these
changed ... I mean altering
these things ... [the slices of
pizza] even if it does change
it, it wouldn't change it as
much as say- moving these
[the lines of the poem]
around.
-yeah.
Child
Jonathan - ... let's ... what I'd like to
do then is ... on this kind of
question is talk a lot more
about it . . . since you did
have the books I thought
that maybe I could read over
a part of the chapter that
Mr. Lipman read yesterday
and then we could talk about
it. [unintelligible muffled
break]... Now you recall
that ... what's going on here
is that they're taking a trip.
Do you remem~r where
they're taking a trip to?
Child
-[muffled) ... to Suki's grandmother's and her father's
farm.
Child
- ... to her grandparent's.
Jonathan -OK,
who's going on this
trip? [to a child) do you want
to talk?
Child
-Ann.
Jonathan -And who else?
Children -and Suki.
Child
-And a man called her father.
Jonathan -By who?
Child
-By Suki.
Several voices chime in here, describing
who went on the trip.
Jonathan -OK,
so we have Suki and,
who else?
Children -Suki's father.
Jonathan -Suki's father.
Children -Suki's little brother.
Jonathan -Suki's little brother and his
name is...
Child
-Kio.
Jonathan -Kio. Good. And they're all
going to Suki's ...
Child
- ... grandfather's.
Jonathan -Grandfather's.
Um, OK, so
they get to the farm and their
grandfather
shows them
around, and I'd like to pick
up at the end of that part, at
the end of the part where the
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grandfather is showing them
around the farm.
[This information is organized and written on the board.
Flnally, they wound their way back to the
house. In the llvlng room, the great stone
fireplace had been lit, and Suki, Ann and
Kio stood warming themselves In front of It.
Slow, slowly rotating as If on Individual
spits. They were hungry, and the food, when
It came, was so delicious they almost
couldn't recognize It. The bread, the milk,
the eggs, the butter, the vegetables - every
taste was fresh, distinct and Intense.
"It's as If the food we usually eat Is Just a
pale copy of this food," Suki remarked.
..Comparedto the milk we get at home, this
Is real mllkl And these eggs taste llke real
eggsought to taste - llke real eggs!"
Her grandfather permitted himself a
sllght smlle, although It threatened for a
moment to fracture his face. Then he lit his
pipe and relaxed... Well, son, what do you
think?" he asked, addressing Kio, "would
you like to be a farmer some day?"
Klo's mouth was full of blueberry muffin,
and his .., don't know," came out sounding
like ..ow-no."

U. reads the rest of the chapter to the
class, pages 57-60.]
Jonathan -[A
good part of the
children's responses were
written on the board.] ...
Can you give some examples
from this story about things
changing and what they said
about change, different
views about change and
things remaining the same ...
can you give some examples?
Girl
-Wood turning to stone.
Jonathan -OK,
right, again... my
chalk, I think, turns into
dust. OK, so what kinds of
things tum into stone?
Child
-Petrified.
Jonathan -You mean the wood?
Child
-Yeah.
Jonathan -Wood turns to stone.
- ... they were saying how the
Child
plants would tum into the,
like the mush-junk and then
it would tum back to plants.
Jonathan - ... can anyone have an example like that - where one
thing turns into another and
then turns back the same
way?
-Well, like ... the cow eats the
Child
grass then the cow uses the
bathroom and then you got,
and then that . . . it deterior-

Jonathan

Child

Jonathan

Child
Jonathan

Jonathan

Girl

Jonathan

Child

Child
Jonathan

Child
Children
Jonathan

Child

Jonathan

ates and makes the ground
rich and it grows back into
corn.
-Right, OK, so the vegetation, cow, vegetation.
Another example might be
the river runs into the sea,
evaporation into the clouds,
back into the sea again.
-Suki's
grandmother said
that nature's job is to
change.
-OK. Let's repeat what she
said that nature's job is to
change. And did she contrast
that with anything? anything
she wanted ...
-That man's job is to change
the world into poetry.
-That man's job is to change
the world into poetry. So
what does that tell you about
what she thinks about
poetry, as opposed to, say,
nature? nature's job. Does it
play something different,
poetry than nature's job?
What do you want to say ...
-Are there othere examples in
the story, of change in the
story, other things that
change in the story?
-Well, Suki's grandmother
said that she couldn't stand
the snapshots any more
because she didn't really
believe that things were
[unintelligible] her.
-OK, so the photographs no
longer were her. Do you
know what she said was her?
-Poems. The poems. The
poems were her... Yeah.
[answering child.]
-The ham changed into ashes
when it burned.
-Right, the ham... do you
remember what caused the
barn to tum into ashes?
-Fire.
-Fire.
-Fire. OK, let's write that
over here. [writes on board].
Was anything else said about
that?
-Suki's grandfather said you
can't trust wood, and that
you could only trust stone ...
-Do you know why he said

that?
-Because of his barn that
burned down.
Jonathan -OK, so somehow stone is
more permanent, is that
right? It would last longer ...
Do you think stone would
last forever?
-No.
Child
Children -No. [quiet jabbering]
-She also .... He also said that
Child
like the vegetation
he
wouldn't change his barn
back into a barn, it's just
ashes and he '11leave it there
and if he ever builds another
one ...
-What'll
he do?
Jonathan
-[continuing]
... he'll build it
Child
out of stone.
Jonathan -So it'll last longer?
-Yeah.
Child
Jonathan -Even that one lasted longer.
-How he said it just went
Child
down to ashes, first it was a
barn, but it won't change
back into a barn.
Jonathan -Right, so in that way it's not
like the vegetation any
more.
-He also said that . . . said
Child
he'd build anything out of
stone that it will last forever.
Jonathan - Yes, and I just asked you do
you think it will last forever?
Children -No ... No.
Jonathan -Not, that too [unintelligible]
-Well it will last longer than
Child
wood.
Jonathan -It would last a lot longer
than wood, right? That's
why he'd do it, but it
wouldn't last forever. Do
you remember anything ...
any other remarks - interesting about change that
anybody says or anybody
mentions in the story?
-Well, she was talking about
Child
the shell and the coral and
stuff.
Jonathan -Oh, good... right... coral or
the seashell and what are
they made from?
Child
-Stone?
Jonathan -What is it?
Child
-[again] Stone?
Child

•••

Jonathan

-Now I have something to ask
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Children
Child

Jonathan

Child

Jonathan
Child

Jonathan
Children
Jonathan

Children
Jonathan

Children
Child

Jonathan

Child
Jonathan
Children
Jonathan

Children
Child

you about, what about
cars... do you think cars
change?
-[various "Yes" es]
-Well, when you first get a
car you may have it for
twelve years or longer, and
then after you take it to the
junk yard and they compact
it, they melt it down and
make a new car from it.
-Oh, so would you say the car
changed or not?
-Yeah.
-It's a new car.
-It's a new car.
-Out of the same materials.
-Well, at least ... Unhun ...
-Almost the same materials.
OK, what about...
you
know... the story... The
Prince and the Pauper?
- Yeah.
- You know they altered their
clothing and their positions,
do you think that fundamentally changed them?
-Yeah.
-Because the prince changed
and found out what the people who were in bad shape
really had to go through,
what was really happening
outside of the castle because
usually inside the castle the
king and the queen and all
the royal family were usually
characters and when they
did go out they were seen
and when they did go out
they were glad that they
were not in bad shape.
[unintelligible]
-OK, So you are saying when
they change positions and
changed clothing, they learn
so much more about things
they haven't seen before, is
that right?
-1
think
that's
right.
[unintelligible]
-They probably had a good
time.
-[Laughing] Yeah.
-Well, do you think or would
you say that afterwards they
were different people?

-Yeah ... Yea.
-Because they know how each

other live now and they
know what they have to go
through and so they might
change it because they found
out what the other people expect from them.

•••

-When, (I think it is) the
grandmother...
says,
"Suki's grandmother spoke
with a flash of fire in her
eyes, what will be will be,
don't confuse our job with
nature's. Nature's job is
change forever turning one
thing into another never
knowing or asking why. But,
our job is turning the world
into poetry." What do you
think? Do you think she
would agree with this about
poetry or poems or do you
think
she would
say
something else?
Child
-I think she was kind of thinking, you know ... when you
got poetry... um, ... poetry
stays the same ... you know,
the same words but you may
have different feeling about
it, but the words stay the
same ... but people's feelings
about it may change, ... but
the world will be . . . you
know... will change, the
poetry on paper is like a
record and you know ...
won't be recorded in nature.
Jonathan -1 see. I just want to say
something
about that,
yeah ... let's hear from someone different.
Child
-Poems depend on what the
poets write, usually the poet
writes his feelings and if you
read two or three different
poems on the same subject
they may have a lot of different contents the others do
because they write according
to how they feel.
Jonathan -And once they record those
feelings into the poem that
. . . they felt last week... and
those feelings may change.
Child
-They
change because it
depends on who reading
them and how they see a
poem in their mind ... how it
Jonathan
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relates to them.

•••

Jonathan

Children
Jonathan

Children
Jonathan

Child
Jonath6n

Child

Children
Jonathan

Child

Jonathan

Child

Jonathan
Children

Jonathan

Child

Jonathan
Child
Jonathan

-Let me ask you this ... let's
say, you have a river, do
rivers change... do rivers
alternate course?
-Yes, Yeah... sometimes.
-OK, so rivers change. OK,
now let's say I have this
river, OK? and I add a
bucket of water to it that I
take from some spring and I
add it to the big river ... and
I add this bucket of water.
Do you think I changed the
river?
-NO.
-Do you think that same
bucket of water, though if I
did something else with it, it
could change something else
much more than the river?
-Yes.
-Like what? can you give me
an example?
-OK. If you maybe like...
had on a beach ... a sand castle and took the water and
poured it ...
-It dissolves... it disappears
fast.
-Right.
-If you had ... like just a little
plastic swimming pool .. .
you could change it by .... if
you took a bucket of water .. .
you could fill it up.
-OK. It didn't do much to the
river, but now you have a
place to swim in.
-Like if you had a bucket ...
and you threw it up... the
sides, you could wash the
bank away.
-mmmhmmm ... right ...
-[another] Like if you had an
empty box or something ... if
you put the bucket of water
in it, it would change it.
Because then it would be a
whole box.
-... if you were thirsty, it
would certainly make a difference to you.
-You could change a seed into
a plant and make it grow ...
-Right.
-That's a good one.
-So you take a bucket of

Thinking, The Journal of Philosophy for Children, Volume 1, Number 3 & 4 Combined

Page 111

Child

Jonathan
Child

water and use it to water the
plant.
- You could take a balloon
and let it go, and that'll
change it.
-1 don't understand.
-Well, look ... you take the
balloon and just let it go and
the air. . . all the air .. :...will go
out of it. That would be a
change.

•••

Jonathan
Child

Jonathan
Child
Child

Jonathan

Child

Jonathan
Child

Jonathan

Child
Children
Child
Jonathan

-[ answering child] Yeah ... ?
- You could change a car by
taking a bucket of water and
throwing it on there and it
would wash it.
-It would clean it, right?
-It would clean it, from a dirty car to a clean car.
-[another]
If you took a
bucket of water... and you
took it to fill it up from the
lake or something, that
would be one less bucket of
water in the lake. Because
that would take water out of
it.
-Right. Now can you think of
a circumstance where it would
make a big difference in the
lake?
- That wouldn't make a very
big difference ... especially if
it were a small bucket ...
-A small bucket and a big
lake ... All right ...
- You could change a much,
much smaller river with the
same bucket of water, if
there was a stream. . . a little
tiny river, like about that ...
that big... if you put a
bucket of water on it, it
would probably flood it ...
-Right. Let's take another example: Let's say I take one
brick away from a house.
Does that change it much?
-The house might fall down.
-[gleeful, laughter] Yea, he
he he.
-Well, if there was an earthquake in the house ...
-Let's add to that. If I took
the brick from the top. If I
took it from the bottom, the
whole thing might cave in.
Let's say I took the brick

from the top.
Child
Jonathan

-Well, you know... you can
cut it without
getting
through the finer nail and
then you got a scratch in
your finger nail, and you've
got just a very slight change
in appearance. But if you cut
down through, your fingers
bleed.
-But if I just clipped a little bit
very carefully.. . and I ...
what if .... if I looked at
Rembrandt's painting of his
son, Titus, and I said, you
know.. I don't like that
finger nail. And I just sort of
erased it. Do you think it
would make a large difference to that painting?
-You'll get put in jail.
-It could make quite a bit of
difference. Everybody would
get quite mad at you.
They'd throw you out of the
museum and make you draw
in the fingernail again.
-Why do you think they'd do
that? Why do you think it
would make such a big difference?
-Well, he painted his son and
he painted it the way he
thought it was, and if you
take things away from his
son, I don't think it would be
the same as it was.
-But painting his son made
him express his feelings
about how much he liked
him... and taking the finger
nail away... that may have
been why he painted the
finger nail that way ...
maybe that's the way he liked it or something. ;M:aybe
that showed his special feeling.
-So what would I be doing if I
took it away?
- You'd be taking his feeling
away.
-One thing you'd be breaking
the law... the second thing,
Rembrandt's
son would
have this big white blank at
the end of his finger!

Child

- You'd have a hole.

-Can you think of a case
,where taking just one brick
away would make an enormous difference?
Child
-If you had a house on a cliff
or it was on stilts, it would
need bricks for support.
Child
-If it was winter you'd get
quite cold.
Child
-It depends on what type of
brick. If it was a great big
brick, it would leave an
enormous hole.
Jonathan -Right, so I haven't told you
what kind of brick I have.
[break in flow of conversation]
Child
-If you have a real pretty
house, where every brick
shows... and you take one
from the top and it shows .. .
and you look like a real .. .
you look like someone who
couldn't afford to spend
enough time to put the brick
in.
[laughter]
Jonathan -Right,
so, It might make a
difference in the beauty of it,
the design of it ... is that what
you're saying?
Child
-If you took the brick out of
the house... [unintelligible]
Jonathan -Do you think, let me ask
you... do you think that's
important about painting?
For example, Let's say ...
remember the painting,
there was a painting you
talked about yesterday, a
couple of paintings, so you
remember some of them?
Child
-St. Francis?
Jonathan -St.
Francis.
Do you
remember any others?
[children all join in naming another
painting]
Children· -Titus.
Jonathan -Ok, if I cut my finger nail,
would that make much difference to me? Would that
change me?
Child
-Not if you ...
Child
-Depends on how big you cut
it.
[laughter]
Jonathan -Depends
on how big you
cut ... he he.

Jonathan

Child
Child

Jonathan

Child

Child

Jonathan

Child
Child

(laughter]
Child
Child

-It wouldn't look so pretty.
-I'm going to go on about
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what he said. If you had a
big white thing around his
finger ... then it won't show
up at all and it would almost
rum the picture. Because
you look at this really pretty
picture .. and there's just a
blob ...
Jonathan -So the little difference in the
picture makes a large difference?
Child
- Yeah. I was just going to add
on to that, one little difference in anything completely changes it.
Jonathan -In anything?
Child
-Well, almost.
[laughter]
Jonathan -Well, do you think just clipping your hair or something
like that, does that change
you enormously?
Child
-.Yeah, it would look horribly
different.
Child
-Depends on where you do
it ... I mean ... if you cut that
he'd look a whole bit better.
[lots of laughter]
Jonathan -Well, do you all agree with
that? Do you think changing, cutting your hair ... and
changing the hair style .. on
let's say, Titus... do you
think that's also [unintelligible]
Child
-Well back then they might
have hair down to their
shoulders but now if you put
an afro permanent on them,
it wouldn't look good.
Jonathan -It wouldn't look so good. It
wouldn't
look quite as
realistic, either.
Child
-No.
Jonathan -I see. Yeah ...
Child
-If you gave him a ... butch ...
that's what it's called when
you cut their hair really
short... that would make
him look much, much different.
Jonathan -Would it have as much effect
if I did it to Tom?
{laughter]
Jonathan -Well, maybe we'll test that
out later.
Child
-If you were like to shave
your beard ...
Jonathan -1 was thinking of doing that,

Child

I'm glad you mentioned
that ...
-Shave
your beard and
mustache and get contact
lenses ...

[laughter]
-Do you think it would be a
change for the better or the
worse?
Child
-I don't know.
Jonathan -I was thinking of doing that.
I was actually thinking of
coming
this
morning
without my beard and all
that ... and asking you if you
thought I was the same or
different than I was yesterday. What would you have
said?
Child
-Different.
Children -Different.
Child
-The same.
Child
- You might look completely
different.
Jonathan -1 might look completely different ...
Child
-I might not know who you
are.
Jonathan -Right,
so you haven't met
me before, you just saw me
with this beard ...
Child
-[unintelligible]
Jonathan -That's
right, somebody
might be imitating me. But
would you say ... You'd say
I'm different if I would have
shaved off my beard, right?
But would you say I'm the
same person?
Child
-1 think you'd be the same
person... it's just that you'd
look different.
Jonathan -I'd be the same person, but
I'd look different.
Child
-You'd have the same feelings and you'd think the
same way... it's just that
you'd look a little different.
Jonathan -Now what you said before .. .
let's go back a little bit .. .
what you said before about
the prince and the pauper ...
a number of you said the
prince and the pauper
change when they change
clothes, right?
Child
-Yes.
Jonathan -And now the suggestion is
that if I shaved off my beard,
Jonathan
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I'd look different but I'd still
be basically the same person.
Now going back to the
prince and the pauper.. did
you mean ... did you want to
say that they appear differently or they sort of
change in certain ways and
they' re basically the same
person, but you want to say
they're no longer the same
person also. Yes?
-They
changed their posiChild
tions. They change their
positions but they don't really change their personality.
They look identical but
they ... but they didn't really
change what kind of person
they are.
Jonathan -1 see, so their personalities
still are... still you think,
basically the same ... Yes?
-Well like ... umm ... you're
Child
going to be ... like if you
shaved your beard and
everything ... you'd still be
doing the same thing, but
like if th~ prince and the
pauper
change
places,
they'd be doing different
things. And so it would ...
really change you because
just you'd be doing what you
regularly do. But they would
be trying something different that might change
them ...
Jonathan -Now, you'd said something
before...
that they had
changed roles.
-Yeah, that would probably
Child
change the whole basic person because of the one kept
inside of the castle, away
from the supposedly real
[unintelligible] he'd probably think everything was
OK and ... when he got outside of the castle, it was totally different.
Jonathan -OK, yeah, go ahead ...
-Well, you ,compared to the
Child
prince and the pauper ... is a
little bit different. You 're
not going to live a different
life style like the pauper,
maybe. He might come back
and he might ... I don't think
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Jonathan

Child

Child
Jonathan

Child

Jonathan

Child

Jonathan

Child
Child

Child

Jonathan

he would change his opinions very much, but the
prince would see what it'd be
like and he might feel sorry
for them and try to change
things. And if you just shave
off your beard... you' re not
going to live a different life
style like the prince and the
pauper.
-Can you imagine some circumstances in which if I did
shave off my beard I would
live a different life style and
it would really change for
me? Any circumstances in
which shaving off my beard
would make all the difference in the world?
-Well, when you shave off
your beard... unless you
want to grow it back ... you '11
have to shave every day,
which would change.
- That would change your life
style.
-That would certainly change
my life style. Yes?
-In winter you wouldn't get
frost on it. If you shaved it
off.
-That's right. Now I do get
frost.
-Imagine getting frost just on
your chin, when you don't
have a beard.
-Well,
It also keeps me
warmer,
though...
the
beard.
- Yea, it keeps you warmer.
-Well, what basically I said
was you as a person
wouldn't change, your life
style or how you may live
would. But, you'd still have
the same personality.
-Well, what if you were making TV shows about ... some
TV show and you had to
have a beard to be in the TV
show... because the guy
you 're playing
had a
beard... so if you shaved
your beard you wouldn't be
able to make that TV show
any more.
-Right.
So then it would
make an enormous difference in shaving my beard.

So if I shaved it today, it
wouldn't make too much of
a difference, I'd be the same
basic person. If I was going
to be on TV and the only
way I was going to get on
TV was with my beard ...
and I was going to shave it
off... well, then, I would lose
my big job, and that would
be very significant. Yea ...
Child
-Moving on to Garis, If there
are two people, one is going
to be on a TV show, and he
has a moustache. The other
guy knows him. Now, he
shaves off his moustache, actually he rips it off because
he doesn't have time right
before he gets on the TV
show. Then his friend watches it and he doesn't
recognize
him and he
doesn't know what character
he's going to be ... he just
doesn't recognize him at
all. .. he doesn't know him at
all. .. he doesn't know him at
all until he comes back and
he tells him ''I'm your
friend."
Jonathan -Oh,
so if you didn't
recognize me it still wouldn't
effect the [unintelligible] but
if I shaved my beard and
nobody recognized me, then
I'd be ...
Child
-Then you'd be in trouble.
Jonathan -Then
I'd be... well... I
might not be ... I might have
been in trouble beforehand
and now I'd be getting out of
trouble.
[general laughter]
-Maybe your boss wouldn't
Child
recognize you... he'd think
that you'd
kidnapped
yourself.
-Yeah ... you might get in
Child
trouble for not being at
work, and you also might get
in trouble for being at work
when you're not supposed to
be at work.
-For
kidnapping myself
Jonathan
Child
-He might have thought that
you'd kidnapped yourself
because you 're wearing your
clothes...

Jonathan

-I

see. Then I could ask for
ransom.

[laughter]
-What if nobody would pay,
what would I do then?
Child
-If nobody knew you ... you'd
probably have to go around
with a sign saying your
name and saying, "Please
believe me, I'm really me."
Jonathan -Let me ... OK, go ahead ...

Jonathan

***
Jonathan

-Do you think that has to do
with anything... Suki... I
think it's Suki's grandmother who said:

"It's funny, though, I have a whole photo
album full of snapshots but I can't stand to
look at them, and when I see them I shake
my head and say, 'That's not me." But I stlll
go over the poetry, I read It and reread It. It's
Just as fresh as when I first wrote It. And I
say to myself, 'If I'm anywhere, It's here In
these words'."
Jonathan
Children

Child

Child

-Do you think that's related
to what we said before?
-It could be.
-Well, when she looked at
herself in the picture she
might have been the editor
or her appearance might
change. But when she writes
poetry, that's the way she
feels and her appearance
wouldn't change.
-When
she looked at the
photograph she knew that
she was different but when
she read the poem, she felt
like she was still good and
she still had a feeling.

***
Child

Child

-Well, you know she might
look at the pictures and think
of the things she used to do
like run... or swim or
something like that ... that
she can't do anymore. And
just looking at them might
make her feel bad. But when
she reads her poetry, she
might feel the same way inside and might give her a
good feeling.
-1 think what it said ... in the
story ... was that she basically kept the same feeling ...
but when she looked at the
pictures she had changed
physically but her poems
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Child

Jonathan
Child
Jonathan

Child
Jonathan
Child

Jonathan

Children
Jonathan

Child

were how she felt ... and in
the story it said that she felt
the same, but she didn't look
the same ... like the pictures.
- The pictures are of her
physical self and the poems
are of her mental self. So the
poems are just of her feelings
and the pictures are just of
her looks. Like she might
have been ...
-Do you think one is more
her than the other?
-What?
-I asked you, which one is
really or which one is more
her?
-The mental one.
-OK. The mental one.
-Like she might have been
really beautiful when she
was in high school... but
now she might be old and fat
and have glasses and a hearing aid.
-Do you all agree, do you
think the mental self is more
important than the physical
one?
-Yes.
-Ok. Well .. look ... I have to
stop, but let me just ask you,
why don't you think about
this: What if Lois Lane and
Superman... OK? .. . and
you took Superman's mental
self and put it in Lois Lane's
body, and took Lois Lane's
mental self and put it in
Superman's body... do you
think ... well ... you can think
about the question - who
would be who .. OK?
-It would be rather strange.

•••

You know, I really thank
you very much ... I really
have to stop because there's
something else here to do.
Ron's going to talk to you
and he's got something with
him, and I think we want
some drinks, we'll get some
drinks?
Child
-Well, we better.
Jonathan -Well ... get something ... so
thanks a lot.

Jonathan

-

[clapping]

The above transcript
has been shortened, to
save space. Some of the
dialogue was hard to
discern in the tapes, and
there is also the problem that during the
class I was using the
blackboard: the
diagrams and other
material on it are not
recorded.
I learned a great deal from the hour. I
made at least three errors, the most
serious being that I often reinterpreted
the children's answers in terms of my
own antecedent distinctions. This is
particularly unfortunate since at a
number of points, it was clear to me
that the children were not making the
mistakes for which those distinctions
are helpful correctives. Second, and
connected with the first error, is that I
occasionally introduced technical
terms which were unnecessary and unfamiliar. Both these errors occur in the
opening part (e.g., "content"). Third,
and I expect, least serious, is that
often I let the discussion run too freely,
which led to digressions. Since the
main point is to get the children to take
an active part in, and to enjoy, philosophical inquiry, I take it as better to err
on the side of risk.
I am probably reading in too much,
but what struck me during the class
was the range of subtle and crucial
philosophical distinctions the children
came up with. Thus, in a number of
cases such as the initial one with the
poem, they find the question - of
whether It is different after something
is done to it (e.g., pizza) - to rest on
too vague or ambiguous use of "different" or "change". When I re-order
the pizza it is somewhat changed, but
it is somehow basically the same. This
seems to me, together with later
discussion, to show the rudiments of
the distinction between qualitative and
quantitiative identity. More importantiy, it does not take my way of phrasing
the question for granted. Typically, one
easily leads a class to paradox by getting them both to say that X changes
and is the same after a certain process
occurs. But the children avoid those initial paradoxes by their responses, and
examples, which require me to say,
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"Same for what purpose?" or, in
Geach's analysis, "The same what?"
Analogously, a change such as the
removal of water can effect a large
change or not depending upon the object affected. Moreover, even for the
same object (e.g., me ), the very same
change (e.g., taking off my glasses or
shaving my beard) may have hardly any
effect or a profound effect (e.g., if I was
trying to avoid detection.) This insistence on revitalizing certain questions to specific contexts seems to me
important both as a challenge to the
setting up by an authority of too
simplistic a situation and, in a number
of cases, a major step in philosophical
progress. Notice also, a theme that I
did not pursue, the way they took it
that virtually any alteration In a work of
art or poetry would effect an enormous
change in the work.
Especially surprising
was the
children's response to the Prince and
the Pauper question. I am used to the
response that they are the "same"
after the switch. But in their new roles
they see a whole new life and meet
people that they would never have seen
before. This will radically alter the kind
of persons they are. This sense of personal Identity, as most determined by
one's personality, continued in a
number of other examples. I threw a
wrench into the works toward the end
when I asked them to imagine Superman and Lois Lane switching brains.
Who would then be whom? Isn't Superman's body very important for his personal identity? The children went wild
with this example and kept discussing
it past the hour, despite my reminders
that time was up.
My aim was obviously not to settle
the problems connected with Identity,
but to see how this sixth grade class
would take to it, and to leave them with
questions that they enjoy exploring further. On the first aim I was overwhelmingly impressed. Most of the class participated. (Therefore, when I say that
the children held a certain view, I usually mean that this was the dominant
view, but there was disagreement).
Moreover the ease with which they
generated examples, counterexamples, and abstract explanatory accounts
(e.g., the appeal to personality, rather
than appearance to explain personal
Identity), tempts one to posit the idea
of them as natural philosophers.
Which naturally leads to the question
of what happens to them when they
grow up?
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